Army spooks in the FO

PAKISTAN has been in the midst of a serious political crisis since early this year. The signs were all over, not only within the body politic of the country but in the region as well. While no one could have predicted that the regime would trigger the current crisis itself, even its supporters recognised that after almost eight years of authoritarian rule, the regime had lost steam.

Current developments are, of course, a matter of serious concern to the citizens, but more so to its foreign policy establishment, which is deeply agitated by the rigor mortis that has set in, in the conduct of foreign policy. This is evident from the “freeze” in the normalisation process with India, the reduced levels of foreign investment and the lack of initiative on other fronts.This would have been true of any country, but more so with regard to Pakistan where the armed forces and its intelligence agencies have historically played a more influential role, both in the formulation and execution of foreign policy, than the foreign ministry.

In democracies, the formulation of foreign policy is the preserve of the political leadership, which in consultation with the elected representatives, determines the nation’s goals both at home and abroad. Thereafter, the foreign offices are given the task of preparing the policy options. Once decisions on these have been taken, the professionals are left to ensure their execution. Of course, other stakeholders, such as defence, commerce, the intelligence agencies, are all involved in the decision-making process.

In the case of Pakistan, the situation has, however, been different. Its legitimate security concerns, arising from the hostility of neighbours on both its flanks, irredentist claims by ethnic groups and its desire to play a role far beyond its capacities, have combined to enhance the leadership’s interest in and focus on the conduct of its foreign policy.

It has been viewed by leaders as “glamorous” as it provides them the opportunity to “act” on the world stage, rather than confine themselves to the drudgery of dealing with routine subjects. This explains some truly weird proposals emanating from here, such as the idea of establishing an association of democracies or spreading enlightened moderation throughout the world.

As early as the mid-1950s, the army and its civilian allies had settled on a strategy that remains at the core of Pakistan’s policies. Since India was seen as its enemy and Kashmir as the symbol of its hostility, New Delhi became an obsession. In such a situation, it was inevitable that the intelligence agencies would assume a position of influence and seek soon thereafter to occupy centre-seat in both the formulation and execution of foreign policy.

The 1971 war with India and the resultant break-up of Pakistan was a turning point in the Inter Services Intelligence’s history. Mr Bhutto decided to strengthen the organisation, while expanding its mandate to include spying on domestic political opponents. Later, our unprecedented involvement in Afghanistan led to the agency’s historic transformation, making it the regime’s most influential player in determining foreign policy. This may account for the fact that on many important issues, but certainly on Pakistan’s relations with India and Afghanistan, the role of the Foreign Office has become increasingly marginalised.

Not only that, the current regime has gone further and introduced the most novel idea of requiring clearance by the intelligence agency for the posting and promotion of our diplomats. This has meant that the defence attaches in the embassies are now writing confidential reports on their ambassadors.

All this has adversely impacted on the nation and its institutions, especially the Foreign Office, while bestowing on the armed forces the mantle of being the state’s defender — both its physical and ideological frontiers — a claim articulated forcefully by Gen Ziaul Haq, who used it most skilfully to perpetuate his 11-year dictatorship.

He also claimed that only military personnel possessed the requisite training, organisation and motivation to promote the “national interest” and therefore they needed to occupy centre-stage on all issues. The military has also been sceptical of the competence and skill of professional diplomats. When occasionally impressed by their expertise, it has questioned their “dedication”.

The desire to be “guardian angels” of the nation’s strategic interests also led the military to demand an institutional role for itself on all aspects of national affairs. Zia was so convinced of this that he insisted on the incorporation in the Constitution of a National Security Council, but had to give it up when opposed by the 1985 parliament.

When Benazir Bhutto was dismissed by President Farooq Leghari, the latter had to concede to the military’s demand for the creation of a National Defence and Security Council to “advise government on everything from national security to economic issues.” Much to the military’s disappointment, this body was scrapped when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif came to power in the 1997 elections. Soon thereafter, the army chief, General Karamat, advocated the creation of a National Security Council backed by a “team of credible advisers and think-tank of experts” to “institutionalise decision-making.”

It was the public airing of this idea that triggered a crisis between the prime minister and the army chief, but to the credit of General Karamat, he decided to respect civilian supremacy and preferred to tender his resignation rather than challenge the democratically elected government.

Not surprisingly, the armed forces have been amongst the most forceful advocates of closer ties with the US. Even as army chief, General Ayub had no hesitation in offering the military’s services to the US in the latter’s foreign adventures, much to the surprise and chagrin of the political leadership. The army was also willing to adjust its priorities to suit US global concerns.

According to Hussain Haqqani, “Pakistan’s relations with the US have been part of the Pakistan military’s tripod that emphasised Islam as a national unifier, rivalry with India as the principal objective of the state’s foreign policy and an alliance with the US as a means to defray the cost of Pakistan’s massive expenditures.”

It is also a fact that Washington has had no hesitation in bypassing the civilian leadership whenever it needed Pakistan’s help and assistance. Major foreign powers are never happy when stymied by the professionals and prefer to approach the political leadership directly to get decisions on the spur of the moment, rather than await analysis and examination by the ministry.

That one telephone call by former US Secretary of State Colin Powell to General Musharraf (in the wake of 9/11) resulted in a total reversal of the country’s policy is well known. The January 2004 Islamabad Declaration on relations between Pakistan and India which contained unilateral assurances by us on the issue of terrorism, is another example. But there are many more such instances where state interests were sacrificed at the altar of individual vanity, reinforced by ignorance.

But nothing could be as demeaning as what we are currently witnessing. Foreign powers are not confining themselves to merely monitoring domestic developments; nor are their representatives in Islamabad seeking Foreign Office’s briefings. Instead, they are involved in actual negotiations with the country’s leadership and its intelligence chief about a future political dispensation.

Even more regrettable is that some of our politicians are desperately seeking the blessings of foreign powers in their bid to capture power. In all this, the people of Pakistan and their national institutions are mere spectators, while the professionals in the Foreign Office wring their hands in growing frustration as the country’s image takes a beating and its influence gets further eroded.

The writer is a former ambassador.

Judiciary and democracy

THE recent decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan to let the exiled leaders return to Pakistan is yet another manifestation of the newly acquired independence of the judiciary.

The decision is neither based on judicial activism nor is it the result of any political influence as is being suggested by some government functionaries to discredit the new role of the Supreme Court and to mitigate the effect of its judgment.

To assuage these apparently mala fide intentions and efforts, one can rationalise the court decision in the context of not only the fundamental right of movement granted by the Constitution but also the larger role of the judiciary to preserve democracy.

The Supreme Court decision will give new impetus to the democratisation process in Pakistan. Although not politically motivated, the decision will have far-reaching political repercussions and will pave the way for the return of the exiled leaders.

Any effort to alter the democratic structure of our government is, therefore, a negation of the basic principles enshrined in the Constitution. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, as guardian of the Constitution, is obligated to preserve and protect democracy in the country. Under the present political scenario prevailing in the country, the court has an important role to play in not only the revival of democracy but also the protection of the process of democratisation.

The Chief Justice of Pakistan, Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, in his foreword in the Supreme Court Report (Golden Jubilee Edition, 2006) has stated: “The story of developed societies and industrialised nations is one of democratic dispensation, adherence to the Constitution and supremacy of law. It is therefore a vital role of the state organs, including the judiciary to lead the country towards establishing a society based on respect for law and adherence to rule of law. Every single judgment of the court, at any level of judicial hierarchy, is a demonstration and manifestation of this principle.”

He has, however, further observed: “During the course of its existence, the court passed through vicissitudes of time and witnessed many social, economic and political upheavals. En route, it faced ups and downs. It delivered some landmark judgments, which received profound acclaim but certain other judgments, equally invoked intense criticism. Every time there was political upheaval or constitutional breakdown, the court was called upon to decide the vires of the executive action. A constant theme that permeates its successive judgments, is indicative of the court’s endeavour to bring the country back to democratic rule and constitutional dispensation.”

The Chief Justice’s remarks are reflective of the apex court’s democratic aspirations and the trials and tribulations it has been facing in order to preserve democracy in the country. The tragedy is that while thus far a lot of lip service has been paid to democratic principles, all that has been done in the name of democracy is the validation of one martial law after another.

The irony of each situation has been that the Supreme Court has in an effort to preserve itself always sided with and relied on military usurpers to provide sustainable democracy to the country.

One need not search in the annals of the sad judicial history of Pakistan in this context and we have only to look at a number of recent judgments given by the apex court from 2000-2005 to see the illusory paragon of democracy that it has helped the army to build in the country. The paucity of space allows us to review only one such judgment here.

In his judgment in Syed Zafar Ali Shah’s case in 2000 relating to the several petitions challenging the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) and Proclamation of Emergency, Chief Justice (rtd) Irshad Hasan Khan used the pretext of democratic instability to validate intervention by the armed forces. He even sought to justify the judges’ oath under the PCO “so as to secure the enforcement of law, extend help to the law-enforcement agencies for maintenance of public order and with a view to restoring democratic institutions, achieving their stability and guaranteeing constitutional rights to the people of Pakistan.”

He went so far as to suggest that “a situation had arisen under which the democratic institutions were not functioning in accordance with the provisions of the Constitutions, inasmuch as the Senate and the National and Provincial Assemblies were closely associated with the former prime minister and there was no real democracy because the country was, by and large, under one-man rule.” In contrast, the one-man military rule could not have been any better and has now, as many times before, proven to be disastrous for the country.

In the same case, Justice Irshad further declared that the “court can take judicial notice of the fact that the people of Pakistan have generally welcomed the army takeover due to their avowed intention to initiate the process of across the board and transparent accountability against those, alleged of corruption in every walk of life, of abuse of national wealth and of not taking appropriate measures for stabilising the economy and democratic institutions.”

Interestingly enough, all the attributes justifying military intervention are now present in the political dispensation today and the situation needs reversal — particularly because of the efforts by General Musharraf to make a deal for self-preservation with those whom he had promised to hold accountable for alleged corruption. This public policy issue merits attention by the Supreme Court.

It is time that the Supreme Court took judicial notice of the current political situation to review its earlier decisions rendered by Chief Justices (R) Irshad Hasan Khan, Sh Riaz Ahmed, and Nazim Hussain Siddiqui in light of the changed circumstances, and order restoration of genuine democracy in the country.

After all, while reviewing his judgment in 2001, Justice Irshad had himself reaffirmed “by way of emphasis that the validation and legitimacy accorded to the present government is conditional, interlinked and intertwined with the holding of general elections to the National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies and the Senate of Pakistan … leading to restoration of the democratic institutions.”

It is time to go beyond the sham democracy introduced by the bogus 2002 elections and restore “real” democracy through free, fair, and transparent elections in the country in which all politicians, including the exiled leaders, are allowed to participate without the spectre of the army looming in the background. The Supreme Court is not only committed by its judicial pronouncements to oversee the restoration of real democracy now but is also constitutionally bound to ensure the preservation of the democratic system in the country in future as well.

The writer, a former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, is an international lawyer based in Islamabad.

Email: thassan@ijurist.org

Lebanon cries victory, but is it too soon?

THE victory of the Lebanese army at the Nahr el-Bared refugee camp, the killing of up to 100 Al Qaeda-type insurgents at the cost of 163 Lebanese soldiers and 42 civilians, is being greeted in the country with “trumpetings” and “hootings” worthy of the country’s greatest poet, Khalil Gibran.

For three days now, the newspapers have been devoting their front pages to photographs of Lebanese troops astride their ageing US-made personnel

carriers, giving “V” signs, firing in the air and succumbing to the traditional warriors’ reward of rice and rose-water.

Chaker Absi, leader of Fatah al-Islam, who vowed to fight to the death for “Palestine”, of course, lies in a Tripoli mortuary, identified by wife and daughter.

But Gibran, whose Garden of the Prophet was published in 1934, warned that we should “pity the nation that ... boasts not except among its ruins ... whose art is the art of patching and mimicking ...” And, after 106 days of fighting, the ruins of Nahr el-Bared are a sea of

Dresden-like walls and collapsed slums, of booby-traps and unexploded bombs.

The Lebanese government has promised to rebuild the whole fandango.

The Palestinians are the brothers of the Lebanese, they say, and what other Arab government would be so generous after the carnage of the past four months? But everyone is asking where the next battle will begin.

The Lebanese army have lost, since April of this year, just five men fewer than the total 163 British dead in Iraq since the invasion of 2003; it is an impressive, dramatic, solemn toll of dead and will only emphasise the army’s unique role in the political life of this sorely broken country.

With the parliamentary majority and its largely Shia Muslim opposition still unable to agree on a presidential candidate, the nation still faces the prospect of the emergence of two governments and two potential presidents, one of whom, ex-General Michel Aoun, was the messianic “prime minister” of

Lebanon last time the country had two civil war administrations.

General Michel Sulieman, the leader of the Lebanese army, comes out of it all with a much enhanced reputation; he has friends in Damascus, friends in Washington, friends even in Lebanon and may yet be the latest “saviour” to protect a statelet created so blithely by the French mandate authorities after the First World War.

But Ghassan Tueni, the doyen of Lebanese editors whose son was murdered last year, by the Syrians, his supporters remain convinced, warned in an epoch-making editorial two weeks ago that Lebanon should not be ruled by generals. He is right, of course; but Middle East nations have a habit of turning to their army commanders for salvation.

Military regimes also tend to be supported by Washington, which was among the first to offer weapons, old and for the most part obsolete, to the Lebanese army in its latest battle.

The Lebanese prime minister, Fouad Siniora, has praised his army and claimed its victory at Nahr el-Bared was “the country’s biggest victory against terrorism.”

Many Lebanese, however, believe the most recent act of terrorism was Israel’s 34-day bombardment of Lebanon last year that cost well over 1,000 civilian lives and followed the capture of two Israeli soldiers on the border by Hezbollah and the subsequent killing of seven others on 12 July.

And the same country which supplied the Israelis with weapons to destroy so much of Lebanon then, the United States, has been providing weapons for the Lebanese army to attack Fatah el-Islam.

The latter’s survivors warned a week ago that some of their number had escaped from Nahr el-Bared and there were “black days” ahead for Siniora’s government. For the moment, Syria and her friends in Lebanon who want to destroy the Siniora cabinet have been heaping praise on the Lebanese army. But we shall see in the near future if those “black days” turn out to be real.

––The Independent, London