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| November 12, 2005 | Saturday | Shawwal 9, 1426 |
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Rebuilding the health sector
A debacle for Mr Blair
Remembering Yasser Arafat
A failure of judgment
A YEAR ago, Yasser Arafat breathed his last. With his death departed the last of the political dinosaurs and icons of a revolutionary era. Arafat epitomized unflinching resolve and remained steadfast to his cause despite several military and political reverses.
PAKISTAN has reacted positively to Afghanistan’s desire to join the seven-nation South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. So has India. Given the history of Afghanistan’s relationship with South Asia over the centuries, Kabul’s keenness to join Saarc is understandable. Apart from a political and historical relationship with South Asia, Afghanistan is part of the South Asia cultural ambience. Economically, landlocked Afghanistan is dependent a great deal on Pakistan because most of its foreign trade is routed through Karachi. Now China, too, is keen to develop a closer relationship with Saarc. Pakistan will no doubt welcome the idea because of the close and friendly relations that have traditionally existed between the two countries. Reports from Dhaka, following a meeting of Saarc officials, say that all the seven members are likely to respond positively to Beijing’s interest. What the Saarc members are trying to do now is to develop a consensus on how to institutionalize China’s involvement. This could take the form of China becoming “a dialogue partner” or being given observer status.
At the moment, Saarc is attracting attention because of the sheer size of its territory and population. It stretches from the Maldives in the south of Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean to Bhutan in the north, and its population is likely to reach one a half billion in not too distant a future. Beyond that, Saarc governments have done little during the two decades of its existence to make its presence felt in the world and to their own people. It has immense natural and human resources, yet in terms of concrete achievements, the grouping’s record is dismal. There are innumerable resolutions, committees and agreements on subjects ranging from narcotics control and cultural interaction to the ambitious plan for a South Asian Free Trade Area. But none of these has seen the light of day or advanced significantly towards the realization of the hopes expressed at every Saarc summit. Mutual distrust and a propensity for verbosity rather than concrete action deeply embedded in South Asia are in sharp contrast to the traits in some other regional groupings which have made extraordinary progress. The ones that readily come to mind are the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Beginning as a modest coal and steel union between France and Germany, the EU has grown in status, size and importance — from the European Coal and Steel Community founded in 1951, the European Common Market, the European Economic Community and the European Community to what it is today — the 25-member European Union. Closer at home, the 10-member Asean has set an extraordinary example of the success that regional cooperation can achieve in improving people’s quality of life. Billions of dollars flow into Asean economies through tourism alone.
Saarc’s lack of progress stems basically from the geopolitical problems that have bedevilled relations between two of its key members, Pakistan and India. Both of them also spend excessively on defence, thus depriving the social sector of much-needed money for the war on poverty and illiteracy. Since they are two of Saarc’s most important members, other members have felt held back in the absence of initiatives and interest on the part of the big two for meaningful regional cooperation. With the normalization process between Pakistan and India making progress now, all one can hope is that Islamabad and New Delhi will make a serious effort to help turn Saarc into a living organization instead of what it is at present — a ritualistic gathering marked by rhetoric.
NOT surprisingly, Pakistan’s traditional neglect of the health sector has come home to roost in the wake of the October 8 earthquake. Lacking an adequate and efficient health-care infrastructure, the country is finding it difficult to cope with the large number of injured and traumatized people. The inclement weather and the inaccessibility of many of the affected areas have made it certain that many more casualties are to be expected. Had an effective health-care system existed in this region and had the structures housing it been built in keeping with the building code, they would have been earthquake proof. Many of the BHUs and RHCs would have been standing intact today to provide care to the afflicted. The injuries people are suffering from would have not been so bad had their wounds been attended to immediately.
It goes to the credit of the medical fraternity that its members responded promptly to the distress of the earthquake-affected people. Teams of doctors from all over the country and abroad have volunteered their services and have been caring for those in need of help. Now plans have been drawn up for rebuilding the health infrastructure in the affected areas and various agencies have offered financial assistance. But as could have been logically expected, they have refused to put their money into units that are under-utilized and are not of much help to the people because of poor planning and even worse functioning. These agencies have called for a reform of this sector before they loosen their purse strings. The government should see this as an opportunity to mend its ways. The NWFP health department which organized a donors conference in Abbottabad has drawn up long-term, medium-term and short-term plans at the district level. Of course, the immediate priority has to be saving lives. Mobile units, additional medical hands, medicines and preventive health-care such as inoculations and sanitation could help in the present situation. It is also important that the long-term and medium-term plans be linked so that there is no duplication.
WEDNESDAY’S parliamentary defeat for British Prime Minister Tony Blair at the hands of his own party MPs on key anti-terror legislation is not only a strong indictment of some of Britain’s anti-terror policies but also a great victory for the parliamentary system of democracy and for civil liberties. Forty-nine Labour MPs voted along with the opposition to hand Mr Blair his first ever defeat in the House of Commons, rejecting by 322 votes to 291 a government proposal that would have allowed the police to detain a terror suspect for a 90-day period. After rejecting the government plan, the MPs immediately passed legislation allowing the police to hold suspects for up to 28 days instead of the current limit of 14 days. Clearly, the vote has to be seen as a big setback for Mr Blair, not least because of the pivotal role played by several dozen of his own Labour MPs in not following the party line blindly and because the proposal was a central plank of his government’s counter-terrorism measures drawn up in response to the 7/7 terrorist attacks in London. Besides, he had made a personal appeal to his party’s MPs to back it in the “national interest”.
It is heartening to see that at least in some countries, when the head of the government makes such an appeal legislators of even his own party have the courage of conviction to resist it if they think it is unreasonable or would restrict civil liberties. The political implication of the debacle is unclear but Mr Blair has already brushed aside calls from the opposition to resign. However, given that he has already announced that he would not be seeking re-election, this vote will strongly reinforce the perception among many that he is now a ‘lame-duck’ PM. At the very least, the defeat should impel the UK government to rethink its anti-terror policies and laws.
It was his incredible courage and conviction that endeared him to his people, and despite his apparent failure to wrest the occupied lands from the Israeli oppressor, he retains a unique place in Arab history. Arafat’s life is a fascinating account of the interplay of diplomacy and force with the single-minded pursuit of his objective.
In contemporary history, Nasser is the only Arab leader, who despite the failure of his policies, has retained the love of the Arab people and has left behind a legacy that survives until today. Arafat, too, will continue to inspire future generations of Palestinians with his faith in the ultimate triumph of the Palestinians and their attainment of the goal of a homeland of their own.
On the first death anniversary of Yasser Arafat, the memories of my intermittent contacts with him during 20 years fill me with pain and exhilaration. On September 6, 1970, four international airliners were hijacked by Palestinians led by the legendary Laila Khaled. Next day, another BOAC airliner was hijacked and joined the earlier four at Dawson’s Field — a Second World War airstrip in Jordan. Of the 600 passengers held hostage, 15 were Pakistanis.
I received instructions from Islamabad to negotiate their release, being then charge d’affaires of our embassy in Amman. This was my first encounter with Yasser Arafat, lovingly called Abu Ammar by his compatriots. I met him in Fatah Qiyadah — the GHQ in mid-town. The meeting lasted some 20 minute and though the hijacking had been organized by the PFLP — a radical splinter organization led by George Habash — the Pakistanis were released after two days with Arafat’s intervention. Subsequently, the planes were destroyed and all hostages released in batches.
Those were the heady days of the Palestinian revolution. The war of attrition was continuing and the Palestinian youth, then known as the “fedayeen,” were carrying out spectacular operations against Israel from Jordanian territory. The Palestinian revolution was in full cry and Arafat as the chairman was a symbol of Palestinian aspirations and one who would undo the shame of the June, 1967 disaster and get them the occupied lands.
These dreams, however, soon turned sour when King Hussein, wary of Fedayeen activities, decided to crack down on them, in the events of Black September. A massive military action by Jordanian forces against Palestinians turned into a civil war and smothered the flowering Palestinian revolution in its infancy. The majority of these refugees were driven out of Jordan into Lebanon and Syria. The confrontation dealt a severe blow to the liberation struggle of the PLO; and the hapless Palestinians experienced yet another diaspora, now in Syria and Lebanon.
It was during this confrontation that stories of Pakistan forces under the command of then Brigadier Ziaul Haq, (later the president of Pakistan) were alleged to have played a critical role in the massacre of Palestinians. Pakistan’s involvement was highly exaggerated but widely believed by Palestinians. I met Arafat at least three times to disabuse him of notions of Pakistan’s alleged anti-Palestinian role. My explanations apparently fell on unreceptive ears, and lurking doubts about Zia and Pakistan’s role remained with him for long.
From Amman I was transferred to Beirut and contacts were revived when the PLO shifted its HQ to Beirut where it stayed until 1982 when the Israeli invasion forced them to exile in Tunis. My last contacts were during 1997-1999. Arafat visited Cairo often to attend Arab League meetings. And as ambassador of Pakistan I had frequent social occasions to meet him. Often we reminisced about the past. Arafat was a broken man, as neither the approach to peace in terms of the Oslo Accord succeeded, nor did the armed struggle bear fruit.
He conceded his two critical mistakes that dealt a major blow to the Palestinian movement. These were his support for Saddam during the Kuwait attack, and his faith in the West and the US, that they would help him realize the dream of an independent Palestinian state in terms of the Oslo Accord. However his major frustration was with Arab potentates, who used the Palestinian issue for their domestic agenda and never gave him the support he needed to crown his struggle with success. Talking of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, he remarked that “there was more warmth in the snow-clad peaks of Mount Hermon in Lebanon than in the Arab hearts for Palestinians”
Arafat decided to opt for the peace process and signed the Oslo Accords in 1993. The great revolutionary turned into a votary of peace, and in the last decade of his life, carried on his mission for a peaceful negotiated settlement. He did not succeed, not for want of political will or courage to embrace peace, but owing to the perfidy and arrogance of his adversaries and the treachery of his Arab friends. Arafat was not only isolated but humiliated and vilified. Israel declared him an arch terrorist and denied him access to the world. In the last three years of his life, he was practically incarcerated in his own compound in Ramallah. The Arabs did nothing to save him from this indignity and misery.
Arafat also made monumental mistakes that brought his people misery. His support to Saddam during the Gulf war not only meant that he forfeited the support of the Arabs, in particular the Gulf rulers, but also led to the expulsion of almost half a million Palestinian workers in these states. His refusal to accept the Camp David peace plan presented by President Clinton in the twilight of his presidency in 2000 was yet another misjudgment.
History will record the failings and shortcomings of Arafat, but its verdict will be charitable. No leader, poised against such formidable odds, did so much for his people, suffered so much, and yet did not compromise on the principles and continued until his last breath, to struggle for a homeland for Palestinians.
WHAT is the major political conclusion to be drawn from Wednesday’s stunning 322-291 Labour government’s defeat on the anti-terrorism bill? One obvious answer is to stress Tony Blair’s loss of authority, by pointing to his inability to drive his 90-day detention plans through a parliament in which Labour has a 66-vote majority.
But, as Mr Blair’s biographer John Rentoul observed yesterday, this argument could imply that rebel MPs would not do the same thing to a different leader whose authority was greater than Mr Blair’s. Yet would any other Labour leader really have been more successful in promoting 90-day detention this week?
It is not obvious. Maybe in the afterglow of an electoral honeymoon a new leader might get away with making such a draconian power into a loyalty test. But the reality is that not even Gordon Brown at his most commanding could now count on persuading many of Wednesday’s 60 Labour civil liberty rebels back into the government lobbies on this same issue.
No, the much more wounding conclusion from Wednesday’s defeat concerns Mr Blair’s judgment, rather than his authority. It was, after all, Mr Blair who first promoted the 90-day solution to MPs and who stuck to it relentlessly to the end.
It was Mr Blair who, as things got more difficult, used every weapon he could grab to win sceptical MPs round - upsetting important conventions by dragging the police into the centre of the party political battle to support his case and insisting that no alternative perspective need be treated with respect.
It was Mr Blair who refused to sanction a compromise solution that a lot of good observers thought was there for the taking, thus guaranteeing the final confrontation. And it is, therefore, Mr Blair who was the architect of this unprecedented defeat for his own government.
That the opposition parties may, as a result, find themselves on the wrong side of public opinion on the anti-terrorism issue is a small prize, of questionable value, to set against the cold reality of self-inflicted failure. Mr Blair’s now celebrated remark in the Commons that it is better to do the right thing and lose has never been the governing principle of New Labour at any other time over the past 11 years, so it takes some swallowing to accept that it should suddenly become one now.
This failure of judgment contains echoes from the past and warnings for the future. So, eerily, does yesterday’s collective governmental state of denial about the cost of pursuing a failed policy to the bitter end in this way. The loudest echoes most obviously arise from the failed policy on Iraq, freshly rechronicled by Sir Christopher Meyer in our pages.
This week’s failure of judgment was not on the same tragic scale as the failure over Iraq. But in both cases Mr Blair’s recklessness helped to squander a carefully assembled coalition of support for a just but more modest aim than the one to which Mr Blair wrongly tied himself. Both cases were marked by a desperation, inflexibility and lack of political skill whose result was failure.
As the critical point approached on Iraq, Mr Blair also used many of the same convention-busting persuasion tactics that he used this week.
—The Guardian, London