THE Bannu jailbreak in April 2012 saw 400 inmates, including well-known militant commander Adnan Rasheed, released by militants. The Dera Ismail Khan (D.I. Khan) jailbreak some days ago saw almost 250 inmates, including hardened militant commanders, freed by the attackers.

Bannu in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is adjacent to North Waziristan while D.I. Khan is adjacent to South Waziristan. D.I. Khan is some 100 km from South Waziristan and a two-and-a-half-hour drive from North Waziristan. Similarities and differences between the two jailbreaks are relevant to the understanding of the new strategy of jailbreaks adopted by Pakistani militants.

The Bannu prison had almost 900 inmates while D.I. Khan had some 500 inmates. The Bannu jailbreak was carried out an hour after midnight while the latest attack was executed an hour before midnight. In both militant operations, some 100 to 150 fighters took part.

In the case of the Bannu jailbreak, prior intelligence to the local administration, prison authorities and provincial government was not available while the opposite was true in D.I. Khan’s case. A day before the D.I. Khan jailbreak, a scuffle between the prison authorities and the prisoners had been reported while in the case of Bannu this had not happened.

In both cases, it had taken security reinforcements a long time to reach the premises and help prison security counter the attacks. Questions have been raised about the coordination and performance of security agencies in the case of Bannu then and almost the same questions have been raised in the present instance.

In neither case was insider support discounted. A report had been submitted by the home department in the case of Bannu and a judicial inquiry ordered. The same is the case regarding D.I. Khan — a report has been submitted and an inquiry, the nature of which is unknown, has been ordered by the KP chief minister.

The militant network has shown it has the upper hand in some aspects of strategy as evident in both cases. First, the militant network has been able to prove beyond doubt that it has achieved the fast execution of tactical operations. It also appears that it now has the ability to gather credible intelligence. In addition to this, it has also refined operational planning of why, where, how and when to attack.

In the case of D.I. Khan, the attack was three-pronged. The first party of militants carried out successive blasts which locals claim might not be less than 35 in number. This led to panic among the security personnel present inside the prison. Another squad that had grenades and heavy weapons broke through the main gate of the prison under the cover of heavy firing. A third party was deployed to ambush any reinforcements that arrived to help the prison authorities. This kind of sophisticated tactical operation seems to have been planned meticulously on the basis of refined intelligence gathering and superb networking capacity.

The second aspect where the militant network seems to have honed its skills is the use of modern technology. In the case of D.I. Khan, night vision equipment was used besides modern weapons and vehicles. They must have also used Google Maps to obtain precision and speed.

The third aspect can be seen in the militants’ skilful media management.

Hence, on the one hand the militant network has been able to push back security and law enforcement agencies and on the other the network has been able to enhance fear by carrying out attacks aimed at large-scale destruction as happened in the case of Parachinar recently. The militant network has been able to put across its message effectively, creating confusion among ordinary people, the political leadership and security agencies.

Against this backdrop, when one observes the specific strategy of jailbreaks aimed at freeing hardened militants, one finds several lacunae in the planning of the security and law enforcement agencies. First, there is the virtual absence of networking among the prison authorities, law enforcement agencies and security agencies at the local level.

This lack of networking and coordination has now been exposed in almost all successful attacks carried out by militants across the country for the last several years. In the case of D.I. Khan, intelligence reports had already been given to the relevant authorities but no coordination meeting was held among the local commands of security agencies, law enforcement agencies and prison authorities.

Second, security and law enforcement agencies seem to either lack modern technology or the skill to use modern technology. In the former it is the lack of resources and in the latter it is the lack of training and capacity build-up.

Third, as the militant network seems to have launched both an ideological and terrorist military onslaught on the state of Pakistan from all sides, a high level of preparedness on the part of security and law enforcement agencies is of utmost importance. This can only happen when the political leadership, security establishment and law enforcement agencies are on the same page. Besides, there is a need to improve the physical counterterrorism infrastructure and have theoretical clarity. It seems to be a collective failure for which collective responsibility must be taken.

In the case D.I. Khan, the prison authorities complain about the lack of resources and security while intelligence agencies claim that they had passed on timely information. The KP government holds the intelligence agencies responsible. The public, on the other hand, seems to be in the dark and hence confused as to whether it is the complicity, lack of will or lack of capacity of the state of Pakistan to defend it.

The writer is a political analyst based in Peshawar.

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