ON November 3 the proposed Afghan constitution was unveiled. Under this constitution Afghanistan will be an Islamic Republic and no law repugnant to Islam will be permitted. But beyond that, all religions will be protected and implicitly there will be no emphasis on the implementation of the Sharia.

An earlier draft of the constitution made available to the media in September, while President Karzai was in New York had visualized both a president and a prime minister. Now there is provision only for a directly elected president along the lines of the American constitution. There will also be a vice president but, according to press reports, the constitution provides that in the event of the president’s death or incapacity the vice president will become an acting president and elections will be held within three months to choose a new president.

According to Karzai’s spokesman the Prime Minister’s office was done away with because Afghanistan has not yet developed the strong tradition of democracy and strong political parties that could support the parliamentary system. Other Afghan commentators suggested that they were learning from the Pakistan experience where the tussle between the president and prime minister had proved to be extremely destabilizing.

In a further emulation of the American constitution there is to be a bicameral legislature, the Afghan twist being provided by the fact that one-third of the upper house will be nominated by the president and that of these presidential nominees half will be women thus ensuring that at least in the upper house one-sixth of the legislators will be women. There is also a provision that in the lower house there will be at least one woman elected from each of the 32 provinces.

The most important provision and the most glaring departure from the reality on the ground is the highly centralized structure of power that the Constitution visualizes and the efforts it makes to prevent ethnicity or religion from being used as a political tool. It maintains that no political party based solely on religion, ethnicity or language will be permitted. Separately a law has already been promulgated that forbids military commanders from participating in elections. The president’s spokesman conceded that eventually Afghanistan would have to devise some means of power sharing among ethnic groups but Afghanistan’s current need was stability which could not be provided without, temporarily, setting such considerations aside.

As could be anticipated this has caused adverse comments from Burhanuddin Rabbani’s Tajik Jamiat-i-Islami party saying that the party is opposed to the concentration of power in the hands of one man. It advocates a parliamentary system of government that could help satisfy the aspirations of Afghanistan’s many diverse groups. Others have also criticized the concentration of power maintaining that the Afghans are instinctively averse to the authoritarianism that such a presidential system will entail.

Nothing however has happened to suggest that the critics are prepared to flex military or political muscle to prevent the adoption of this constitution. It is clear that in the last few weeks Karzai has been negotiating intensively not only with the members of the Commission but also with the other power brokers in today’s Afghanistan. It would be reasonable to conclude that he has had the full support of the Americans and the international community (UN’s Brahimi Lakdar) in getting the sceptics, including most notably the Panjsheris, to accept this draft. This is a good omen...

The Americans have of course welcomed the publication of the Constitution terming it “an important milestone in Afghanistan’s political development”. I believe that Pakistan and Afghanistan’s other neighbours too should welcome this as an important step — despite its flaws — towards the resolution of Afghanistan’s many problems.

But the publication of the constitution and its circulation to all corners of Afghanistan for further comments before a final draft is prepared for consideration at the Loya Jirga scheduled for December is only a first and an uncertain step towards restoring peace and stability in Afghanistan.

Every one, most notably the delegation of the Security Council members — which recently concluded a visit to Afghanistan — recognizes that Afghanistan’s main problem is security. In the last three months the level of violence in south and south-east Afghanistan has increased to higher levels than in the past. American military operations in the area are creating further resentment against the central government rather than building support for it. Not only have Taliban attacks multiplied but continued American reliance on interpreters from local warlords who provide false information to settle their own scores have led to attacks on government supporters. Reconstruction is not proceeding at all, nor is there any discernible effort to reduce the dependence of American forces on local warlords.

In the north, the quarrel between the Uzbek warlord Dostum and the Panjsheris-supported Tajik warlord Atta Mohammad has intensified rather than abated and while one wishes the new interior minister Mr Jalali succeeds in his efforts to merge the forces of the two warlords and to put them under a Kabul-nominated commander, the mind boggles at the thought that these two warlords will meekly acquiesce or even if they do so ostensibly will not continue to cause trouble.

Every one agrees that the expansion of the ISAF’s mandate to provide security in the provinces as it has been doing in Kabul is essential and the UN Security Council has approved such a mandate. The problem is that no country has yet offered additional forces for this purpose. The Norwegians have agreed to send two hundred troops but only for the limited purpose of providing security to the participants in the December Loya Jirga.

To make matters worse there have now been attacks in Kabul itself on the offices of the NGOs which, more than the PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams), have carried the burden of providing relief materials and education and health facilities to the Afghan people. There is speculation that this relatively new phenomenon is an emulation by the Taliban, either on their own initiative or under Al Qaeda guidance, of the success such attacks in Iraq have had in driving out the UN and such reputable and hitherto sacrosanct NGOs as the Red Cross.

InterAction, a US umbrella organization for international aid and development agencies, has bluntly told the Bush administration that the aid agencies regard the security arrangements as inadequate and that “during a six-week period from August to September, eight staff members from non-governmental organizations were killed in an apparent campaign to pressure humanitarian agencies to abandon the Afghan populations they are assisting”. Another think tank that has done good work in Afghanistan in monitoring developments calculates that the remnants of the ousted Taliban regime have increased their attacks on aid agencies from an average of one a month to one every two days over the past year.

The demobilising, disarming and reintegration (DDR) which started on October 24 with a somewhat symbolic collection of arms from militiamen in Kunduz (symbolic because these were arms that had already been surrendered but were reissued to the militia so that they could be formally surrendered) has not proceeded much further. The further reform of the defence ministry is still hanging fire as is the question of the withdrawal of Panjsheri forces from Kabul. The UN Security Council delegation drew pointed attention to the fact that the continued presence of these forces was a breach of the Bonn Agreement. The Commander of the ISAF has also called for the withdrawal of these forces. So far it has not happened.

The selection of delegates for the Loya Jirga is also problematic. Reports have already appeared about warlords using intimidation against candidates they deem unacceptable. Human Rights Watch reported early November that armed men and military commanders had threatened candidates in the north, forcing at least one to withdraw. The manner in which the Panjsheri used their intelligence and militia personnel during the last Loya Jirga remains an unpleasant memory for most Pushtun participants. This time round perhaps they will be kept in check during the meeting itself but they will have plenty of room to influence the selection of the candidates in the provinces.

Preparations for the elections are also far from proceeding at the desired pace. The lack of security is compounded by the fact that the UN body mandated to make the preparations still has not received the funds it needs.

The expectation in Kabul as far as one can tell is that the elections will have to be postponed. It is perhaps bearing this in mind that the constitution provides for the president to continue in office and to rule by decree in the event that elections cannot be held as scheduled.

There is one ray of hope in this picture of gloom. The Karzai government has been having talks with a breakaway faction from Hikmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami and Karzai has apparently appointed as his personal adviser a former key ally of Hikmatyar. Rumours continue to circulate also of the former Taliban foreign minister Mutawakkil being in negotiations with Karzai to work out a deal for the return and political accommodation of the “moderate Taliban”.

Karzai still represents the best hope for bringing ethnic balance and consequently the peace and stability in Afghanistan that Pakistan so badly needs. It would be in Pakistan’s interest if an agreement is worked out that strengthens his position among the Pushtuns and isolates the extremist Taliban. Equally important, it would mean that we will be rid of the presence of the Taliban in Pakistan. According to The Washington Post, Quetta has become “the new headquarters of the extremist Taliban movement”. It would bring to an end the stories proudly told by Taliban recruiters to American correspondents about the ease with which they take Pakistanis into Afghanistan to wage jihad against the Americans and against Karzai loyalists. It would make more credible our plan for “enlightened moderation”

The writer is a former foreign secretary of Pakistan.

THE euphoria generated by President Pervez Musharraf’s visit to Beijing earlier this month has glossed over some hard realities of international politics in South Asia.

The visit was described as “outstanding” and a “success” by the two sides. There was a lot of talk about the “all weather relationship” and their ties being as “high as the mountains and as deep as the oceans”.

No one would dispute all of this. One, however, hopes that the policy makers in Islamabad have noticed that behind the bonhomie was the shift in China’s approach vis-a-vis South Asia which has a direct bearing on the entire gamut of Pakistan’s external relations. The fact is that ever since the two countries negotiated their boundary agreement in the early sixties and entered into a special relationship, they have derived great strength from it. Needless to say, Pakistan as the smaller state and with an ambitious foreign policy has emerged as a more dependent partner.

Besides, China was quick to diversify its external relations with other countries. Within a decade it had established communications with Washington, thus reducing its dependence on the good offices of its friendly neighbour in the south. Although China has been signalling a shift in its policy for quite some time now, Pakistan has not responded to it and continues to proceed on the assumption that the China card is still available to it.

True, Beijing is a steady friend. The defence links and economic and trade relations that Pakistan and China have forged are undoubtedly phenomenal. The array of agreements signed during President Musharraf’s visit speaks volumes of the significance they attach to their ties.

Yet at the same time China has been normalizing and expanding ties with India. This could have been dismissed as one of those quirks of international relations which take place all too often. It is, however, important to take note of this development because of the fact that India is the country against which we have been using the China card. Does this not call for a modification in Pakistan’s policy vis-a-vis New Delhi?

One has just to see how things have been moving on the Sino- Indian front. If you read the People’s Daily on the web you would realize that howsoever warm the Chinese may be towards us they are not unmindful of their strategic and economic concerns. It must be noted that the People’s Daily reflects the views of the Chinese government and can be regarded as a barometer to test the mood in Beijing.

We have been told that the joint declaration signed in Beijing during the president’s visit gave a roadmap of the future relationship between the two countries. Strangely enough, the text of the joint declaration about which there has been a lot of hype in the media has not been published so far. A week has already elapsed since it was signed and though it was announced that it would “be released to the press after a couple of days”, it is not yet available.

On the contrary the People’s Daily had printed the full text of the joint declaration which was signed in June when the Indian prime minister paid a visit to China. It contained significant statements, such as: “The common interests of the two sides outweigh their differences. The two countries are not a threat to each other. Neither side will use or threaten to use force against the other.”

After this no one in Islamabad should still believe that China serves as a countervailing force against India. China’s ties with India have grown to such an extent that Beijing would want a very solid reason to upset its equation with New Delhi. What is more, according to the People’s Daily, bilateral trade between China and India exceeded 4.9 billion dollars in 2002, up 37 per cent from the previous year. It is expected to touch the 10 billion dollar mark in 2005. Compare this with China’s trade with Pakistan which stood at 1.8 billion dollars last year.

China is holding joint naval exercises with India for five days. How should this be seen when a similar three-day exercise last month with the Pakistan Navy was defined as a “milestone in their defence cooperation”? All this indicates that China’s South Asian policy is now directed at maintaining a balance in its ties with the two squabbling South Asian neighbours. This has been made clear by the Chinese themselves.

While emphasizing that any improvement in Sino-Indian ties is not directed at Pakistan, Chinese scholars have reaffirmed that China wants to deal with South Asia on a regional basis while forging good neighbourly relations with all states. Hence Beijing welcomes peace moves between Islamabad and New Delhi, but it would avoid getting involved in any way in an India-Pakistan peace process. It is essential for the “South Asian countries to solve their problems and disputes by themselves” a Chinese scholar said at a seminar on big powers and South Asia in Islamabad.

In view of this shift in the Chinese stance, should we not modify our hardline position on Kashmir? On a one-to-one basis, Pakistan lacks the strength to seek a military solution to the Kashmir problem — be it directly by fighting a war across the Line of Control (as was launched in Kargil in 1999) or indirectly through infiltration of the extremist groups. A resolution of the dispute has to be sought through a political dialogue. Even in this process, help is not forthcoming from any quarters. China which has always proved to be our most reliable ally has now made it plain that it prefers to adopt a neutral stance.

Past experience has shown that outside pressures can push India to the negotiating table but no further than that. India is too big a power to be forced to submit to the good offices of a third party without its voluntarily agreeing to it. So far New Delhi has not shown the propensity to talk about the core issue of Kashmir with Pakistan.

With the China card seemingly no longer available to it, Islamabad must plan its next moves accordingly. The imperative for peace in South Asia has increased only further. In Beijing President Musharraf joined the Chinese leaders in pledging to battle the “separatist Muslims” and not allowing anybody to use Pakistan’s territory to carry out any anti-Chinese activities. Although this has incurred him the wrath of the jihadis, it was the sensible thing to do.

Had he not adopted a firm anti-terrorism stand President Musharraf could have found himself in a tight spot in view of what Prime Minister Vajpayee and premier Wen Jiabao agreed to in June. They “recognized the threat posed to them by terrorism” and agreed “to promote cooperation on counter-terrorism through their bilateral dialogue mechanism”.

Wouldn’t it be wiser if Pakistan were to avoid creating a situation which will force China to drop its neutral posture and join hands with India to fight the “terrorists”?