Taking the peace process forward
By Talat Masood
AS India and Pakistan prepare to enter the third phase of the composite dialogue, it is important to asses how far the two countries have moved forward since the initiation of the peace process, and what impact this has had on the security and strategic environment of South Asia as well as what does the future portends.
Considering that nearly three years ago the two nuclear rivals were locked in a protracted military standoff, there is no denying that they have come a long way, although progress has been essentially on softer and less contentious issues. The security environment has improved significantly. Ceasefire along the 750-kilometre Line of Control and the Siachen Glacier is holding and both sides have reaffirmed their commitment to ensure its compliance in future.
Additional confidence building measures (CBMs) include the pre-notification of ballistic missile tests, the establishment of communication links between the maritime security forces, a dedicated fibre optic communication link between foreign secretaries to serve as a nuclear risk reduction measure and upgradation of the existing director general military operations hotline.
Besides, a host of CBMs covering travel between the two sides of Kashmir, allowing the visit of the All Parties Hurriyet Conference (APHC) leaders to Pakistan and the restoration of air, rail and bus links between India and Pakistan have been agreed upon. New air and land routes are also likely to be opened in due course. People-to-people contacts have improved significantly and the business community on both sides is looking at prospects for economic and commercial cooperation.
The revival of the Indo-Pakistan joint commission after a lapse of 16 years opens up possibilities of cooperation in the fields of agriculture, health, science and technology, education and information technologies. It is indeed encouraging that the peace process and the leadership of both countries is showing sensitivity towards each other’s political constraints.
Negotiations on Siachen and Sir Creek are going on but have not made any real progress so far. Some agreement may emerge on these issues in subsequent meetings as the joint statement after the foreign ministers’ meeting of October 2005 in Islamabad indicated. On the resolution of the vital issue of Jammu and Kashmir, India continues to drag its feet and wants to compel Pakistan and the people of J&K to, by and large, accept the status quo.
This led to growing fears that the peace process may lose its momentum when in September 2005, at the United Nations, both President Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh fell back on the old rhetoric of blaming each other’s country for destroying the spirit of the peace process.
Nonetheless, the positive aspect of the issue of Kashmir is that talks between the APHC and the governments of India and Pakistan have taken place. As the dialogue moves on, it is possible that besides the APHC, Islamabad may also consider reaching out to other political forces in Kashmir, including the militants, to make the process more inclusive.
If India allows an institutionalized dialogue among these major political forces, then it is possible that they could work out the future methodology to determine, either through referendum or other means, the election of representatives for negotiating with India and Pakistan and move toward conflict resolution that is acceptable to all three.
Meanwhile, the promotion of trade and joint economic activity between the two sides of Kashmir should strengthen the peace constituencies. Both parts of Kashmir could also promote tourism, exchange horticultural products, export Kashmiri handicrafts and jointly undertake communication and energy projects. Ideally, Azad Kashmir and Indian administered Kashmir can undertake hydel-projects as great potential for generating power exists.
Improving the economic well being of the people of Jammu and Kashmir is a prerequisite for creating the enabling environment and weaning disgruntled elements away from militancy.
Freedom of movement in terms of greater people to people contact and new trade and commerce opportunities can act as a catalyst for change both in Kashmir as well as between India and Pakistan.
New Delhi and Islamabad are also seriously examining prospects for energy cooperation, but progress has been slow. US pressure on India and Pakistan has made the future of the gas pipeline from Iran uncertain, although both countries maintain that they will pursue the project and are working on its financial and technical aspects.
The US approach is short sighted, considering that the key challenge to the sustainability of India and Pakistan’s economic development is to find ways to satisfy their rapidly increasing energy demands.
Additionally, energy demands are a critical factor in influencing strategic thinking and military attitudes. Regional energy grid projects will strengthen the cause of bilateral and regional cooperation and boost peace constituencies in South Asia. Islamabad should look at the gas pipeline project not as a stand-alone venture, but more holistically by embracing the concept of normal trade, granting Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status and permitting transit rights to India.
Regional energy networks could eventually move the two countries and the region including Afghanistan to pursue common energy policies. Success of pipeline projects could also act as an incentive for all parties to bring peace and security in Balochistan and the tribal belt as these form the transit areas from where the pipelines are expected to pass.
There are other trends that are disconcerting, including India’s adoption of the “cold start strategy”. This concept is based on using highly mobile integrated battle groups, combined with elements of air force and navy as “hard strike” forces in an offensive role. It is not that Pakistan’s military cannot counter this, but the approach reflects a state of mind and attitude totally at variance with the spirit that both countries are trying to develop. Similarly, Pakistan can no longer be ambivalent about its policy of support to the militants.
India and Pakistan have held exploratory talks on nuclear issues yet there is no likelihood of either country placing restraints on its nuclear and missile development. Both seem to be engaged in a silent arms race. Both countries continue to expand and modernize their nuclear arsenals. Both are increasing production of fissile materials, and high priority is being accorded to the development of delivery systems, with India focusing on Agni 2 and Agni 3 and Pakistan on the Shaheen l and Shaheen 2.
Indeed, what is even more critical is the type of nuclear strategies the two countries evolve over a period of time. It is, however, encouraging that both sides have so far not deployed their nuclear weapons, and declared that they will not engage in nuclear testing. They have agreed to limited stabilization measures such as following a missile notification regime and remain committed to their earlier agreement on prohibiting attacks on each other’s nuclear installations.
The other negative aspect is that the strategic thinking in both India and Pakistan lacks clarity about the concept of minimum deterrence. Both countries pursue the term rather loosely to cover their nuclear aspirations. Their doctrines and nuclear discourse occasionally mirrors the Cold War lexicon. They still talk of massive retaliation and India’s adoption of the triad militates against the concept of minimum deterrence.
The transformed geo-strategic environment and changed global order demands that India and Pakistan bring about a fundamental change in their military thinking and culture. And this can be facilitated if the differences in the security perceptions between the two countries are narrowed and the legacy of distrust that continues to cast a deep shadow on their relations is minimized.
We also have to remind ourselves that the forces of radicalism are still very active in the region and could exploit the lack of substantive progress on major issues.
The greatest challenge facing the two countries is, therefore, to gradually work towards removing the major contradictions in their relationship and harmonizing their military aspirations with the ongoing peace process.
Without this, it will not be possible to bring about a qualitative shift in their relationship. This is a great window of opportunity for the leadership in both countries to settle their disputes and eventually work towards a conventional and strategic restraint regime in South Asia.
The writer is a retired lieutenant-general of the Pakistan Army.


