New Saudi assertiveness

KING Abdullah’s ascension to the throne of Saudi Arabia in August 2005 was marked by hope and expectation in the kingdom, but considerable concern in foreign capitals, particularly in the West.

This was understandable, given that Abdullah had gained the reputation of an ascetic Bedouin whose views were deeply influenced by his lifelong attachment to the simple harshness of the desert. Though viewed as an advocate of modernity, it was known that he would pursue it only with caution and prudence.

As crown prince, he had earned the reputation of a strong defender of Saudi interests, while remaining an articulate promoter of Arab causes. The western media projected him as an Arab/Islamist nationalist, who harboured suspicion of the West in general and the US in particular. It was against this background that the king opted to keep a low profile, avoid controversies and work assiduously to cultivate the US with which relations had been frayed in the wake of 9/11.

Abdullah, however, recognised that it was Washington alone that could ensure Saudi security, as well as influence Israel to adopt a reasonable attitude on the Palestinian issue. Resultantly, the US soon came to appreciate Saudi Arabia’s unique role in the region, abandoning any effort to promote reforms that could destabilise the kingdom.

It was, however, the dismal US failure in Iraq and resultant worries over growing Iranian influence in the region that provided the Saudis with the opportunity of claiming their rightful place not only in the Middle East but in the wider Muslim world as well.

The first sign of Riyadh’s newfound confidence was its openly expressed concern over the deteriorating situation in Iraq, with the Saudis making it clear that they were not prepared to be mere bystanders in the intensifying civil war in that country, specially if it caused irreparable damage to Sunni interests.

Senior officials even hinted at the possibility of Saudi military intervention in Iraq, if needed. In doing so, Riyadh was not only signalling its resolve to act as a defender of Sunni interests, but also as the upholder of Arab causes against any threat from enhanced Iranian influence.

Next, the Saudis took the initiative to use their financial prowess to mediate between the Hezbollah and the Fouad Siniora government in Lebanon. This was done to rescue that country from the threat of a paralysing civil war and also to strengthen Saudi credentials as a major player in the region. Of course, in the process, Iran’s influence on the Hezbollah was reduced — an added bonus for the Saudis.

Next, it took on the hazardous task of cajoling the two rival factions in Palestine — Fatah led by President Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas led by Prime Minister Ismail Haniya — to sink their differences and agree to the formation of a unity government. This was not an easy task, but Riyadh used its clout to convince the two factions to work together under the provisions of the Makkah accord.

The Bush administration, under pressure from Israel, nevertheless found fault even with this arrangement and refused to deal with the new government. The US opposition to the Makkah accord, however, helped reinforce Saudi Arabia’s credentials.Last week’s Arab summit in Riyadh, aimed primarily at resurrecting the peace process and first developed at the Beirut summit in March 2002, was, however, Abdullah’s boldest move and evidence of his monarchy coming of age. It brought together not only all the Arab leaders (Muammar Qadhafi was the sole exception) but also those of three major non-Arab Muslim countries — Turkey, Pakistan and Malaysia — to indicate support for the initiative.

The Arab leaders decided unanimously to revive the five-year-old plan for peace with Israel, thereby re-launching a diplomatic offensive, to resolve the Middle East conflict by issuing a direct call to the Israeli government as well as Israeli citizens to accept the Arab offer and “seize the opportunity to resume the process of direct and serious negotiations on all tracks.”

The summit was marked by King Abdullah’s candid and objective assessment of the ills plaguing the Arab world. It was, however, his remarks on Iraq that caused a major stir when he stated: “In beloved Iraq, blood flows between brothers in the shadow of illegitimate foreign occupation and hateful sectarianism threatening a civil war.”

When US Under-Secretary Nicholas Burns claimed being “a little surprised to see these words”, Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal retorted that “any military intervention that is not at the request of the country concerned, is the definition of occupation.”

The king also stressed that “we will never allow any forces from outside the region to draw the future of the region and no banner will be raised in the Arab land but the banner of Arabism.”

Israel’s initial reaction to the Riyadh declaration was non-committal, verging on the negative, with its leaders claiming that while it contained a few interesting elements, it also suffered from major shortcomings. Soon thereafter, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert told a major Israeli newspaper that the Jewish state could clinch peace with its enemies within five years, adding that “we are ready to hold discussions and hear from the Saudis about their approach and to tell them about ours.”

This offer, however, has to be taken with extreme caution, lest it be another propaganda ploy. In any case, the Israeli prime minister’s popularity is at an all-time low, with even his conservative supporters having lost faith in him after the Lebanese adventure.

Moreover, there is no fundamental change in the Israeli leadership’s attitude, as evident from its claim that the conservative Arab states are its natural allies and that they must get together to face the real threat to the region, which in their view is Iran. This was evident in Olmert’s remark that “a bloc of states is emerging that understands that they may have been wrong to think that Israel is the world’s greatest problem. That is a revolutionary change in outlook.” He said, “There are things that are happening which have not happened in the past which are developing and ripening.”

It was, however, wrong and mischievous of Olmert to think that by promoting an Arab-Ajam divide and by expressing his willingness to meet King Abdullah, he would be able to achieve peace in the region.

As the well-known Israeli activist Uri Avnery wrote recently: “This is an old gimmick of Israeli governments from the time of David Ben-Gurion,” which is to meet with an important Arab leader and then “claim that this amounts to normalisation with the Arab world, which is Israel’s main objective, without giving anything in return.”

Immediately afterwards, Olmert affirmed that “not a single settlement or post would be dismantled until the Palestinians fight terrorism”. Incidentally, dismantling those settlements that are illegal even in Israeli laws and which all Israeli leaders, including Ariel Sharon were committed to dismantle, is also included in the “roadmap”.

According to it, Israel was obliged to dismantle these settlements in the first phase, and simultaneously the Palestinians had to disarm their organisations.

The king is, however, far too intelligent and experienced not to have foreseen the impact of his policies on Arab capitals, as well as on Washington. The Riyadh summit, coming on the heels of Saudi initiatives to bring back Hezbollah and Hamas into national mainstreams, gave rise to understandable speculation as to whether it was indicative of a shift in the Saudi position.

Admittedly, the change is remarkable, leaving many observers to wonder whether this was on account of a genuine change of heart in the royal family, of course at the behest of King Abdullah, or whether this was a major tactical ploy by a regime that is increasingly fearful of the rising anger and dissatisfaction on the streets. If the former, it would be indicative of King Abdullah’s success in consolidating his position within the royal family. If the latter, it would indicate that Washington and Riyadh may have agreed that it was to their mutual advantage to agree on a common strategy, while agreeing to disagree on tactics.

There are others who believe that the Saudis are increasingly worried about growing Iranian influence in the region, resulting from the mess in Iraq and because of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. They may, therefore, like to bring the Arab countries under one tent, but at the same time, would not like to be perceived as promoting the US line that a resurgent Shia Iran, in cahoots with a Shia-dominated Iraq, could destabilise the conservative Arab regimes.

The Saudis also do not accept Washington’s claim that the real enemy of the Arabs is Iran, not Israel. The Saudis know that it is Israel which has had the rare distinction of invading or attacking half a dozen Arab states, at one time or another. And that without an early resolution of the Palestinian problem there can be no peace in the region, nor can the monarchies feel safe and secure.

King Abdullah has, therefore, chosen to take advantage of the US failure in Iraq, as well as the confidence derived from its unique role as “a swing producer of oil”, to play an active part in protecting Arab interests and pursuing bold but responsible policies on this and other issues as well.

This was evident from the fact that at a time when the US was pushing Riyadh to join it in ostracising Iran, Abdullah was sending Prince Bandar to Tehran to invite President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the summit and to assure Iran that it would not lend itself to US plans against the Islamic regime. This is a welcome development that Pakistan should seek to promote.

As a country that prides itself on its historic, strategic relations with both Saudi Arabia and Iran, it should be Pakistan’s fervent hope that King Abdullah will rise above sectarian considerations and resist the temptation to succumb to American pressures or ploys and instead play a role befitting his stature in the region.

The writer is a former ambassador.

Common market for South Asia?

PAKISTAN Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz probably did not say anything new when he pointed out at a press conference in Delhi a few days ago that trade with India was linked to a solution on Kashmir. But he did correct the general impression that the two countries would have free trade, especially when Kashmir was under discussion behind the scenes.

When he made the opening remarks, Shaukat Aziz mentioned travel, trade and Kashmir in the same breath. But then he realised that the relaxation of visa facilities which the two countries had already accepted would sound hollow if he were to bracket travel with Kashmir. He watered down his reservations on travel. Probably, he was confident that whatever visa facilities he had agreed to Islamabad could always nullify through its mission in India.

In fact, I have found how the two governments have agreed to the liberalisation because of popular pressure on both sides. But it is equally true that they go back on the facilities whenever they feel like or whenever the intelligence agencies frighten them over the increase in the number of visitors. Mindset bureaucrats are ever willing to carry out an informal word.

After a five-day stay last month in Lahore, my impression is different: the public and the establishment are at variance. People want to open up to India, a bigger market and a larger economic unit. Yet the government, beleaguered by internal problems, does not want Indians in the midst if it can help it.

Industrialists and businessmen are more eager than others to have free trade with India because they realise that the solution on Kashmir is like waiting until the cows come home. At a commerce chamber meeting where I was present, an industrialist representing the set-up, said that he used to believe that Kashmir was the core problem of disputes between India and Pakistan. But he had come to realise that the core problem was free trade, not Kashmir. Nearly 50 leading industrialists present at the meeting applauded him. I did not find any media criticism about his views.

Two things have contributed to the change in outlook. One, the industrialists have generally felt that they are in no way inferior to their counterparts in India. Two, the circuitous route the goods of both countries take through Dubai and Singapore raise costs unnecessarily and profit a particular clique in the establishment.

However, Shaukat Aziz’s observation has once again defeated the Saarc purpose which looked like emerging from the debris of bad relations between India and Pakistan. The 22-year-old organisation has made no headway because New Delhi and Islamabad have been at daggers drawn. One felt that there was realisation at last to keep politics and economics apart. But this is not the case when a person like Shaukat Aziz, who once headed a foreign banking organisation, plays to the gallery.

This does not mean that the Kashmir question should be put aside. It has to be sorted out, not only for the sake of peace in the region but also for the satisfaction of the people. Thousands have died to change the status quo. Why should Islamabad kick the dust when it is beginning to settle down, probably because of some specific proposals New Delhi has sent to it? Progress is slow because there is a difference in outlook over joint control. Still the fact that India has come up with suggestions to change the status quo is a step forward. New Delhi has not done so officially so far.

Finalising even a modicum of agreement will take time. This will need to be placed before the public for debate. Then it will be presented to parliament in India and Pakistan. This process is difficult and time-consuming. Should Saarc be held to ransom? Trade cannot wait till then. Members at the summit emphasised this.

When Shaukat Aziz cautioned at dinner at the Pakistan High Commission in Delhi that the coming generations would not forgive them if they continued to remain mired in conflicts, I told him that this was precisely what my generation said two decades ago. Words have no meaning if they are not backed with action. Indeed, this is what ails Saarc. Shaukat Aziz himself said that the time had come for them to implement the declarations they have made. Then why bring in matters like Kashmir which are sought to be sorted out away from the public gaze?

The core problem is how soon economic prosperity comes to the region so that people can forget religious and other differences and set themselves the task of improving their standard of living. This is not impossible because all the Saarc countries are now committed to social justice and democracy.

I support Shaukat Aziz’s other observation that there has to be a level playing field. India is a developed country while, in comparison, Pakistan is developing. If India is justified in seeking concessions from the developed West, Pakistan has every right to expect concessions from India. New Delhi has done well to announce custom-free entry for goods from small neighbouring countries. But it should also lower the wall of tariffs for Pakistan.

The Saarc countries have to develop a common market as Europe has done or the Asean countries have nearly done. After the emergence of Bangladesh, I asked Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then heading Pakistan, whether a common market to string together countries in South Asia, was feasible. He said: “We will have to see whether we can mutually benefit but in principle I think as far as a common market is concerned, we are not ready for such an arrangement. Europe also was not ready for it. It took time for Europe as a whole to get the advantage of a common market. Today we are basically producers of primary commodities and your industrial progress has been better than ours. We have also had some industrial progress but we have not reached that standard where there can be a grand collaboration in industry because these things are very difficult to arrange and even Europe is finding it difficult regarding agriculture commodities.”

That was 35 years ago. Pakistan, if not Bangladesh, has come a long way. Development depends on harnessing natural resources, manpower and technical know-how in the region, from Afghanistan to Bangladesh, and using them collectively. There is an unhappy history. With time, we may jettison the baggage of the past. As Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah said before partition, “Some nations have killed millions of each others, and yet, an enemy of today is a friend of tomorrow. That is history.”

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.

There will be a reckoning

FROM the rocky hills above the south Lebanese town of Bint Jbeil you look down over a valley of wild flowers and goats, where the word Hezbollah is scored into the grass. Three miles away is the border with Israel, and the red-tiled roofs of its settlements which face Bint Jbeil, the symbol of the war that Israel lost last summer. In 18 years of Israeli occupation of 10 per cent of Lebanon, Bint Jbeil was the capital of Hezbollah's resistance, and it was unsurprising that it took the early brunt of Israeli air strikes, tanks, and street fighting in the 34 days of war.

The first UN convoy into the town after the war found a picture of devastation. "The main street looks like a set from Stalingrad," Unicef reported. "One school has taken a direct aerial strike, and one wall is missing. Another looks to have been the scene of a pitched battle." To me, it's less Stalingrad and more Ngiva, Cuvelai or Huambo, the southern towns of Angola shattered by South African apartheid in the 1980s. Here, as there, roads are scarred with huge potholes from shelling, and targeted bombing broke bridges and factories. For decades Angolan children have been killed by unexploded mines, and now the Lebanese are having to contend with cluster bombs in their fields.

Along the mountain roads into Bint Jbeil are thousands of pine saplings and young fruit trees, planted when the Israeli army withdrew in 2000. Above them are new posters of the young men who died here last year, another generation of shaheed (martyrs).

Memory and history are the keys to the resilience of this society. An old lady's house is already rebuilt, and there are rows of pewter bowls which belonged to her grandmother, the wooden cradle where she lay as a child, and a faded photo of her heavily-armed grandfather and uncles who fought the French.

Her daughter offers guests orange-flower water made at home, as it always has been. Seven months after the war, Bint Jbeil's shops are open, streets and houses repaired and children are back in a makeshift school. This is one of the places where Qatari officials arrived with instant cash for rebuilding. All over the country are slick billboards of beautiful children and flowers, saying, "Thank you Qatar." This is not a society which allows the grim to triumph.

Israelis, too, know about the power of memory, and made an attempt here to rub it out. Another of their prime targets was the hill-top prison of Khiam, northeast of Bint Jbeil, where hundreds of Lebanese and Palestinians were held and tortured by Israel's proxy, the South Lebanese Army, during the occupation.

Khiam was the symbol of Israel's power, and the prisoners' will to resist it. Today, bleak Khiam is a heap of tangled rubble, watched over by a man who spent four years inside the prison and has been telling its story ever since.

All he can show now is one small remaining corridor of cells, and an isolation punishment box which he can just fit his body inside.

But three years ago, when I was last here, the anniversary of Israel's withdrawal was a holiday, and there was an atmosphere of celebration under a forest of Lebanese and Hezbollah flags. Khiam then was a Hezbollah museum, where families were shown round by this same former prisoner. The Angolan government produced a white book detailing every attack by South Africa, and today Lebanese citizens are doing the same, documenting civilian losses, damage to housing, land and the environment in a website. Memory and history will be served by this, but there will be a reckoning beyond it. South Africa learned to live with its apartheid crimes through its truth and reconciliation commission. Will Israel go down this route too?

—Dawn/Guardian Service