Where did we go wrong?

IT IS a measure of the frustration caused to the politically conscious citizens over a better part of Pakistan’s history that, in the midst of independence day festivities, many of them find themselves struggling to answer the question: ‘Where did we go wrong?’ The query springs from the realization that for a majority of the people the promise of independence remains unfulfilled.

Apart from a gnawing feeling of shame at failure to prevent the break-up of the state less than 25 years after it was established in 1947, there is much in public experience to suggest non-materialisation of the dream of freedom.

The question posed here is quite unwelcome in two quarters. The country’s permanent establishment is so fully convinced of its infallibility that it rejects any hint at wrongdoing on its part as unpatriotic heresy. It has invited censure not only for ignoring the lessons from history but also for preventing the people from learning from these lessons. Something similar is done by the cynics who argue that our record of having gone wrong is so voluminous that it may be easier to list instances of our having acted rightly as a free nation.

Both of these groups need to be ignored as it is necessary to identify the significant deviations from the course charted out during the freedom struggle and which caused Pakistan grievous harm, particularly with a view to avoiding repetition of such mistakes. The effort often peters out into a barren debate mainly because of difficulty in distinguishing between cause and effect. It is, however, not impossible to identify the principal sin and its main consequences that have obstructed the Pakistani people’s journey towards self-realisation.

The single greatest cause of Pakistani people’s plight has been persistence with a scheme of governance manifestly incompatible with the avowed constitutional principles and the demands of objective reality both.

The founding fathers perhaps had reasons for avoiding, during the dangerously short freedom movement, a detailed and complete description of the system of governance they wished to follow in the state of their seeking. The Lahore Resolution merely referred to the ideal of independent states comprising self-governing provinces. Allegiance to a federal ideal survived the change of objective from two sovereign zones to a single state at the Delhi convention of the Muslim League legislators,

and was accepted as the only authoritatively defined groundnorm of the Pakistan state.

The Quaid-i-Azam consistently declined to say what Pakistan’s constitution was going to be and always answered queries in this regard with a statement that this was something for the people of Pakistan, and for them alone, to decide. He did refer though to democracy being in the blood of the Muslims and as something sanctioned by their belief too. At the 1943 annual League session he declared that he won’t have a Pakistan in which the landlords were free to exploit the tenants and at a later stage used the expression “people’s democracy” to define his vision of Pakistan.

During the Central Assembly debate on the future of the INA (the army comprising British Indian troops created by Subhas Bose to fight the colonial power) the Quaid promised capital punishment for anyone in the defence forces who defied the constitutional authority in his Pakistan (a point he emphasised again after independence when, while addressing a defence contingent, he asked the audience to join him in reading their oath.)

It is from the Quaid’s and his colleagues’ implied faith in the British parliamentary system that one can claim that Pakistan was conceived as a democratic federation of independent units, to be managed under a parliamentary system and in which no disloyalty to the constitutional authority could be allowed. Three days before the birth of Pakistan, the Quaid-i-Azam called for the creation of a Pakistani nation based on the equality of all citizens regardless of belief which, in any case, was a citizen’s private affair and had nothing to do with the business of the state.

It was not impossible to knit the basic formulation in the Lahore Resolution on a federal set-up and the Quaid’s faith in the paramountcy of the people’s will, his emphasis on democracy and exclusion of religion form politics, into a system of sound governance. But these principles began to be breached soon after independence and the practice continues to this day.

The concept chosen for the worst possible mutilation related to the federal ideal. The task of constitution-making was approached with serious reservations on the pledge to constitute a federation and when a basic law was finally drawn up, it was based on denial of autonomy to all the provinces in the country. The provinces in the western wing were forced to give up their status as autonomous units of the federation while the eastern wing was also deprived of its status as the home of the country’s majority. Moreover what was written in the constitution was not respected in practice.

All governments in Pakistan, civil as well as military, have tried to avoid managing the affairs of the country in accordance with the division of powers and privileges between the federal centre and the constituent units. The only difference has been that while democratically elected civilian governments can, if led by politically inadequate persons, fail to respect federal imperatives, unconstitutional non-civilian governments, regardless of the qualities of their leaders, are innately incapable of respecting the rights of the federating units.

In situations of absolute rule, the greater the concentration of power in the hands of a single person, the smaller the degree of respect the federal principles will enjoy.

It is not necessary to go over the history of East Bengal’s alienation from Pakistan. What needs to be discussed now is the growing tension between the federation and the three smaller (in terms of population) provinces of Pakistan. All three of them have had their political demands answered with use of state’s armed might and are displaying increasing signs of unhappiness at what they describe as denial of their right to autonomy.

Reliance on unitary form of government under the facade of a federation was not possible without abandoning the principle of democratic rule. The absence of respect for democratic governance can be gauged from the denial of the supremacy of parliament throughout the history of Pakistan and refusal to accept parliamentary majorities’ right to form governments. The parliament that adopted the Constitution of 1956 was quickly divested of this role by an overbearing president who chose prime ministers and sacked them without reference to the legislature.

The parliament was not consulted when elected governments were sacked during 1988-1996 by presidents who had little respect for the parliamentary system. Not only that, in all such instances parliament was penalised while the target was only the prime minister. Besides, attempts were frequently made to prevent a majority party or the largest group in the legislature from forming government. The year 2002 is still remembered as the year of turncoats as formation of a government to the liking of the establishment was possible only after raising the premium on defection to a record high.

In order to sustain deviation from federal and democratic principles the custodians of power in Pakistan have had to rely on props completely incompatible with these principles. First, instead of building a nation of politically equal citizens the belief of the majority community was adopted as the sole force of national cohesion. The policy has not only divided the population on the basis of belief, it has also divided the majority community into a host of militant sects.

Perhaps the worst of all, it has given rise to the concept of two sovereignties, one of God Almighty and the other of the state. Since the former is superior than the latter, those who deny the sovereignty of the state can get away by invoking the power of belief in defence. Secondly, it became possible to define state’s security in terms that are in conflict with commitment to democracy. The theory that defence requirements are more important than providing basic needs to the people inexorably led to the people’s impoverishment. At the same time, defence matters could be put outside people’s oversight.

Above all, uninterrupted regression from the ideal of democratic federalism has resulted in making the governments impervious to their obligations to strengthen the foundations of representative and responsible rule by helping political parties to evolve into mature outfits capable of fulfilling their responsibilities in this regard. All governments have kept political parties out of favour and undermined them by pouncing on their weaknesses to justify extra-constitutional measures.

Everybody knew that strong political parties were needed for the success of democratic norms in a society that had very meagre political capital, but regime after regime enjoyed mocking at whatever political parties were there instead of devising means to open channels of people’s political education. Once the ideal of democratic federalism had been abandoned the suppression of political parties accelerated Pakistan’s drift away from the goal it had started with at independence.

Perhaps even a brief and cursory recalling of the way the ship of state has been foundering away from its foundational commitments may persuade one to amend the query under discussion to “Where are we going wrong?”

Bush’s moment of truth

PRESIDENT Bush finds himself today looking at a potential legacy that includes a world in which anti-Americanism will have increased exponentially among America’s friends and foes alike, terrorism will have grown rather than receded, and America will be enmeshed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Gaza and now Lebanon provide the Bush administration with a major opportunity to demonstrate its global leadership and its stated commitment to the spread of democracy and promote the Middle East peace process, policies used by the Bush administration to legitimate the US led invasion and occupation of Iraq. Tragically, the administration has thus far chosen to be part of the problem not of the solution.

From North Africa to Southeast Asia as a recent Gallup World Poll indicates, overwhelming majorities (91-95 per cent) said that they did not believe the US is trustworthy, friendly, or treats other countries respectfully nor that it cares about human rights in other countries (80 per cent). Outside of Iraq, there is over 90 per cent agreement among Muslims that the invasion of Iraq has done more harm than good. How has the administration responded?

In a world in which the war on global terrorism has come to be equated in the minds of many Muslims (and others) with a war against Islam and the Muslim world, the administration reemphasised the importance of public diplomacy, appointing a talented senior Bush confidante, Karen Hughes, and spoke of a war of ideas.

However, the administration’s responses in Gaza and in Lebanon undercut both the president’s credibility and the war on terrorism.

The US has turned a blind eye to Israel’s launching of two wars whose primary victims are civilians. It failed to support UN mediation in the face of clear violations of international law and Israel’s use of collective punishment, policies in Gaza that Amnesty International labelled war crimes.

It refused to heed calls for a ceasefire and UN intervention and continued to provide military assistance to Israel.

America, with its unconditional support of Israel, has become a partner not simply in a military action against Hamas or Hezbollah militants but in a war against democratically elected governments in Gaza and Lebanon, a long time US ally. The “disproportionate response” to Hezbollah’s July 12 seizure of two soldiers and killing of three others has resulted in the death of more than 1,000 the displacement of more than 900,000 and the destruction of Lebanon’s infrastructure; its primary victims are hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians not terrorists.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan criticism of the Israeli bombardment of Lebanon as “excessive use of force” was countered the next day by the New York Times headline “US speeds up bomb delivery for the Israelis.”

Is it any wonder that news reporters in the Arab world speak of the Israeli-US war, a Western Christian religious leader and long-time resident of Lebanon speaks of “the rape of Lebanon,” or that in Southeast Asia, as one observer put it, “Malaysians are telling Bush, forget the war on terrorism. He is inflaming terrorism!”

There are no easy answers but as John Voll has argued, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon some 20 years ago demonstrated that a massive military response is not the solution.

The administration needs to respond in concert with the international community and international organisations like the United Nations. America must lead in the call for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire and a negotiated settlement as well as be a major donor in the restoration of the infrastructures of Gaza and Lebanon.

While nothing should compromise America’s commitment to the existence and security of the state of Israel, America’s national interests and credibility not only in the Arab/Muslim world but internationally will depend on our ability to “walk the way we talk.” US policy should make no exceptions, for the Arabs or Israelis, when it comes to the disproportionate use of force, indiscriminate warfare whose primary victims (those killed, injured or displaced) are majorities of innocent civilians not terrorists, collective punishment and the massive violation of human rights.

Time to act on Burma

THIS might seem the least likely moment to expect the UN Security Council to take up the question of Burma. Lebanon is burning; Iran is going nuclear — do the world’s diplomats really need one more intractable problem?

But in one sense, the fact that Burma is not at the top of anyone’s agenda is exactly the reason the Security Council should act. Burma, also known as Myanmar, offers the United Nations a chance to show that it can deal with a threat to global security before it explodes onto the front page.

Burma is not engaging in nuclear blackmail, and it has not attacked a neighboring country. But its malevolent dictatorship does represent a threat to peace: Its depredations at home (mass rapes, enforced child labour, burning of farms and villages) push masses of refugees across its borders.

Its economic failures make it a locus of Aids and other diseases. Its corruption makes it a leading source of illegal drugs. And its population of 50 million suffers under a regime whose repressiveness is rivaled only by North Korea’s.

In the face of this anguish, the beleaguered democrats of this Southeast Asian nation are asking only that the Security Council put their misery on its agenda.

They are not asking for UN-mandated sanctions, let alone peacekeepers or intervention — only some attention from Secretary General Kofi Annan and the international body that promised, not so long ago, not to let notions of national sovereignty keep it from standing up for human rights.

This shouldn’t be a hard call. Unlike many dictatorships, Burma boasts a clearly legitimate alternative: the National League for Democracy, which demonstrated overwhelming popular support when the hubristic junta mistakenly permitted free elections in 1990.

Many party leaders have been in prison since, and the NLD’s leader — Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi — is under house arrest.

But despite that treatment, she and her colleagues are asking only for dialogue about a gradual transition to democracy.

The Security Council needs to put Burma on its formal agenda and then adopt a resolution calling for her freedom and the release of all political prisoners; for a process of national reconciliation with the democrats at the table; for United Nations and other international aid to flow directly to Burma’s most vulnerable people, not through the corrupt bureaucracy; and for Mr Annan to report back regularly on progress made on all these points.

The United Nations would enhance its own stature by associating itself with Burma’s nonviolent democrats. — The Washington Post

Will the US listen to the OIC?

WASHINGTON’S proxy war in Lebanon continues to raise troubling questions about the long and dark shadow of American military might that has fallen over the Muslim world. Is this part of the relentless response to 9/11 that has become a surrogate for the achievement of larger American and Israeli strategic objectives in the region?

Is the rhetoric about the creation of a new Middle East merely a front for hideous power politics? Who is winning and who is losing? The fact is that both the West and the Islamic world are losing. The OIC has spoken — in favour of a ceasefire — a little too late as the fighting runs its bloody course. Will the US listen to the OIC? I doubt it. Let us face it. Most Islamic states are not free. They suffer from a dual freedom deficit. Populations are under the thumb of ruling elites who themselves live in bondage to a Faustian bargain with outside powers that mortgage the economic and strategic interests of their societies Admittedly in some cases they have serious security concerns, legitimate or otherwise, arising from regional disputes or conflicts, or from hegemonic or ambitious neighbours.

There are ideological tensions, regional rivalries and sectarian conflicts within the Islamic world. The embattled countries thus look up to outsiders to redress the balance of power. Whatever the rationale, it constrains their freedom of action.

No wonder, US influence looms large in the Islamic world. It is not the best bargain for US allies but it does serve the interests of the ruling elite. The rhetoric costs nothing and amounts to nothing. That is where the OIC rhetoric stands.

Could the OIC have done better? Let us not get carried away with illusory expectations of the OIC or be despondent over the lack of unity and cooperation among Muslim countries. The truth is that it is simply not possible to base a state’s policies on considerations of religious unity. It flies in the face of both the interests of the ruling elite and national interests.

A country’s interests stem from its geography and resources, political and security concerns, its history, relations with neighbours and the geo-strategic profile of the region. Several domestic conditions — culture, ethnic mix of the population, social structure, domestic political compulsions, and the wishes and assumption of the ruling classes — are also relevant.

Naturally, different Muslim countries move along different orbits, responding to their own historical impulses, political dynamics and oligarchic or dynastic interests. But most of them remain locked in an unequal bargain with the West giving them little space for manoeuvre.

Let us look at the extent of American power in the Middle East in recent decades and how Muslims themselves have facilitated it. Take the case of the Iraq-Iran war. The US may or may not have instigated it, yet Washington exploited this strategic opportunity to embroil two major powers in the region (that could challenge American influence) in a mutual conflict and thus weaken both.

It could not have done it without support from friends in the region. The Gulf War provided the next strategic opening to the US to entrench its power, again acquiesced in by the Gulf countries. And now, the war on terror which is also not without its supporters in the Muslim world.

It is a tragedy for the Muslim world that extremists have become the only credible force challenging this bargain between Muslim governments and the West. They have become the voice of much of the disempowered populations ironically tempting them with their goal of overthrowing everything, good and bad. They are being ably assisted in their endeavours by Washington’s policies. It is not the war on terrorism per se that has caused anger with America on Muslim streets. It is the insensitive way in which this war is humiliating the Muslim world that has angered its population.

Even before the war on terrorism, the environment in the Muslim world was giving rise to frustration. Against the background of weak democratic institutions and the absence of a just international order the population was already losing faith in prospects of a peaceful and orderly transition to a better future. A sense of dismay was descending.

Muslims have forgotten the lessons of history: that in the ultimate analysis, it is more than a religious ideal that spurs people on to exceptional achievements. Knowledge, scholarship, organisational skills, resources, leadership abilities and statesmanship count just as much as if not more than piety or jihad. The reason Muslim societies had excelled in the past was that they were way ahead of their times where human progress and values, including tolerance and social justice, were concerned. Now they are well behind. The Muslim world needs to search for its own strengths rather than base these on its relations with the West.

Unfortunately, Washington’s policies continue to complicate this search by pursuing the extremist agenda in the Muslim world. The horrific carnage unleashed by the war in Lebanon and the understandable outrage it has caused in the Islamic world is an example of this. Through this appalling human tragedy Washington has tried to retrieve what it had lost in Iraq. By striking at Hezbollah and boxing in Hamas, both allies of Iran and instruments of its influence in the region, the US and Israel have tried to weaken Iran’s leverage. If Iran does not succumb, Israel will retain the option of striking at Iran’s nuclear facilities. The origins of such an attack could lie in hostilities that may not have anything to do with the nuclear issue but could provoke Iran and thus aggravate the situation by giving Israel an excuse to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities — all in the name of the war on terrorism.

Israel has reckoned that a prosperous, stable and strong Lebanon means a strong Hezbollah. A weak Lebanon on the other hand means a weak Hezbollah. A strong and resurgent Hezbollah would be looking to confront Israel, whereas a weak Hezbollah would be fighting for its own survival, and involved in a civil war, would be a lesser threat to Israel.

This ferocious attack on Lebanon was intended to send a strong message to Hamas that if it wants peace it will have to come to terms with Israel. How far Washington and Israel have succeeded or failed in achieving these respective objectives, only time will tell. For the present, their failures seem to be as big as their successes.

No great power has historically succeeded in influencing world affairs without employing the full range of its economic and military power, diplomatic assets, and above all its moral authority. When these instruments of foreign policy were available at optimum levels in the past, America was able to make great contributions to international peace and stability and humanitarian causes.

But currently, America’s diplomatic assets are strained because of Washington’s failure to navigate the paradigm shift that has taken place in the global balance of power and to understand or appreciate what is going on in the Islamic world. It still feels it can lead by domination but the world that used to bend to America’s will has changed.

As for Washington’s moral authority it has been degraded by its increasingly self-centred policies and total alignment with Israel, and the emergence of a low stature leadership in the new structure of politics in the country where the influence of money, media and the public relations industry has made it easy to successfully package mediocre leadership which remains hostage to its constituencies.

America is thus left with limited options to influence world affairs. No wonder there is the propensity to use military power which remains undiminished. But the use of this power without moral basis or international legitimacy is proving costly to foreign policy that ends up straining domestic consensus and imposing unacceptable financial costs as we are witnessing in Iraq. In the ultimate analysis, all this grandeur might prove to be just tinsel. Already the current administration has hurt America’s image.

It is sad, for the world and itself, that on many issues America is looking terribly small and isolated. It is a big comedown for a great power. And however strong their rhetoric at the OIC summit, those who support the US may also be walking alone.

The writer is a former ambassador.

Email: thussain@gwu.edu