| 28 November 2004 | Sunday | 15 Shawwal 1425 |
Changing political scene
EU divided over Turkey's membership
A gentleman of the name of Umar Ahmad Ghumman, who is apparently a minister of state for investment and privatization in the government of Pakistan, went to a "seminar" at the Johns Hopkins University on November 9. Having identified himself as a politician, he declared that politicians had always made a mess of things in his country. Pakistanis, he said, were simply incapable of working a democracy, a military government suited them much better, and that they "would rather have a dictatorship."
He went on to praise General Musharraf for his "courage and wisdom," and commended him for having gone to establish the rule of law in South Waziristan where no government had dared enter during the last 250 years. With friends and spokesmen like Mr Ghumman, Pakistan surely does not need enemies or even detractors.
I do not propose to use my limited share of space to refute Mr Ghumman's preposterous claim that military dictatorship has always served Pakistan well. But the question whether democracy can work in our culture does merit consideration. Let us begin with a recent observation of Mr Henry Kissinger in this newspaper (November 8). Referring to the prospect of democracy in Iraq, he wrote:
"Democracy in the West evolved over centuries. It required first a church independent of the state; then the Reformation, which imposed pluralism of religion; the Enlightenment, which asserted the autonomy of reason from both church and state; the Age of Discovery, which broadened horizons; and finally capitalism, with its emphasis on competition and the market."
None of these conditions, he said, exists in the Islamic world. Here we see a merging of religion and politics inimical to pluralism. He went on to observe that "the emergence of democratic institutions, and of the arrangements that hold them together, cannot be engineered as an act of will; it requires patience and modesty."
Let us see how Mr Kissinger's advice relates to our aspiration for democracy in Pakistan. We have not witnessed an extensive reinterpretation of Islam comparable to the Reformation in Christendom. Nor have we generated a movement such as the European "Enlightenment" in recent memory. In our case even capitalism needed large-scale assistance from the state and foreign agencies to get going.I should like to submit, however, that we do not have to reinvent the wheel or rediscover the principles of Newtonian physics.
The developments to which Mr Kissinger refers did not occur in Japan, India, Malaysia and several other societies where democracy is functioning reasonably well. Their workings and results are available for all to learn. The intellectuals and scientists of the more mature non-western countries have understood and adopted them. It is open to us to do the same.
One of the elements in Mr Kissinger's prescription, namely, patience, calls for elucidation. Beyond certain institutions and procedures, democracy is a habit of the mind. Attitudes and habits are not formed in a day; they result from continuous, at least frequent, practice over an extended period of time.
That it took centuries for democracy to evolve in the West necessarily implies that even if the right of the people to be governed by their consent had been articulated a long time ago, there were impediments to its implementation. Those who had traditionally possessed and wielded political power (nobility and landed aristocracy) were understandably loath to give it up. It took a long struggle to wrest power from their grasp.
The House of Commons in England began sitting as a distinct and separate body as far back as 1341, but the contest for supremacy between the parliament and the king continued for more than another 300 years. Some of the kings asserted their divine right to rule as they might deem fit. One of them, Charles I, was beheaded (January 1649) after a prolonged civil war resulting from his disputes with parliament. It was not until the Glorious Revolution (1688-89), and the passage of the Bill of Rights, that the parliament's primacy over the king got established.
The great majority of the adult males in UK did not get the franchise until 1867, and women had to wait for 60 more years to have it (1927). In the preceding times, the number of eligible voters was incredibly small. There were large industrial towns with almost no voters within their ranks. Manchester in the 18th century had less than a dozen of them. In the rural areas only certain designated categories of property holders could vote.
The entire borough of Horsham, for instance, had only 74 voters in 1783. Nobility and aristocracy bribed or intimidated voters to vote as directed. They also controlled the appointment of bailiffs and constables who conducted the elections. Following the Reform Act of 1832, which extended the franchise, charges of electoral malpractice mounted.
Democracy in the country that houses the "mother of parliaments" had a difficult passage during the 500 or more years that it took its institutions and processes to get fully established. Its career in France was no less tumultuous. At the time England was having its Glorious Revolution, Louis XIV claimed and exercised absolute power, and defeated the last vestiges of representative institutions called "parlements."
The French Revolution of 1789, wrought in the name of liberty and equality, did articulate the rights of man, but failed to implement them. After a few years of atrocious excesses, the republic yielded to Napoleon's absolutist rule. The revolution of 1848 restored the republic, but French democracy continued to have a rough ride through much of the 19th century.
If the places of its birth have had a hard time raising democracy to maturity, why should we in Pakistan expect to have it in good working order without going through any toil, and any ups and downs, in the process?
Let us return for a moment to the movements to which Mr Kissinger refers. Leaving aside theological complexities, it may be said that the Reformation asserted the "priesthood of all believers" and thus liberated the individual from submission to organized church in his quest for salvation. The Renaissance liberated his reason from the bonds of conventional wisdom and received opinion by encouraging him to inquire, investigate, and require supportive evidence before authenticating propositions.
Thus, in both cases, the balance of influence shifted to some degree from collectivities to the individual. We need not take the extremist position in individualism, which claims that society and state can only have such authority over the individual as he may have conceded to them. But nor may we accept the position at the other extreme, to wit, that since the individual cannot have a meaningful existence except within society and state, he must remain unreservedly subservient to them.
The developing conscience of mankind has gone a long way towards conceding the individual a good deal of autonomy by recognizing that he is possessed of certain inviolable rights. Democracy is unreal to the extent that the state does not honour them. There is growing worldwide insistence that these rights be respected, and organs of the international community have made it their business to watch their observance in various societies.
A democratic revolution has been sweeping the world. During the last two to three decades, democracy has gone to Latin America, and then spread to Eastern Europe and Africa. One hundred and seventeen of the world's 191 countries today are considered to be democratic. Will Pakistan fight this wave of the future and opt for dictatorship even though it was better prepared to receive democracy 50 years ago than the emerging democracies of Latin America and Africa ever were?
Democracy would seem to have had an easier passage when trade and commerce outranked farming in the countries of its first beginnings. Merchants do not normally think in terms of absolutes; they are open to bargaining and compromise, which happen to be among the essential ingredients of the culture of democracy as well. Urbanization also helps inasmuch as the city harbours diversity and, over time, cultivates tolerance. Relations between landlords and their tenants, and those between large landowners and small peasants, tend to be hierarchical and, as such, they militate against equality, even equality before law, as a value.
As commerce, industry, and urbanization proceed, the ground in Pakistan will become increasingly more fertile for the growth of democracy. But the beneficial effects of these developments will be dissipated unless feudalism and its mean and stifling spirit are taken out of our political culture. The countries where democracy has made an appearance in recent years have one other common characteristic: they are able to keep their military establishments out of their politics.
In the case of Pakistan the eradication of feudalism and its ethos has never been an object of public policy, professions of the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his party to the contrary notwithstanding. The majority of those who dominate our politics are still guided by a feudalistic outlook. We will probably have to look to the operation of other forces currently at work (expansion of commerce, industry, urbanization) to subdue feudalism.
During the last 50 years our generals have become addicted to politics and a major role in governance. No amount of sermonizing will cure them. We encounter a most vexatious paradox here. The generals intervene in governance because our politics is in disarray, but our politics remains ineffective because the generals won't give it time to straighten itself out. This is where patience on the part of all concerned is relevant. We will not internalize the ways of democracy except by staying with it on a sustained basis for an extended period of time.
Given time, we are bound to succeed. If the Indians, Malaysians, and Africans can learn to operate a democracy, well, then we should be able to do it also. We are not the same as they? No, but they too are not all the same. We have a lot more in common with the Indians and the Malaysians than do the Africans.
The writer is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, USA.
E-mail: anwarsyed@cox.net
Changing political scene
Asif Zardari has been bailed out by the Supreme Court but a condescending Sheikh Rashid lost no time in claiming that he is free because, taking a long-term view, the government had decided to respect the order of the court. And Sheikh Rashid, we all know, speaks for the government not for the benefit of the people at home alone but also for the world at large.
The message thus conveyed to Asif Zardari is that he owes his freedom, still tentative, not to judicial order but to the indulgence of the government. The impression that the world gets is that executive authority in Pakistan can always defy, or defeat, the orders of the courts.
After all Zardari was bailed out by courts a number of times in the past and yet remained in jail. Facing trial in 13, by some accounts 14, criminal cases topped by two murders, innumerable options still remain available to the government to send him back to jail. If no ground can be laid to recall the bails, the Sindh chief minister has already offered to charge him with the theft of a goat. To remind Zardari that his freedom is conditional on good behaviour, the accountability bureau has been quick to dispel rumours that cases against him are being withdrawn.
Whether the cases are pursued, withdrawn or allowed to atrophy, the amazing phenomenon before the government and the people is Asif Zardari's instant rise as a star on Pakistan's murky political firmament in his own right. Forgotten is the husband of Benazir who was loathed and feared when in power and accused of every conceivable offence against the law and propriety when out of power. Other leaders have languished longer in jails for lesser offences only to sink into oblivion. Abdus Samad Khan Achakzai is a prime example.
To Sheikh Rashid, the government's mouthpiece, a freed Asif will open new doors to national conciliation. The Nawaz Muslim League which was the first to send him to jail, after instituting six criminal cases against him, now feels that his release will strengthen democratic forces in the country. Asif Zardari, too, wishes to forget the past and look to the future.
The likelihood is that in this forget-and-forgive atmosphere, politicians of all factions and affiliations may also forget to learn a lesson from the misconduct and mischief that marked their years in power in the period between the departure of one general (Ziaul Haq) and the arrival of another (Pervez Musharraf). Their impression that they have not learnt any lessons.
President Musharraf's telephone call to the Sharifs in Jeddah suggests that he is now seeking the long-delayed realignment of political forces in the country. This change in the president's political strategy also explains why yet another case was not registered against Zardari when his bail appeared imminent in the last, and the weakest, case against him. The strategy may be Musharraf's but the politicians can use it to strengthen the civilian part of the government and hold the general elections earlier.
For all of the past five years, General Musharraf and the religious parties (MMA) have been drawing support from each other while their thinking and programmes have been poles apart. Musharraf is a liberal (that is because being secular is tabooed), the religious parties are parochial if not reactionary, what to him is militancy at home and in the neighbourhood is jihad to the MMA; he wishes to normalize relations with India by making some compromises on Kashmir, to MMA, or at least to its driving force the Jamaat-e-Islami, it would be the betrayal of a long-cherished cause.
Musharraf's plans to purge the country of oppressive laws and practices have been stalled by the MMA. The country is at the crossroads, Musharraf often says, but he himself has been lingering at the crossroads for all his years with the MMA millstone around his neck.
Despite severe and irreconcilable differences, Chaudhry Shujaat and Sheikh Rashid, bizarrely, keep insisting that their faction of the Muslim League and MMA are natural allies. Since their faction constitutes the hard core of Musharraf's political support, they will do whatever they can to prevent the Muslim League from emerging as a united, middle of the road liberal force in the politics of the country as it has always been.
The defectors from the PPP calling themselves patriots for similar reasons, and out of reprisal, would not like the Makhdum Amin Fahim led PPP, now bolstered by Zardari's release, to dominate the changing scene which it can. For their own survival in power, the defectors would naturally do their best to keep their parent party sequestered and its leader Benazir Bhutto out of the country.
In letting PPP regain its central position in the country's politics, greater responsibility rests on Benazir Bhutto and Asif Zardari. Besides Amin Fahim people like Aftab Shaban Mirani and Aitzaz Ahsan, who have weathered the storm of intimidation and inducement for five years, must not be pushed to the sidelines for Asif Zardari to occupy the centre stage. In the current situation, he would not be able to lead the party whether it chooses to cooperate with Musharraf (as Benazir has often supportive role.
By now it should be obvious to President Musharraf that he can find support for his policies only from the ranks of the PPP, the nationalists who stand for provincial rights and that part of Muslim League which does not consider itself a natural ally of the religious parties. His efforts above board should be to bring all such elements together. His instructions to the agencies working behind the scenes should also be to the same effect.
The ultimate aim of all political forces however should remain to bring the general elections as much forward as possible and to keep the army and civil authority apart. To that end the MMA may be left to try its chosen route of street agitation. One or the other might succeed.
EU divided over Turkey's membership
With just three weeks to go before European Union leaders decide on whether to start membership talks with Turkey, many of the bloc's leaders are getting cold feet about opening the EU's doors too wide for Ankara. Diplomats say the EU leaders meeting in Brussels on December 16-17 will probably say yes to the opening of entry negotiations with Turkey but make such discussions conditional on a range of additional political reform efforts by Ankara over the coming years. Such a qualified yes, however, is not what Turkey wants.
Despite years of debate and discussion on the pros and cons of Turkish membership, EU nations remain deeply divided over Turkey. The bloc is still coming to grips with its eastward expansion in May this year and many argue that the ten new mainly central and eastern European countries must be fully integrated before the EU considers Turkish membership.
Those who oppose Ankara's entry argue that allowing in a relatively poor, mainly Muslim nation of over 70 million people will change the EU forever, weaken its cultural identity and cause an inflow of even more Turkish workers into the Union.
Advocates for membership argue that Turkey's economic vigour will inject more momentum into the flagging EU economies, give Europe more global clout and improve Europe's relations with Islamic nations.
British Prime Minister Tony Blair and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder remain firmly in the camp of those who favour Turkish membership. But French President Jacques Chirac recently caused alarm in Ankara by saying the EU should consider the "fallback option" of a special relationship with Turkey if the country failed to meet EU political standards for membership.
The camp of naysayers is led by another Frenchman: Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the former French president and chief architect of Europe's draft constitution, who is running a campaign to offer Turkey a "privileged partnership" with the EU rather than full membership.
"Accession by Turkey would change the nature of the European project ... it would [because of its size and population] become the major decision-maker in the EU," Giscard d'Estaing wrote in Britain's Financial Times recently. "We have been concerning ourselves with Turkey a good deal recently. Is it not time to give more thought to Europe?"
Giscard d'Estaing's hostility to Turkish membership is long-standing. He has often warned that Turkey is neither European nor Christian and therefore does not fit into the EU. President Chirac, meanwhile, has promised a French public referendum on Turkey's membership at the end of any entry negotiations. Opinion polls suggest more than 50 per cent of French voters oppose Turkey's entry.
Germany's opposition Christian Democrats also dislike the idea of Turkey's accession and, like Giscard d'Estaing, say Ankara should be offered a special partnership instead of membership. Schroeder, however, has shrugged this off as unacceptable and says he will be standing up for Turkish accession at the EU summit on December 17.
Some of the omens are relatively upbeat. The European Commission recommended in October this year that Turkey was ready to open entry talks. Political reforms required to meet EU standards were being adopted and implemented, it said. The Commission did, however, add a caveat to its recommendation by saying negotiations should be suspended if Ankara backtracks on human rights or political reforms. The EU executive also warned that the negotiating process would be long-lasting up to 15 years - and difficult, with Turkey under constant pressure to do more to meet EU demands.
But it's the 25 EU governments which have the last word on whether to set a final date for starting the accession talks. In talks with Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul in The Hague on November 24, EU officials made it clear that Ankara must work harder on reforms on criminal procedures and judicial policing. "In a number of fields, more progress should be made," said Dutch Foreign Minister Bernard Bot. "If EU leaders decide to begin accession talks with Turkey at December's summit, then these may begin in July 2005."
Ironically, Turkey's historical adversary Greece has promised to come to Ankara's aid in securing a negotiating date. Greek Foreign Minister Petros Moliviatis will soon travel to several European capitals to lobby for Turkey's entry into the EU. "The strategy of fully supporting the European orientation of Turkey is widely supported in Greece," foreign ministry spokesperson Giorgos Koumoutsakos said, adding: "It helps peace and stability in the region and the normalization of Greek-Turkish relations."
Athens has become one of Turkey's biggest supporters in the EU despite on-going disputes such as territorial rights in the Aegean and the divided island of Cyprus. One of the issues that troubles Athens, however, is Turkey's failure to recognize Cyprus despite the island being in the EU and its open support for Ankara's membership.
Turkey insists that it has met all EU political criteria for membership and now expects an objective, impartial and fair decision on Dec. 17. "We fulfilled the political conditions and I think we have the right to start negotiations," said Gul recently.
Turkey's dogged pursuit of EU membership has to be admired. Viewing EU entry as the ultimate symbol of Turkey's coming of age, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has pressed government and business leaders to step up efforts to meet the EU's tough political and economic membership criteria. As a result, Turkey has carried out more sweeping reforms in the last 12 months than in the last 40 years.
The Turkish parliament has acted to reduce the dominant role of the military, abolish the death penalty and granted greater cultural rights to long-oppressed Kurds. Despite the strict conditions attached to EU membership, opinion polls consistently show overwhelming Turkish support for joining the EU, with no major political party in the country opposing the move.
However, they may couch their objections to Turkey, those opposed to Ankara's membership are really worried about bringing a Muslim nation into the club. Although Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) rejects the Islamist label, describing itself as conservative, democratic and pro-western, those against Turkish membership, including centre-right parties in Germany and France, say Ankara's entry will dilute Europe, undermining the club's still-largely Christian character.
Critics also claim that the entry of a country as big as Turkey will destabilize current EU power politics, giving the country as many votes as current EU giant Germany in the bloc's decision-making machinery. In fact, on current demographic trends, by 2020, Turkey, with a population of about 70 million could have more people than Germany, which currently counts 80 million people. Given its size and still largely underdeveloped economy, there is also concern that Turkish accession will mean additional burdens on already cash-strapped EU budgets.
Significantly, however, arguments in favour of Turkish membership are also gaining ground. Senior EU policymakers and many independent analysts insist that the EU, seeking to compete with the US and emerging powers like China and India, must acquire more territory, more people, especially young people, and more soldiers.
Far from destroying the EU, pro-Turkey analysts argue that opening the doors to Ankara will help Europe cope with a spate of specific social and civilizational challenges sparked by the September 11 attacks on the US. Turkey as a Muslim nation offers the EU the opportunity to build stronger bridges with the rest of the Islamic world, boost its presence in the Middle East and with an estimated 15 million Muslims already living in the Union, helps confirm Europe's emerging multi-ethnic, multi-religious identity. Crucially also for most Muslim nations, the credibility of the EU's calls for a dialogue between the West and Islam hinges on whether or not Turkey gets into the European club.
Given the high political stakes, many argue that EU leaders will find it impossible to disappoint Ankara by saying no to opening entry talks. For one, the prospect of joining the Union has worked as a crucial spur for reform and helped boost secularism in the country. Removing the goal would strengthen the hand of the army and Turkish nationalists.
Even if membership talks get EU leaders' go-ahead, however, actual Turkish entry into the Union is unlikely for another 10 to 15 years. Since a vast amount of work will be needed to bring Turkish legislation up to EU standards - in areas such as human rights, the judiciary, environmental law, gender equality and competition policy for instance - negotiations on membership will not go fast.
The next few weeks up to the EU's make-or-break summit on Turkey on December 17 are likely to be tough for both sides. Ankara will have to make sure there is no slippage in its reform effort and focus its energies on implementing the new laws.
European policymakers, meanwhile, will probably engage in more bickering over the merits of Turkey and more soul-searching on the identity and future contours of an expanding EU.
Diplomats predict, however, that EU leaders will give their go-ahead to starting entry talks - but use cautious language which makes clear that the opening of negotiations is not a guarantee that Turkey will be walking through the EU's doors - even in 15 years.