Muslim states & democracy

A LARGE number of countries in the world like being called democracies on the basis of holding periodic elections in the presence of international observers and on the laws that they enact through their functional cabinets or parliaments. Many also claim to be governed by the rule of law, stating that they are guided by their constitutions in keeping their social contract and taking important public decisions.

Many resources are committed by the US in developing democracy promotion strategies. However, the experience of EU accession agreements with the new applicants setting up clear targets for membership suggests that conditionality may be more effective in promoting democracy than mere incentives. There are also periodic reports which “name and shame” countries on the basis of democratic yardsticks such as political rights and civil liberties, human rights violations, corruption and on meeting international goals.What is, however, needed now is investment in resources and tools for building the architecture of democracy in countries which are democracies only in name. This is a gigantic task. The design of democracy requires that in order to be effective, several of its components should be working efficiently and in accordance with international treaties, non-binding declarations and political commitments of national leaders.

These components consist of a modern constitution; separation of powers with proper checks and balances; an independent judiciary; electoral and political processes that deliver representative and responsible government; instruments of accountability, public scrutiny and transparency; the contribution made by women in politics and conflict-resolution; the comfort level of minorities and other marginal groups in the political system; protection of human rights and freedom of assembly, belief and expression; and devolution of powers.

The weakening of any of these important components of democracy can endanger the very foundations of democracy and it would take years to restore trust and millions of dollars to rebuild institutions. Also, when elected governments become complacent and self-serving, they become corrupt and devoid of imagination to reform.

Experience suggests that the design and capacity for democratic institutions cannot be imported. The local population must be consulted fully in any reforms agenda and must own the changes before constitutions can be written or improved in a country. Afghanistan is a permanent example of why things have never gone right with this country. For most part of their history, the Afghan people remained strangers to the policies of the government in Kabul which were framed with outside consultation without involving the people in the discussions on the nature and composition of their governance.

It is, therefore, unfair to assume that Hamas, having won the elections in Palestine would behave like its counterpart rightwing political party in Israel or that a monarchy like Swaziland which has welcomed democracy and adopted its first indigenous constitution limiting the powers of the king, could now be compared to a constitutional monarchy in Europe which has gone through a long democratic transition from monarchy to liberal democracy for almost a century.

Should these suspect regimes be given the benefit of doubt and room for engagement, or should they be thrown out and replaced by their western educated counterparts who have been in exile abroad, and who may be very articulate and good-intentioned, but who may not have popular support in their home countries to pursue long-term reforms?

This brings us to the point of where Muslim countries stand in regard to the western democratic model. While the former group of countries may still exhibit signs of authoritarianism, countries in the latter category are in the final stages of liberal democracy where the focus is entirely on the freedom of the individual.

A further stage in the evolution of democracy is secular democracy where the emphasis is on the separation of state from religion in all aspects of social and political issues, such as the constitution, administration, legislation, policymaking and culture.

Only two countries would find trouble with this definition; namely Pakistan and Israel because both were founded in the name of religion. Over the last 60 odd years there have been robust debates in both these countries on separating religion from politics.

The traditionalists in these countries take the view that this is tantamount to challenging their very reason for existence. Others, who are also in a majority, take a more general view and regard their independence as a result of historical forces which is no longer relevant in a modern world. The emerging social contract in both these countries today favours separation of state from religion.

Secular democracies have been very popular in pluralistic and multi-ethnic societies such as India and South Africa where unity is achieved by treating all citizens equally and keeping religion out of public discourse. In secular societies, the tyranny of the majority is balanced by the rights of the minorities protected by law and efficient justice. In this type of democracy, justice plays a central role. It guarantees a stable and just society despite divisions created by religious, philosophic and moral doctrines.

Despite its open view, secular democracy is not liberal democracy which is the next step in democracy’s higher evolution. In liberal democracies, top priority is given to individual liberty over all other human endeavours such as equality, social justice, democracy, stability and order.

Except for western democracies, many emerging democracies are not aware of what liberalism means to their societies. They have not yet faced issues such as legal protection for same-sex marriages, right to euthanasia, etc. In fact, this horizon is further expanding with political scientists talking about the state-plus vision of global democracy.

The question that is often asked is how the promotion and building of democracy can be successful in the Muslim world which has been slow to implement reforms. Many traditional Muslim countries which are now experimenting with democracy find it hard to feed the western theories of democracy to their traditional populations beyond deliberative democracy. This is because secular democracy still raises doubts in the minds of many Muslims as to its implications for their ideology and family traditions.

Irrespective of the clear definition of secularism, which is not to be confused with communism, these countries suspect that it is a way of bringing a godless culture into their lives through the backdoor.

It is also inconceivable that if some Muslim countries indeed embrace secularism as their political philosophy, such as Turkey, they would find it easy to move to liberal democracy in the next stage of their democratic evolution. What is, therefore, required is a new marker on the horizontal line of democracy’s evolution for Muslim states and its recognition by the international community as an important stage in their transition.Pakistan has called this intermediate stage “enlightened moderation”. Some others call it “decent democracy’.

Malaysia, for instance, would argue that in the Muslim world, the aim should be to replace illiberal democracies or authoritarian regimes not with secular or liberal democracies but with decent democracies where human rights, democratic and institutional reforms and constitutions correspond to the core values of the local population and sit well with the social makeup of their respective communities.

The model of decent democracy also sets aside endless debates about whether Islam is compatible with democracy or is democracy compatible with Islam. Instead of highlighting the definition of sovereignty in Islam, the linkage between political Islam and religious Islam or the limits placed on man as the creation of God, decent democracy lays emphasis on those positive aspects where there is no difference of opinion between the West and Islam.

These common values highlight developing democratic institutions and processes; good and honest governance; effective social and economic development; respect for all faiths, cultures and human rights; legal, administrative, political and structural reforms; development of free media and independent civil society; participation of women in politics, both in numbers and the quality of their input; and an active engagement with the external actors in the western world who are perceived not as enemies but as partners.

In addition to that, some way should be found to gainfully utilise the experience of very senior and experienced leaders in the Muslim world whose continuation as kings or heads of state or government may no longer be fashionable or popular in their respective countries, but who remain a valuable source of political advice, guidance and inspiration for the younger leadership.

Regrettably, apart from a few selective efforts, no global attempt has been made to tap this important resource and encourage more such leaders who do not see an active political future for themselves in their countries to retire early and play a regional and global role as mediators, special envoys and guardian angels of peace and democracy worldwide.

Perhaps the United Nations can take the first step in setting up a global institution which keeps former presidents and prime ministers occupied in lecture tours and resource-building efforts to make it worthwhile for them to retire and give democracy a chance.

The author is a former special adviser for political affairs in the Commonwealth Secretariat, London.

Hamas phenomenon and Pakistan

THE rise of Hamas as a political force in Palestine has not aroused in Pakistan the kind of interest it deserves. An offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas and its sweeping electoral victory in January 2006 should not be viewed merely as a reaction to Fatah’s decline in the post-Oslo accord period; there are more important reasons why Hamas became a viable alternative to Yasser Arafat’s Fatah in the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

Hamas’s founders, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, who became a cripple at age 11 and remained wheelchair-bound till his murder by Israel, and Abdel Aziz Rantisi once belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) but fell out with it in the late eighties over what they thought was the MB’s lack of a focussed policy on Palestine.

The Muslim Brotherhood and the PLO both posed “problems” for Yassin and Rantisi. Devoted to the idea of uniting the Arab world on an Islamic platform, the MB rejected the boundaries of the Arab states, considered the existence of separate Arab states artificial, and believed in a united struggle by all Arab masses for capturing power. The aims were two – one, undoing the injustices done to the Arab world by the western powers and, two, building an Arab society based on Islamic values and purged of western “impurities”.

Founded in 1929 by Hasan al-Banna, the Brotherhood existed in Palestine the way it did, say, in Egypt or Algeria, and had no specific line of action for Palestine’s liberation. To it, the Palestinian issue was a problem to be solved, just as there were challenges to the Arab world in the presence of British troops at the Suez Canal and in the French occupation of Algeria. The creation of Israel and the occupation of Palestine by European migrants caused no particular change in the MB’s outlook and philosophy.

The PLO had an altogether different aim, its focus being on Palestine. To Arafat and other PLO leaders, pan-Arabism was useful if it furthered the cause of Palestine’s liberation. Founded in Cairo in 1964 by Gamal Abdel Nasser with Ahmad Shukairi as chairman (Arafat became its third chairman in 1969 and remained so till his death), the PLO could not but stick to a secular path at a time when the world was divided between the western and communist camps, with the vast majority of the Afro-Asian masses struggling for freedom from colonialism.

There were significant Christian populations in Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq. If he had to emerge as leader of the Arab world, and perhaps of Africa, Nasser was clear in his mind that his struggle and vision would not be confined to Egypt or Palestine.

Having successfully nationalised the Suez Canal and survived the 1956 tripartite attack on Egypt, Nasser aimed at a bigger role that aimed at liberating Arab countries then under British, French and Italian control and changing regimes in countries ruled by pro-western potentates – as those in Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Yemen, etc.

Trying to unite the Arab masses on an Islamic platform would mean alienating the affiliations of the Arab world’s Christian people. More important, such Islamic fervour would evoke little support from communist powers or from Afro-Asian countries. On the other hand, a secular fight against colonialism would mean fervent support from the communist camp and from Afro-Asian freedom-fighters and non-aligned leaders like Castro, Soekarno, Tito, Nehru, Nkrumah and others.

Ignoring Nasser’s achievements and focussing solely on Arafat, we can see that the strategy worked. By 1994 the “terrorist” leader had won the Nobel Prize for Peace (along with Yitzhak Rabin), and his enemies, who once denied the very existence of a Palestinian people, had conceded the idea of a Palestinian state.

While space does not permit a review of the events following the signing of the declaration of principles (DoP) in September 1993 and Arafat’s return to Palestine, briefly, we can see how Israel’s sabotage of the Oslo peace process and Arafat’s death strengthened the lobby that believed that the DoP was an instrument of capitulation. The post-Oslo period also saw PLO officials vulnerable to corruption charges. This was the vacuum that provided an ideal opportunity for Hamas to make gains at Fatah’s expense

Hamas, acronym for Harkatul Maqavamatul Islamia (Islamic Resistance Movement), came into being in December 1987 a few days after the second intifada, also known as Al Aqsa intifada, began following Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Islamic holy sites. Extensive debate preceded Hamas’s formation, for the MB’s Palestinian members were appalled by the Brothers’ failure to take up the cause of Palestinian territories groaning under Israeli occupation.

Yassin and Rantissi and many other Palestinian members of the MB, including Salah Shehada, Mohammad Shama’ah, Isa al-Nashar, Abdul Fattah Dukhan and Ibrahim Yazuri, were outraged that the Brothers relegated the Palestinian cause to a secondary position and attached greater importance to their Islamic agenda – a policy that often exposed the Brotherhood’s central leadership to the charge that it was working for Israel’s benefit. After intense debate, Yassin and Rantisi came to the conclusion that the Brotherhood did not have an answer to the Palestinian question and that what was needed was a party that would combine the Brothers’ Islamic zeal with Fatah’s focus on Palestine. That is what Hamas is.

It is an indication of the Hamas founders’ realism that they gradually moved away from the goal of the “liberation of Palestine” to the more practical task of making Israel quit the Gaza strip and the West Bank, including Jerusalem.

Despite its Islamic commitments, Hamas was careful not to get involved with Al Qaeda or accept its philosophy that believed in terrorist attacks against targets within Muslim countries ruled by perceived pro-western leaders. From this followed a sensible military doctrine that differed in several significant ways from that of the PLO and Al Qaeda. First, Hamas renounced violence against all Muslim countries so as not to expose itself to the charge that it was shedding Muslim blood; second, it did not believe in attacking western targets anywhere in the world; third, it pledged not to carry out military operations outside Palestine.

Hamas’s Islamic philosophy and strong commitment to Palestine and its people are in sharp contrast to the situation in Pakistan where most religious parties pursue policies whose underlying philosophy lacks a focus on Pakistan and shows little consciousness of the country’s sensitive geostrategic location and its security concerns. This is a tragedy for a country whose foreign policy since independence has been security-centric.

The religious parties’ rhetoric could be the subject of a PhD thesis. But it would not be wrong to assert that most religious leaders’ utterances have served to undermine the Pakistani state by creating contempt among the people for everything Pakistani. They might not have done so deliberately, but their rhetorical outbursts against all Pakistan governments, civilian and military – barring Ziaul Haq’s – have instilled into the people serious doubts about the moral basis of everything Pakistani. Unless they themselves come to power and establish an Islamic “system”, every government department, every NGO, every nurse, every traffic cop and every air-hostess is un-Islamic and therefore must be condemned. Even educational institutions, education itself, and teachers deserve to be reviled and held to contempt.

This philosophy has affected even those who may not be religiously inclined, but one can see its effect on the Pakistani people in the recklessness with which they go about burning public and private property. It is this kind of weird philosophy with extra-territorial loyalties that makes Lal Masjid clerics say that the last rites of Pakistani soldiers killed in battle with Uzbek and other militants should not be performed, because their death was haram. In other words, the loyalty of a segment of our religious leaders is not to Pakistan, but to Osama bin Laden and his militants waging war on the Muslim world’s only nuclear power.

Here we can clearly see the difference between Hamas and whatever is going on in Pakistan in the name of religion. While Hamas stands committed to the peace and prosperity of the Palestinian people, our religious parties lack the same kind of commitment to the Pakistani people whose majority is languishing in poverty and ignorance in a system characterised by gross inequalities in the distribution of national wealth.

That explains why the religious orthodoxy has never tried to mobilise the people’s energies for the stability, growth and consolidation of Pakistan and for its entry into the modern world through progress in science and technology at a rate one sees in China and the Asian tigers. Maybe, this would be an exaggeration to say, but the behaviour of certain parties suggests that they would write off Pakistan in return for the Taliban flag to fly on a barren rock in Afghanistan.