System of judicial appointments: Is the judiciary independent? – 3
By Salahuddin Ahmed
The system of effecting judicial appointments by the political executive prevailing in the US is neither consistent with the scheme of our constitution nor the ethos of our society and has also been subjected to scathing criticism in the US itself.
Louis Fisher in his book Constitutional Dialogue (quoted in Al-Jihad case) writes; “Appointments to the supreme court are highly political appointments by the nation’s highest political figure to a highly political body”. Despite the security of life-tenure in a developed democratic political culture and subject to few tensions, the myth of judicial independence stood exploded in the highly controversial decision of the US Supreme Court in Bush vs Al Gore (503 US 98) where all judges are stated to have voted along partisan lines.
Harvard University law professor, Alan Dushowitz, wrote:
“The decision may be ranked as the single most corrupt decision in Supreme Court history, because it is the only one I know of where the majority justices decided as they did because of the personal identity and political affiliations of the litigants. This was cheating, and a violation of the judicial oath.”
In an article published in 2006, Adam Cohen observed in a crisp comment: “The Supreme Court’s highly partisan resolution of the 2000 election was a severe blow to American democracy and to the court’s own standing.”
Criticising the judgment, which reversed the direction of the Florida Supreme Court for a manual recount, Bill Clinton wrote in his autobiography: “If Gore had been ahead in the count and Bush behind, there is no doubt in my mind that the same judges would have voted 9-0 to count the vote and I would have supported the decision.”
Judges and scholars feel embarrassed in citing the judgment as a precedent and writers enjoy referring to anecdotes from George Orwell’s novel portraying government workers busy in destroying politically inconvenient records in its context.
Instead of being charmed by the system of judicial appointments prevailing in the United States, the PPP team of constitutional experts drafting the constitutional package ought to have realised that the recent example of judicial performance from the highest court of the so-called developed world has not yet gone down memory lane of our people. We would much rather stick to our own constitutional system instead of importing one; the myth of whose efficacy in this day and age stands fully exposed.
It needs to be realised and understood that in any democratic society the judiciary is viewed as the custodian of the rights and liberties of the weak and the oppressed. The mighty and the powerful may never need the assistance of the judiciary. Indeed the majority has a right to rule but those not being in a majority and not even hoping to become part of it have a right to live with dignity and enjoy certain rights and freedom guaranteed to them by the constitution and the law. For the protection of these rights, their only recourse is the judicial system.
This is the essence of the rule of law. In a constitutional system where the judiciary is entrusted with the power to undertake judicial review, strike down legislation repugnant to the constitution and keep a vigilant check on the manner of exercise of executive power, it does not claim to exercise any legislative or executive power.
Nevertheless, it is required to see that the executive not merely acts within limits of the power conferred upon it by the legislature but also uses such powers honestly and fairly as a trustee of the people whose mandate it has received. For the smooth working of any democratic system it is of cardinal importance that the judiciary at all levels must be kept separate from the executive.
Indeed, the only possible objection that could be taken to the present system of appointments could be that in accordance with the strict parameters laid down in the Al-Jihad case, the requirement of objectivity could possibly be overlooked by according primacy with a practically binding effect to the personal opinion of the Chief Justice of Pakistan. After all the chief justice, though expected to be a person possessing a high level of professional competence and integrity, is a fallible human being and in the process of forming personal opinions does not sit judicially.
However this problem could have been addressed by taking it up seriously as was done by the Supreme Court of India, in Special Reference No.1 of 1998 (AIR 1999 SC 1) where the court unanimously held that the opinion of the chief justice is not personal, but institutional and therefore, before communicating his views, a chief justice must also obtain the views of his other senior colleagues and convey them to the executive.
Indeed some, though not decisive, role has been acknowledged for the executive in judicial appointments by the constitution and in the Al-Jihad case. Participation of public representatives from the opposition and the bar in accordance with the Charter of Democracy could also be helpful in assessing the reputation of a candidate. To avoid delay it would be appropriate that all persons involved in the selection process sit together and select the best person after mutual deliberations. This participating process, as detailed below, will be more transparent, objective, and credible and consensus- oriented.
(i) A vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice of Pakistan should be filled by appointment of the senior most judge of the Supreme Court and that of a high court by the senior most judge of that court.
(ii) A judge of a high court should be selected by a committee none of whose member should be eligible for consideration for selection. This committee shall comprise the following:
(a) The Chief Justice of Pakistan and the senior most judge of the supreme court belonging to that province; (b) The chief justice of the high court and two senior most judges of the high court; (c) The federal law minister or any other nominee of the prime minister; (d) The provincial law minister or any other nominee of the chief minister; (e) The leader of the opposition in the provincial assembly or his nominee; (f) A nominee of the provincial bar council chosen through a resolution of the council for a fixed duration
It is proposed that the chief justice of the high court may circulate the names of all persons (preferably two against each vacancy) that he might like to be considered for appointment to all committee members along with their particulars. At least three committee members may also propose any other person for consideration within one week of receipt of such proposals and convey their particulars to remaining committee members. The Chief Justice of Pakistan may then convene a meeting of the committee after two weeks, which may, after due deliberations, select suitable persons. No body should be appointed unless at least two third of the committee members have voted in his favour.
Appointment to the Supreme Court may be made from amongst the serving chief justices and senior judges of the high courts to ensure fair representation of all provinces. A number of seats may be allocated to each province and in respect of others selection may be made on an all Pakistan level on seniority-cum-fitness basis. The three senior-most candidates may be considered against each vacancy. Perhaps the collective decision of the senior judges of the Supreme Court could be most useful in determining the suitability of a person to be elevated. The participation of public and bar representatives could also be considered.
Similarly a six member committee for the selection of Supreme Court judges could be constituted comprising the following:
(i) The Chief Justice of Pakistan and two senior-most judges of the Supreme Court; (ii) The federal law minister or another nominee of the prime minister; (iii) The leader of the opposition in the National Assembly or his nominee; (iv) A nominee of the Pakistan Bar Council.
To ensure representation of all provinces a minimum number of vacancies in the Supreme Court should be allocated to each province. Once they are filled, the remaining appointments should be made on an all Pakistan basis. The senior-most eligible judge of the high court approved by four members should be appointed.
The proposed provisions relating to the appointment of judges in the constitutional package appears to destroy the very concept of the independence of the judiciary which has been recognised as an essential feature of the Constitution of Pakistan for all intent and purposes. The last word in judicial appointment is sought to be given to the executive while the concept of consultation with judicial functionaries has been reduced to a farce.
The concept of meaningful consultation which was even recognised by the council representing the Federal Government in the Al-Jihad case is said to be replaced by some provision which ensures induction of the executive nominees of the executive in the superior courts. The proposed article 193-A stipulates a four member commission comprising two chief justices and two ministers to recommend candidates for appointment as judges of the high court.
To be continued


