New tremors in Pak-US ties?

ONE of the first pieces of legislation being considered by the Democrat-dominated Congress is a comprehensive bill whose focus is Pakistan – both in the context of its internal and external policies. The bill expresses concern with Islamabad’s current policies, demands revisions in them and lays down markers as to when, where and how it seeks these changes.

While it may appear that the issue of terrorism, especially in the context of Afghanistan is the main concern of the authors of the bill, other issues such as nuclear proliferation, democracy and human rights figure in it as well. Most astutely, the Democrats have pegged this legislation to the implementation of the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act, 2007, aimed at strengthening US national security and foreign policy.

The proposed legislation acknowledges that “since September 11, 2001, Pakistan has been an important partner in helping the US remove the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and combating international terrorism in the frontier provinces”. Nevertheless, “there remain a number of critical issues that threaten to disrupt the relationship between the US and Pakistan, undermine international security and destabilise Pakistan”. The bill also recognises Pakistan’s importance in the war on terror and grants the US president the power to forge a “strategic partnership” with Pakistan.

But the sting is contained in the provision that places limitations on the US president’s authority to provide credit and favourable terms for purchase of military equipment and spares. It states that for fiscal years 2008 and 2009, US military assistance to Pakistan may not be provided, unless the president “determines and certifies” that Pakistan is taking necessary action against the Taliban. This provision would impact negatively on credit for military sales and purchases covered under the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act.

The proposed legislation also pinpoints actions that amount to micro-managing critical aspects of Pakistan’s sensitive policies. These will not only have to “secure the borders of Pakistan to prevent the movement of militants and terrorists“ but the US president will have to certify that Islamabad is making all efforts to prevent the Taliban from operating in areas under its sovereign control before releasing any funds or approving licences for enhancing its military capability. This is a limitless agenda.

Other sections of the bill relate to the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, making it a critical issue that needs Pakistan’s immediate attention. Coming as it does after the Bush administration expressed satisfaction with Pakistan’s comprehensive measures in terms of new legislation and institutional command, control and intelligence mechanisms, the bill’s aim is simply not understandable. Does it mean that Congress does not accept that Pakistan has done enough on this score? If true, Islamabad needs to prepare itself for new demands from the US, because as far as Congress is concerned, nuclear proliferation is still an open issue. This is corroborated by provisions in another bill under consideration, which speaks of the need for the US to get direct access to Dr A.Q. Khan.

Other sections of the bill refer to the need to build effective government institutions and promote democracy and the rule of law, particularly at the national level. Any assistance in promoting these objectives would normally be welcome, given Pakistan’s abysmal track record on this score. But such laudable objectives cannot be promoted by outside powers and certainly not through the vehicle of a controversial piece of legislation.

The bill then tries to offset the damage by offering incentives, known in diplomatic parlance, as the “carrot”. This is the recommendation “to dramatically increase funding for programmes of the US AID and the Department of State for Pakistan”. It also calls upon the US to “work with the international community to secure additional financial and political support to effectively implement the policy set forth in this bill”. Of interest to Pakistan is the provision that calls upon the administration to help resolve the dispute between Pakistan and India over Kashmir.

Given the history of Pakistan-US relations, the provisions of this bill have caused understandable concern in Pakistan. While US scholars may have a different view, most Pakistanis fear that the US may once again be demonstrating its proclivity for using and then abandoning friends who have promoted US interests sometimes at the cost of their own.

Pakistan was described as “the most allied ally of the US” in the 80s, when the country became a frontline state in the global confrontation against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. It agreed to host more than three million Afghan refugees on its soil, a decision that continues to haunt it to this day. I recall how we in the Pakistan embassy in Washington were asked to escort Afghan Mujahideen leaders to the White House where President Ronald Reagan hailed them as the world’s true heroes and compared them with America’s founding fathers. The word “Muj” entered the American political lexicon, evoking the picture of brave freedom fighters who stood as the only barrier between godless Marxism and man’s quest for freedom.

All this seeming admiration for the “Muj” disappeared as soon as Moscow announced its intention to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and the first signs of the chaos that was to lead to the breakup of the Soviet Union appeared. The then US president, the senior George Bush, had no hesitation in denying Pakistan the “certification” that was an essential requirement of American law, known as the “Pressler Amendment”, for US assistance to flow to Pakistan.

It was no pleasure to be summoned to receive the president’s letter informing us that since he could no longer certify that Pakistan was not “in possession of a nuclear explosive device”, all US economic aid and military sales would cease with effect from October 1 1990. The implementation of this decision was so bizarre that not only was the delivery of the F-16s, for which Pakistan had already made a down payment, withheld, even those aircraft and ships sent for repair and maintenance were not returned. Happily, the situation today is not as dismal. The Bush administration has tried to allay Pakistan’s fears by assuring it that it will use its influence to either have the bill rejected when it goes to the “conference” stage, or to at least have its punitive measures diluted. John Gastright, deputy assistant secretary of state for South Asia, who was recently in Islamabad, said that the administration’s “efforts are underway to make sure that certain Pakistan-specific provisions in the 9/11 legislation are not made part of the law”. He was also confident that Congress would not pass any law that would jeopardise the three-billion-dollar military sales and aid package to Pakistan. But he admitted that once the new bill became law, “it would bind the US president to certify that Pakistan was taking necessary measures against Al Qaeda, Taliban and other terrorists”.

Gastright also had the obligatory words of praise for President Musharraf, who according to him had done “superb work for establishing a framework for holding free and fair elections” and who was America’s “valued partner in the fight against terrorism”. While the establishment was still savouring these laudatory remarks, it was learnt that the House had passed another bill, which if enacted, could see Pakistan surrendering Dr A.Q. Khan to US authorities for investigation.

It would also require the US president to sign a report on the extent to which “a country is fully cooperating with the US in its efforts to eliminate the nuclear proliferation network or in stopping proliferation activities”. One of the ways in which this would be determined would be the degree to which the US had “been granted direct investigating access to key persons involved in the nuclear proliferation network or activities”.

The House has passed both bills. These now go to the Senate for approval. Whatever efforts are to be made by the administration and Pakistan must be undertaken now. Pakistan’s fears that the House action may be a repeat of the Pressler affair may be exaggerated but are not unfounded. One of the reasons why there is a sudden spurt of Pakistan-related bills is that the US licence for military assistance and arms sales to Pakistan expires this year. Congressman Frank Pallone, founder of the congressional Caucus on India, and other committed friends of India are active on this front.

It may be that the Democrats in Congress have the Bush administration in their gunsights, given the perceived vulnerability of the president on account of the administration’s failure in Iraq and other equally disastrous mistakes elsewhere. There is also great merit in the Democrat laundry list of this administration’s failures. Not surprisingly, former national policy advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski has expressed the fear that thanks to the Bush administration’s follies, America’s influence in the Middle East may be at the lowest point ever since the Second World War.

However, in such a situation where the US faces problems on all fronts, the Democrats may be reluctant to punish Pakistan, not because they are enamoured of Musharraf, but because they recognise that America will not find another ally as committed to promoting the US agenda as the Pakistani leader. At the same time, politics being the game that it is, the Democrats will continue to target Pakistan, especially on issues such as terrorism, proliferation and democracy, because these are areas of vulnerability and embarrassing the administration is always good politics for the opposition.

There is also evidence to the effect that notwithstanding regular complaints from senior administration officials alleging Islamabad’s lack of commitment to the war on terror, President Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and others appreciate the invaluable services rendered by President Musharraf without whose personal involvement the security and intelligence agencies of Pakistan would not have been as forthcoming as they have been in the war on terror.

It is also rumoured in Washington that not only is the administration giving serious consideration to an armed strike in Iran in the near future, but that it has already broached this subject with its allies in the Middle East. Pakistan may also have been taken into confidence. There is no evidence as yet to corroborate any of this, but Arab capitals are full of speculation that the president’s tour of the Middle East was arranged hurriedly, at the behest of Washington, for this very purpose. The Iranians have been watching these developments with increasing anxiety. Moreover, the growing presence of Nato in Pakistan and the likelihood of an early conclusion of an institutionalised framework of cooperation between Pakistan and Nato is going to add to their concerns. Difficult times lie ahead for Pakistan and it will take all Islamabad’s skill and acumen to navigate the ship of state safely through these choppy waters.

The writer is a former ambassador.

India’s north-east in ferment

INDIA’S north-east is like Balochistan in Pakistan or Tibet in China. All three territories are in ferment. The governments are employing arms for registering their authority – and the defiant their identity. It is a political question which is being sought to be solved through violence.

The north-east in India embraces Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura, Arunachal Pradesh and Meghalaya. The first three states are disturbed, Assam probably the worst in this respect. The army is combing the state which the militants of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) have announced is meant only for Assamese-speaking people.

ULFA is not a new phenomenon. New Delhi has lived with it for the last 30 years. Several years ago, it signed an agreement with the All Assam Students Union (AASU), after protracted agitation, to delete the names of foreigners, the Bangladeshis, from the electoral rolls and deport them to their country. ULFA has since then raised the standard of an independent Assam and has taken to arms. Practically no foreigner has been ousted.

What has attracted the nation’s attention at present is the indiscriminate killing by ULFA of labourers from other parts of India, particularly Bihar. Although the army is in the midst of flushing out ULFA cadres from Assam, bomb blasts continue to kill a few here and there. Some say that ULFA is wreaking revenge for India’s attack two years ago on its camps in the foothills of Bhutan with the king’s cooperation. The diary of Hira Sarania, a battalion commander of ULFA’s army, says: “We vowed even if it takes 100 years, we will seek vengeance on India.” This may well be true. But there is also a suspicion that Bangladesh eggs ULFA on to make forays in Assam to create confusion for the easy assimilation of illegal migrants, with Bengalis living across the border. Already the Assamese-speaking population in the state has shrunk to nearly half. (Assam and other north-eastern states have only a 21-kilometre border with the rest of India as compared to 1,829 kilometres with Bangladesh.)

No doubt, ULFA has irritated New Delhi so much that it has agreed to supply arms to even the much-hated military junta in Myanmar to bottle up the militants. A few years ago a joint operation was launched with limited results. ULFA has in Assam some firm supporters who enable the militants to go right up to Guwahati to carry out killings even during the day. There is, however, something in the allegation that Congress, which rules the state, has connived in ULFA’s activities to repay for the help it rendered to the party during the last election.

Still Assam is the last reliable post of India in the north-east. The state has not yet forgotten Jawaharlal Nehru’s words during India’s war with China in 1962 that “my heart goes out to the people of Assam.” Yet they have kept their injured feelings aside to concentrate on development which they realise they cannot have without capital from the rest of India. Even otherwise, ULFA has lost its substantial following after its repeated declarations to create a sovereign state which the Assamese do not like. The Assamese generally suspect that ULFA has close connections with the intelligence agencies of Bangladesh and Pakistan.

Manipur is primarily a victim of the army’s excesses. The state also faces the problem of tribals returning to their lands in the plains from where they were evicted a few years ago. (Tripura could have faced the same problem but the Bengali-speaking population which has migrated from Bangladesh is in such a preponderant majority that others have no choice except to accept reality). Not long ago when I visited Manipur, I could see the divide, the youth fuming with anger and discussing ways to retrieve the land. Alienation between indigenous people and outsiders has resulted in clashes, even large-scale killings.

However, the worst role has been that of the army which is trying to maintain peace. In the name of curbing militancy, it has killed many innocent people. Seldom has anyone from the force been hauled up because it enjoys immunity under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958. One woman activist, Sharmila, has been on hunger strike since the massacre of innocent civilians by army personnel some time ago. The agitation is still going on. The army’s powers have not been curtailed, and they include shooting to kill, searching property without the safeguards present in ordinary criminal law and arbitrary detention to “maintain public order” based on “suspicion” of insurgent activity.

The central government appointed early last year a judicial commission headed by a retired supreme court judge to assess whether the special powers act was necessary and was being used for legitimate purposes. On both grounds, the commission found the government wanting. It recommended the abolition of the act. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh promised to implement the commission’s findings. But probably the army has had the last word because the act has stayed with its injurious fallout.

The Nagas, although divided between the ruling Nagas and hostile underground Nagas, are fired by the same ambition to have an independent Naga state. Their argument is that they were never part of British India and enjoyed an independent existence. New Delhi has been negotiating with the main faction, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), headed by T. Muivah for the last few years. But the talks have not brought the government and the NSCN any closer.

The NSCN wants India to accept the sovereignty of Nagas with a joint defence apparatus between them and the Indian army. The NSCN also wants greater Nagaland embracing the Naga population in Assam and Manipur. The government has reportedly offered a special Kashmir-type status within the Indian Union. The NSCN finds it “too little” but may come round to accepting something like that. The renewal of a ceasefire which is almost a decade old hangs in the balance. If not renewed, the army will have another problem on their hands: the hostile Nagas apart from ULFA.

What is, however, peculiar to Nagaland and the rest of the states in the north-east is that the people elect their governments every five years and voter turnout is around 60 per cent. Had there been strong feelings of separation there would have been a boycott of elections or some way of registering their protest against the present system. It appears that people in the region ride two boats at the same time: raising their demand for autonomy and staking their claim to power through elections. The government is not unduly bothered so long as there is no ULFA-like disturbance.

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.

The Afghanistan ‘surge’

WHILE the country debates the Bush administration's "surge" of American troops into Baghdad, a similar American build-up has begun in Afghanistan. As in Iraq, it comes in response to rapidly escalating violence, and in Afghanistan, too, one question is whether the reinforcements are too little or too late.

By extending the deployment of a brigade of the 10th Mountain Division even as the 82nd Airborne begins to arrive, the Pentagon will bring the US troop level to 24,000. That's 50 per cent more than at this time last year and about six times the number of American soldiers who were in Afghanistan at the time of the battle for Tora Bora, in early 2002. The administration, led by Vice-President Cheney and then-Defence Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, stoutly resisted calls for expanding either US or allied forces then. Let the record show: They were terribly wrong. Successful wars begin with a large troop deployment that tapers off as objectives are accomplished and security is restored. In Afghanistan US troop levels started at rock bottom and have steadily risen over the past five years, even as security has worsened.

By most measures, there are still far fewer Afghan and foreign troops than are needed to secure the country. With the increase, the total number of US, Nato and other allied troops will be around 45,000, while there are about 40,000 soldiers in the new Afghan army. By contrast there are 146,000 coalition troops in Iraq in advance of the surge, and 134,000 Iraqi army troops. Yet Afghanistan is 50 percent larger than Iraq and has a larger population. What's more, many Nato troops in Afghanistan are constrained by their governments from fighting or even deploying in the areas where the Taliban insurgency is based.

— The Washington Post