THE recent episode relating to the capture and release of 15 British sailors and marines by Iran was another example of how this beleaguered regime is able to play a weak hand with considerable skill and intelligence and thus derive unexpected advantages. This is not the first time something like this has happened. Yet diplomatic observers were surprised by the manner in which the drama unfolded.

This is because most countries, and in particular those in the West, have always made the mistake of believing that the Islamic regime lacks adequate experience and understanding of how the world functions, which leads it to either overstate its strengths or underestimate the resolve of its opponents.

The Carter administration’s dealings with Iran during the hostage crisis that lasted from November 1979 to January 1981, demonstrated the folly of this perception. Consequently, it had to pay a heavy price that included not only an inordinate delay in the release of the hostages, but one that saw its presidency being discredited and eventually destroyed on account of an ill-conceived and poorly executed rescue operation.

The Reagan administration, too, fared no better, with senior officials from the National Security Council, deciding to travel to Tehran bearing a Bible and a cake, in expectation of rebuilding relations with the regime. I cannot imagine a more bizarre exhibition of inept behaviour by seemingly wise people representing a superpower.But it was, of course, Saddam Hussein who suffered most grievously from his misreading of the Islamic regime’s steely determination. I recall being told by senior US officials in Washington how the Iraqis armed with advanced Soviet weapons and reinforced by sensitive American intelligence would overrun the poorly-equipped Iranian soldiers who lacked both the weaponry and professional training required for modern warfare. Saddam was left to rue the day he decided to invade Iran.

These past weeks we have seen how the Iranians have once again handled a potentially explosive situation with skill and resolve. Though the British claimed that the marines were seized in the Shatt Al-Arab, there can be no doubt that the British were aware that their activities in the area were likely to upset the Iranians who have always considered it theirs.

This is because a 1975 treaty between Iran and Iraq set their border as running down the centre of the Shatt Al-Arab, but Saddam cancelled the treaty before launching his invasion of Iran in 1980.

The Iranians also made it clear that they were all the more upset by the British navy encroaching its territorial waters because Britain has always been viewed as the US’s junior partner in Washington’s conspiracies against Tehran. In any case, by capturing the British sailors, Tehran succeeded in reinforcing its claim to the area. Tehran was also able to handle the situation with poise and self-assurance. Though Iran condemned the violation of its territorial waters and threatened to put the captured soldiers on trial, it never rejected the option of dialogue and negotiations to resolve this confrontation. Finally, by ordering their release on the occasion of the Holy Prophet’s (PBUH) birthday, Iran demonstrated that it did not wish to be viewed as rigid and vindictive.

Once the hostages were back home, the British press expressed its outrage at what it claimed was the harsh and illegal treatment of its naval personnel. The US, too, joined in, even though it has had no hesitation in violating the provisions of the Geneva Convention relating to the treatment of prisoners of war. Bush actually signed a memo after 9/11 relaxing adherence to Geneva, causing immense damage to the sanctity of this agreement.

The British accusations were simply ludicrous, coming as they did from a country that has hardly been a model of correct behaviour. Lest it be forgotten, Tony Blair’s government has not only been among the most vocal defenders of the Bush policies, but has itself been accused of similar transgressions. That the British captives were kept in reasonably good condition was obvious from their physical and emotional state when released from captivity.

The British could not, however, hide the fact that Tehran had succeeded in outsmarting it, even though they claimed that the release was accomplished “without any deal, without any side agreement of any nature whatsoever”. Nevertheless, as reported by the Iranian media, an Iranian diplomat was promised access to five of their officials arrested in Irbil by US forces earlier in the year. And, it was not a coincidence that an Iranian official, Jalal Sharafi, detained in Iraq for some two months, was released at the same time that the British sailors were allowed to go home.

As expected, the US tried to fish in troubled waters by jumping into the fray and trying to come out swinging in support of its ally. The Americans were also keen to claim credit for the release of the British servicemen, with the neo-conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer claiming that “American action is what got this unstuck”. This was also the view of Bush administration officials, but mainstream American journalists were not impressed by these claims.

They acknowledged that US policies in the Middle East, and in particular its occupation of Iraq, had not only generated tremendous hostility against Washington, but also weakened US leverage over Iran.

Many credible journalists have recognised that with the debacle in Iraq, the US may also be losing the will to carry out a surgical strike against Iran’s nuclear installations. Not only are the US and the UK stuck in a quagmire, their policies have had an effect exactly the opposite of what had been intended. Gary Sick, an American expert on the Middle East, recently noted: “From Iran’s perspective (the US war in Iraq) is a gift of unparalleled proportions.” Bob Gates, before becoming Bush’s defence secretary, admitted that the US would be “the supplicant” if US-Iran discussions were held now.

It was, however, the US raid on the Iranian liaison office in Irbil on January 11 that was the starting point of the drama that culminated in the Iranian capture of the British sailors some 10 weeks later. The US raid was carried out within hours of Bush’s State of the Union address on January 10, 2007, in which he charged that “Iran is providing material support for attacks on American troops.”

On that day, the US forces launched a surprise raid on the Iranian office in the city and took into custody five relatively junior officials. Accused of being intelligence agents, they are still being held in custody. It has, however, now been gathered that the US operation was aimed at capturing two senior officials of the Iranian security establishment. They were reportedly M. Jafari, the powerful deputy head of the Iranian National Security Council, and General Minojahar Frouzanda, the chief of Intelligence of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. They were on an official visit to Iraqi Kurdistan to meet President Jalal Talabani at his house in Irbil. The US action was both irresponsible and highly provocative.

For Pakistan, an unfortunate development at this time was a report carried by a US television network alleging that a group known as Jundullah was operating from inside Pakistan to carry out raids across the border into Iran. The US network claimed that US officials had secretly encouraged a militant group operating out of Balochistan to carry out several deadly attacks in Iran.

Recognising the damaging nature of the report, the Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson, rejected it as “absurd and sinister”, but the denial carried little credibility given the fact that our Foreign Office is not privy to these kinds of things.Nevertheless, this latest episode has once again demonstrated that just when it appeared that Iran was moving inexorably towards extreme positions, it surprised the world by adopting a moderate, pragmatic approach. The swift and peaceful resolution of this latest crisis is another demonstration of Iran’s remarkable ability to switch gears.

Reputable American scholars, such as Mark Gasiorowski and Stephen Green, have pointed out that the Iranians have always demonstrated intelligence and astuteness in dealing with foreign powers. Even during the hostage crisis, US arms continued to flow to Iran through Israel, with “the knowledge and tacit approval of the Carter administration”. All this suggests strongly that Iran has never “allowed ideology to influence its political conduct or supersede its national interests”.

Iran’s current difficulties pose both a challenge and an opportunity for Pakistan. If we can demonstrate genuine understanding for Iran’s core interests, we could use our current close relations with the US to promote dialogue and reconciliation between Washington and Tehran. This will be neither easy nor risk-free, but the stakes for the entire region are very high.

The rewards are great as well. No opportunity must, therefore, be lost to impress upon the US that it would do itself and the region a lot of good if it was to grasp every available opportunity to engage Iran’s leadership in a quiet, constructive dialogue. This is the only way out for all sides.

For Washington to even contemplate that it can now engineer a change of regime in Tehran would be a folly of monumental proportions. The correlation of forces has undergone a radical transformation and it would be best for the US to recognise this.

The writer is a former ambassador.