Commonwealth’s rebuke

IT is highly embarrassing for the nation that the communiqué issued in Valetta by the Commonwealth summit conference on Sunday should have mentioned Pakistan specifically as a country whose progress towards democratization will be watched by the 53-nation grouping. As the communiqué made it clear, the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group will retain Pakistan on its agenda “pending the resolution of this issue” — the issue being the holding of the offices of head of state and army chief by Gen Pervez Musharraf. Pakistan’s membership of the Commonwealth was suspended following the October 1999 coup, but in May 2004 the CMAG decided to accept Pakistan back into the fold because it “welcomed the progress made in restoring democracy and rebuilding democratic institutions in Pakistan.” This was obviously a reference to the general election held in October 2002. However, Secretary-General Don McKinnon said the group agreed “to remain seized of the situation by retaining Pakistan on its agenda”. Now, two years later, the situation remains the same, for there is no word from President Musharraf yet that he would cease to be the army chief of staff. More regrettably, there was the humiliation for a nation founded by Jinnah the constitutionalist, to be told by the world leaders gathered at Malta’s capital that “holding by the same person of the offices of head of state and chief of army staff is incompatible with the basic principles of democracy...”

On numerous occasions — as for instance, while speaking at the Staff College, Quetta, on June 14, 1948 — the Quaid-i-Azam asked the officers of the armed forces to study the constitution then in force, to see the full implications of their oath to it, and realize that their first and foremost duty was to defend the frontiers of Pakistan. With the benefit of hindsight we can see that our armed forces have never bothered to follow the advice of the Father of the Nation. The point to note is that the issue concerns the people of Pakistan, their future and the system of governance and institutions that they want for the country. The political non-system that we have today is largely controlled by the army, which queered the pitch for its opponents by making arbitrary changes in the 1973 Constitution.

The Legal Framework Order reincarnated some of the worst features of the Zia era, including a president in uniform and the infamous Article 58-2b, which gives the president the right to sack the prime minister and dissolve an elected assembly. The general election of 2002 was thus held in an atmosphere in which the two mainstream political parties had no chance of winning. The referendum held in 2002 was spurious, as was Gen Musharraf’s “election” as president in January 2004. To top it all, the highest policymaking institution in the country is now the National Security Council, which is headed by the president. There are rumours now — let us hope they are unfounded — that the generals could opt for a presidential system, with the nazims serving as the electoral college. Should they really choose to follow this dangerous course, the end-result will hardly be different from the fate suffered by similar “systems” practised by Ayub Khan and Ziaul Haq. In the ultimate analysis, it is the nation that will be the loser. The real task before the army now is to draw up an exit strategy. No country will be considered a democracy if the army chief happens to be the head of state.

Doing away with jirga system

THE three-day conference on honour killings organized by the British Council has called for the elimination of the parallel system of justice in Pakistan which, to a great extent, is responsible for ordering honour killings. This is not a new demand. Jirgas have been notorious for taking the law into their own hands and creating their own social and legal code that very often militates against the law of the land. Hence, conceding to the human rights activists and the champions of women’s rights, the Sindh High Court imposed a ban on the holding of jirgas in April 2004. But as is the wont in this country, the ban has been blatantly ignored and nothing has been done about it. Hence the honour killing conference found it necessary to repeat the demand.

The tradition of the jirga system which found its way into Sindh from Balochistan has flourished in the province. So entrenched has it become that an HRCP report issued in August 2004 noted that 25 jirgas were held that year after the Sindh High Court judgment banned them. What is worse, these jirgas have been held under the chairmanship of MPAs, nazims, political party leaders and even ministers. What is more, they hand down their verdicts in line with their tribal customs and feudal culture, and the punishments very often violate the laws of the land. If theirs was a role of a conciliator one might have turned a blind eye to the existence of the jirgas. But that is not generally the case. For instance, giving the death sentence is quite normal for them and they tend to favour the vested interests and the privileged. Thus in a karo kari case, a jirga does not even hear the woman’s side of the story. It is therefore essential that the jirga menace be curbed. This institution has flourished because it dispenses summary justice in an arbitrary manner which its supporters prefer to the slow-moving judicial system of the state. But the failure of the judiciary to dispense quick justice does not justify a parallel system of justice. It must be curbed, while judicial reforms are carried out to expedite the legal and judicial process.

As the virus threat persists

ONE week after the death of Dr Yusra Khalil in Karachi, reportedly from Congo virus contracted at Civil Hospital (CHK), authorities seem to be still unaware about the dangers a potential outbreak could cause. Some of the confusion centres on what kind of haemorrhagic fever patients are being treated for, since symptoms are similar. The Congo virus (caused by a tick bite prevalent in cattle) is just one type of haemorrhagic fever as is the dengue virus (caused by a mosquito bite); both have been found in Pakistan. If diagnosed at an early stage, the viruses are curable, but it is important for authorities to allay the public’s fears about any possible epidemic and spread awareness about each virus, advising people on preventative measures. Around 40 patients suffering from haemorrhagic fever have been admitted at a private hospital between Oct 2 and Nov 23 which highlights the severity of the problem. The fact that 400 CHK doctors recently went on strike demanding that authorities provide adequate facilities and protective tools shows just how abysmal the state of hospitals is. Some of their demands, like the creation of an isolation ward, have been met, but a lot more needs to be done to assuage fears.

Health authorities will need to move beyond issuing advisories to hospitals to exercise caution when dealing with suspected victims. Requiring hospitals to be sprayed to prevent any outbreak is not enough. Preventive steps must be thorough and effective. The realization of the gravity of the issue seems to have sunk in but action must go beyond setting up committees to probe the matter. It is equally important that precautionary measures are in place at every level. An honest appraisal is more likely to save lives than the constant denial, which ultimately proves costly in terms of death and suffering.

Political economy of reconstruction

SIX weeks after the October 8 earthquake, the economic effects of the natural disaster are beginning to unfold. The immediate effects of the natural disaster on the economy may well be positive, largely as a result of the stimulus provided by the massive relief work underway.

However, the extent to which the relief work benefits the affected people and the long-term impact on the economy remain ambiguous.

No doubt the government has succeeded in converting an initial lukewarm donor response into pledges for very sizeable international funding. However, the manner in which the government has mobilized its support by assuring continued obeisance to its political patrons and the way the aid is to be disbursed, notwithstanding the solemn pledges of transparency and accountability, are likely to make Pakistan even more dependent on US-sponsored assistance than before. It is not unlikely that Pakistan may again be asked to enter into an IMF-monitored programme for channelling external assistance.

The main concern with regard to pledges of external assistance received by Pakistan in the November 19 meeting in Islamabad is not simply that the major proportion of these pledges are in the form of loans rather than grants, but whether they will prove adequate for the rehabilitation and reconstruction purposes and whether they will permit the reorienting of our development priorities.

The prospects of rehabilitating the earthquake-affected areas depend not only on the extent to which the promised foreign aid and domestic funds are disbursed, but also on the way the relief and rehabilitation programme is planned and carried out. If past experience is any guide, ad hocism will have the upper hand over planning, and vested interests will bypass the deserving, resulting in a lot of leakages which accompany programmes with a high component of foreign aid and charity.

There is thus likely to be many a slip between the cup and the lip. What is more, the government does not have a coherent plan regarding reconstruction other than the hurriedly put together needs assessment report by the ADB, World Bank and the UN agencies, whose primary aim was to attract donor funding at the conference. The government’s own planning machinery, which like the disaster management outfit has been largely dysfunctional, has hardly played any useful contribution in shaping the country’s development strategy. Through the attrition of its professional capability and the government’s indifference to its role, it has become incapable of providing a credible analysis of the economic consequences of the earthquake and preparing a reconstruction plan consonant with the country’s resources and objectives, without the help of foreign agencies.

Ad hoc announcements such as doubling the share of GDP on education or deferral of the purchase of F-16s, meant to appease an increasingly agitated public opinion against the regime’s misplaced priorities, do not make a consistent and coherent plan. The government needs to present an interim budget and a five-year earthquake reconstruction plan, as an integral part of a revised medium term development plan, to be debated by parliament and civil society.

The parts of the country which were severely affected by the earthquake formed a relatively small proportion of the national economy. They were both underdeveloped and under-populated relative to the rest of the country and depended largely on remittances from predominantly male migrants from these parts to various urban centres of Pakistan, but primarily to Islamabad and Rawalpindi. A considerable proportion of the migrants from Azad Kashmir have been living in the UK since the early days of independence, but still send remittances to their relatives.

The economies of these areas are likely to experience further out-migration, especially among the relatively more affluent sections of the population, while the more indigent survivors of the disaster are likely to be left behind, with heavy dependence on doles being provided by the government and relief agencies. The current strategy of the government has the potential to make this area a vast beggar house, living on charity and compassion, rather than on productive employment.

The best way to avoid this situation is to urgently introduce an employment guarantee programme, which would involve the local population in clearing the debris, building village roads and mountain tracks, agricultural terraces, schools, health centres and other local infrastructure destroyed by the earthquake. Such a programme will help revive the local economy and keep poverty at bay. It will also induce the local population to stay and participate in the reconstruction work, which will otherwise be hijacked by unethical contractors, who were in part responsible for the construction of the unsafe buildings which collapsed.

An important feature of the larger half of the earthquake-affected area, viz Azad Kashmir, is the heavy presence of the army because of the existence in it of the Line of Control. The earthquake has reportedly caused very heavy casualties among the troops bunkered along this volatile border and of the military infrastructure including hospitals, training camps, roads, bridges and hospitals.

The figures for these human and material losses have not yet been revealed, neither are their estimates included in the reconstruction costs of the earthquake prepared by the ADB and the World Bank in collaboration with the government of Pakistan. If the government really stands by its promise of transparency, it must come out with a detailed paper on these losses and on how it intends to repair them.

The government’s recent proposal to demilitarize both the Indian-held and Pakistani parts of Kashmir as a precursor to a larger settlement with India could well be prompted by the large military casualties and the harsh conditions in which a substantial force has to be stationed there in very unfavourable living conditions. In case India accepts the proposal — a rather unlikely prospect — the withdrawal of Pakistani armed forces from the area is likely to adversely affect the employment and livelihood of the surviving population which chooses (or is forced to) continue to live there.

The only way this unhappy consequence could be avoided is through a massive development effort jointly undertaken on both sides of the LoC, with the active participation of India and Pakistan, as well as expatriate Kashmiris and with sizeable help from friendly dynamic economies such as Japan and Korea. However, Pakistan’s continued insistence that trade and economic relationships with India will not be normalized until the Kashmir issue is resolved will make such a plan a non-starter.

Moreover, the fact that virtually no economic development took place in Azad Kashmir, during the last half century or so, while Indian-held Kashmir received considerable help from the Indian government in building its social and physical infrastructure and in developing the valley’s tourist potential, which have suffered a setback since the 1989 uprising, is likely to give India an advantage in winning the hearts and minds of Kashmiris.

The government’s linkage of the solution of the Kashmir problem with that of the reconstruction effort, although seemingly well-intentioned in principle, is likely to make the transparency of the latter much murkier. Such a linkage confuses the medium-term issues of rehabilitation and reconstruction with the long-term issues of Kashmir and reconciliation with India.

By making a purely economic and humanitarian issue subject to the solution of long-term political issues, the government is provided with a smokescreen to avoid the promised transparency and accountability of the vast sums received by the government from international donors, expatriates and ordinary citizens.

The problem with the present military-dominated regime is that it is keen to take credit for solving all the problems that the country is currently faced with, within the term of its tenure, which it knows cannot be extended indefinitely. The regime is continually enlarging the agenda which it deems necessary to implement before relinquishing its self-imposed responsibility for solving all the problems, domestic and external, that have backlogged in the past 50 years.

Unfortunately, as is widely perceived, the military itself has largely been responsible for the creation and aggravation of many of the problems it is keen to resolve now, although it has never admitted any responsibility for them nor has it instituted or implemented any enquiry into its blunders. The increasing friction between civilian and military actors in the administration of the relief programme testify to its ineptness in handling humanitarian problems which require sensitivity and understanding, qualities for which the armed forces have not been trained.

In expanding further its already vast political and economic agenda, the regime’s real aim is to validate its legitimacy and extend its continuing hold over the country’s polity, which has stagnated and is stunted because of the military’s continued interference in civilian affairs, including the management of the earthquake disaster relief and reconstruction programmes.

The ultimate aim of such an exercise has little to do with rendering the LoC irrelevant, but much more with making political parties and civil society organizations redundant. Yet the challenge facing the country now makes it imperative that the military recognize the inevitable need for limiting (if not reversing) its political role and allowing the civilian institutions to play their constitutional duty of exercising their oversight on vital national expenditures, including military expenditures, and in reaching a national consensus on major political issues, including Kashmir and long-term political and economic relations with India.

Email: sm_naseem@hotmail.com