Persons unknown have fired at groups of Christians at their places of worship and work and killed numbers of them in several instances during the last year or so. It is important to determine who they are, but it is just as important to know what moves them. It will not do to blame these acts on unfriendly foreign agents and thus relieve ourselves of the trouble of discovering the truth of the matter. We can start with the plausible assumption that the killers are Muslim extremists of some kind.

Muslim-Christian conflict is not unknown to history. Muslim Arabs drove Byzantine rule from Syria, Palestine, and Egypt during the pious caliphate, fought European Christians (instigated by the Popes in Rome) during the crusades (1095-1244), ruled a large part of Spain for almost eight hundred years, until the forces of Ferdinand and Isabelle finally broke Muslim power in Granada in 1492 and asked Muslims to choose conversion to Christianity, emigration out of Spain, or death. (Descendants of Arabs who had converted were expelled from the country in 1610.)

Muslim Turks conquered and ruled a substantial part of eastern Europe for several hundred years, entered Constantinople and terminated the Byzantine empire in 1453, took all of Anatolia, from where the Christian population gradually fled. There were massacres of Armenians under Ottoman rule in the nineteenth century (1894-1896), which the latter’s descendants have still not forgotten. In more recent times, Muslim Turks and Greek Orthodox Christians have fought in Cyprus, Christian Copts and Arab Muslims in Egypt, Maronite Christians and Arab Muslims in Lebanon.

Some of this conflict may indeed have resulted from differences of religious identity. But in numerous other instances it may be explained in terms of the dynamism of rising powers-Arab conquests in Egypt and other parts of north Africa, Spain, Iran (beyond the Shatt-al-Arab) and central Asia, Turkish conquests in Europe, and in more recent times the western powers’ colonial systems of rule or control in Muslim territories in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia..

But this catalogue of conflict should not obscure the fact that, for the most part, Christians living under Muslim rule were not persecuted. They were allowed to practice their religion, follow their own personal law and customs, and keep their language and culture. Some of them rose to high positions in the professions and in government, especially in the area of diplomacy. Along with the Jews, they dominated banking, industry, and foreign trade..

Christianity appeared in India during Mughal rule, and then made some modest gains while the British ruled. Conflict between Muslims and Christians is not a part of our historical experience in the sub-continent. It is of relatively recent origin, coincident with the rise of fundamentalism. Hindu fundamentalists in India have killed Christians and demolished their villages, and Muslim extremists have lately done the same in Pakistan.

Muslim extremists in Pakistan have killed thousands of fellow Muslims on the basis of sectarian differences. The Sunni have attacked Shias, and the Shia the Sunnis. Apart from any differences in doctrine and practice between them, consider the fact that the Shia constitute a substantial part (25 per cent or so) of the Muslim population. They have a visible presence in the country’s government and administration, politics, commerce, and the professions. They can be perceived as posing a challenge to the Sunni predominance in national affairs, especially if the projects of Islamizing our society and polity begin to be pursued seriously.

Christians number between one and two percent of Pakistan’s population. A great many of them work in lower ranking occupations. They pose no challenge or threat to any segment of the Muslim community. They want to be recognized as patriotic Pakistanis and long to be treated as a part of the Pakistani nation. Why then kill or even harass and persecute them?

They are suffering the effects of a rebound; theirs is a “guilt by association.” They are paying penalties for the “crimes” of the greedy and expansionist western powers. As many observers see them, these powers, in addition to being Christian, seek to control the resources of Muslim countries, plunder them through puppet regimes that are at once corrupt, despotic, and un-Islamic, maintain substantial military presence on their soil, support Israeli policy of imposing death, deprivation, and destruction on the Palestinians, and do nothing to stop India from continuing its subjugation of the Kasmiris or the Russians from repressing the Chechens. The more militant among the Muslims feel that they must do something to resist this western onslaught.

Muslim extremists have not had organized military force at their disposal, except in two recent cases, namely the Islamic Republic in Iran, and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The Iranian regime has mellowed considerably with time and the ruling clergy have had to yield to non-clerical politicians to some degree. The Taliban have been defeated, disbanded and, for the most part, expelled from Afghanistan by a coalition of forces (including Pakistan) headed and guided by the United States. In this situation, the extremists feel they have no option but to launch sporadic acts of violence — currently called terrorism: kidnappings, hijackings, assassinations, attacks on enemy security forces where possible, but also bombing of buses, markets, and other places where people congregate.

Acts of terrorism, done over a period of several decades, have brought the Catholic separatists some success in Northern Ireland, and they may eventually produce similar results for the Tamil in Sri Lanka. But they have not accomplished much for their sponsors in other places, such as Palestine and Kashmir. Here they have failed not only to bend the oppressor or even generate worldwide sympathy for the cause in behalf of which they are being undertaken. The chances of success are even smaller when the targeted oppressor is not just one specific power-Israel or India-but a whole civilization such as the “West” or a superpower based on a very large territorial spread and vast resources such as the United States.

America and its allies, in turn, are waging a war against the Muslim extremists on the ground that they are terrorists. They will, most probably, not succeed in wiping out the alleged terrorists, and the latter will fail to break up western or American power and civilization. American policy makers may have political and economic goals that they hope to achieve under the cover, or as a byproduct, of their war against terrorism. These goals may be achieved in some measure even if terrorism is not fully eradicated. Will Muslim extremists make any gains at all even as they fail to bring the western powers down to their knees? I doubt it.

One may wonder if the militants know that their chances of defeating the American coalition are extremely poor. They should, if their leaders are intelligent. But it is possible that they do not think in terms of victory and defeat, profit and loss. Rationality to them may not mean choosing ends with an eye to the sufficiency of available means, They may feel that it is their duty to fight America and if, in the process, they meet death instead of victory, then so be it, for they fall fighting in the way of the Lord.

There is apparently no place in their thinking for the impact their acts have upon Muslims outside their ranks, especially those who live in western (Christian) countries. The rights of these Muslims to liberty, privacy, personal safety, access to jobs, respect of fellow citizens, and equality before law have become relatively insecure as a result of the events of 9/11.

Muslim governments have come under pressure to join the war against terrorism internationally, and to demobilize extremists and militants in their own societies. The United States is contemplating an invasion of Iraq not only because it is making weapons of mass destruction but because it is, allegedly, harbouring al-Qaeda. American pressure on Iran may escalate because of its alleged support of terrorism. The adversity suffered by Muslim governments and people as a result of the extremist’s actions is of no consequence to him, because he regards them as misguided and profligate. Solicitude for their well-being cannot be allowed to detract him from his duty under God.

While threats continue to be made, Muslim militants have not actually launched a major attack on a western country since September 11, 2001. It may be that they are unnerved by the severity of the western response. They and their potential collaborators or protectors are being hounded relentlessly. But they have been mounting attacks on western persons and property located in Muslim counties, notably Pakistan. This course of action makes life ever more difficult for Muslims without making a dent on the apparatus of western/ (Christian) power.

But, once again, why kill the poor Pakistani Christians? It does nothing to deter the western powers from pursuing their expansionist or exploitative designs in relation to Saudi Arabia, the emirates, Iraq, or Iran. It serves to link Islam with terrorism in the thinking of the ordinary western men and women, makes them indifferent to the cause of oppressed Muslims in various places, and provides their governments a justification of sorts to maintain their aggressive and discriminatory posture towards certain Muslim groups and governments.

Routine assertions of Muslim intellectuals that Islam is a religion of peace and tolerance cannot undo the damage that the killing of innocent Christians in Pakistan does to the profile of Muslims, and the receptivity to them, in the non-Muslim world. It is amazing, and extremely disconcerting, to see that Qazi Husain Ahmad, Maulana Fazlur Rahman, Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani, and leaders of other Islamic parties have not condemned these killings strongly and unequivocally enough, and that they have not commanded their followers to refrain from such despicable savagery.

AS General Musharraf’s reformist and purging era draws to a close, the national political scene presents a strange mixture of chaos and pathos. Whether the people dominating it would be less corrupt is yet to be seen but they are obviously more provincial and less charismatic than their predecessors of the previous decade.

It is hardly a scene inspiring hope, but a right moment to quickly recount the chief characteristics of the Musharraf regime before it passes into what The Economist of London has quite appropriately termed Musharrafocracy. It is only an endorsement of Musharraf’s own claim that he had “tailored” a democracy suited to the conditions of Pakistan discarding its conventional forms more familiar to philosophers and practitioners.

The first, and most striking, feature of this period of military rule is that the power to decide political and administrative policies resided in the generals. The ministers, governors and civil servants entrusted with their implementation were further hedged around by the research and advice that flowed from a variety of bureaus again headed by generals, serving or retired. Only the fiscal and monetary sector was left alone because of its frightening magnitude and not because the generals thought they did not know enough about it.

Whether it was democracy or defence, sports or sewerage, electricity or education, railways or airlines, you name it, nothing escaped the direct control or supervision of army officers. Ghulam Murtaza Piracha, a retired civil servant, now a columnist, has put their number in the civil administration or institutions at 600 to 700 (that is more than the total strength of CSP — the country’s premier administrative service — in its heyday).

It was a despotism of mediocrity which did not overvalue brains. For good cheer, it evinced integrity at the top but did not disturb others, around or below, devoid of this virtue. Friendship or obligation of a bygone time weighed more than the ability to do a job or standing in public life. The compliant overwhelmed, or ousted, the dissenters.

Starting on a high note of liberalism and neutrality, the government quickly abandoned both. It did not want to confront the religious fanatics for they posed no threat to its authority and it needed friends in politics to neutralize the influence of the foes it had made by dislodging and prosecuting them. To the modernists and exponents of apolitical governance during the interregnum, the very raison d’etre of the army takeover was thus lost. An early avowal by the president himself that the two former prime ministers would never be allowed to return to national politics prompted defections from their parties, especially Nawaz’s Muslim League and the formation of its Q faction which has universally come to be known as the “king’s party.”

The saddest feature of the passing regime however would remain the loss of faith of the litigants and lawyers alike in the independence and integrity of the judiciary. The Election Commission became all but a body subordinate to the government.

The press was never so free and yet never so critical of the government — towards the end even hostile. For that its inept spokesmen, who spoke too much and too often, were to be blamed as much as its actions.

The reversal of the Afghan policy was a bold step in a situation full of hazards which earned the country acclaim and debt relief but no advantage of securing a settlement of the Kashmir dispute which is the key to peace and prosperity in the country. With India it remains on the brink of war and the warmth from its relations with old friends like Iran and Turkey has diminished.

It is in this complex background of policies and events that the performance of the regime must be viewed for gain or loss to the community as a whole.

Without doubt, Musharraf’s early retreat from an enlightened stance on statecraft gave an impetus to religious intolerance and hate. After the minority sects, the Christians became the victims of its renewed upsurge. Besides the worldwide shame, it kept the tourists and investors alike away.

This turn in Musharraf’s thinking disillusioned the liberals and modernists. They sank into apathy. Ironically, the religious groups whom it was expected to rein in joined hands to whip up public sentiment against the war against the Taliban and international terror hoping to win more seats in the assemblies than they ever did in the past. (In this they have now succeeded).

The commendable process of accountability was tainted by many glaring and partisan omissions. In it, most observers suspect, lay the genesis of the so-called king’s party. It won the government some political support but impaired credentials of its impartiality. At the end of the day, General Musharraf might be left wondering whether the price was worth paying.

The ruckus created over the recovery of arms and the registration of religious schools must necessarily be added to the list of failures. The terrorists and the fanatics both took a good measure of the government’s lack of capacity to enforce its laws and plans and drew enormous comfort from it.

The restoration of joint electorates which all sections of the people and the world at large welcomed also fell victim to the pressure of the extremists when the president, without giving any plausible reason, transferred Ahmadis from the combined rolls to a separate supplementary list. An unquestioning Election Commission instantly disenfranchised more than a million voters.

The presidential referendum was not just a failure it was the regime’s biggest folly. Despite discovering what had actually happened, Musharraf’s constitutional experts who drafted the LFO chose to rely on its “democratic mandate” for his new five-year term. In times ahead it might call into question not the president’s term alone but all the constitutional amendments for drawing legality from a source which itself lacks legitimacy.

Devolution, the pride of Musharraf’s performance with its connected administrative and police reforms, needs more time to be judged. It is based on foundations of sand as no function has devolved from the centre which is the repository of all power and money. So far the people and their grassroot representatives alike are disappointed.

General Musharraf, in his Wednesday’s broadcast, again promised to transfer all the executive authority to the prime minister the parliament elects. But his determination to remain the sole judge of the country’s security, dignity and good governance carries an ominous ring and portends a conflict between the two sooner than later.

The president and the new parliament must agree to depart from the current jingoism to find a working relationship with India. Peace in the neighbourhood would make the benefits of the reduced debt, large reserves, a strong rupee and a buoyant stock market reach the people only if the economic activity revives. Tension and war, on the other hand, would deepen poverty, giving rise to their anger and despair which neither the president nor the parliament nor prime minister would be able to deal with.

The emerging composition of the parliament would make a heavy demand on the neutrality and skill of President Musharraf. The parliament has new faces but not of the kind be may have expected. Yet he must not try to influence the deal-making among them and its inevitable companion, the horse-trading. How effectively Musharraf conducts his war against terrorists while the coming government of the NWFP will be all out to provide succour to them will put both his commitment and ingenuity to the severest of tests.

E-mail: kunwaridris@yahoo.com

CLICHE is defined as a hackneyed literary phrase by Oxford dictionary. Now a day with a surfeit of news channels one can be born virtually overnight. One of the current ones is that the world changed on September 11, 2001 implying thereby that what followed the tragic events of that fateful day would not have taken place if the US security agencies were more alert. That is rather simplistic.

The world did change but it was more than a decade earlier on the day when the Russian people thronged the parliament square in Moscow and dared the Red Army to shoot them with its colossal firepower. The latter withdrew and with that the edifice of Soviet Union collapsed like a house of cards. It also took away one of the two poles on which the world was precariously balanced, a balance based on fear but nevertheless working fairly well. Another major effect was loss of support for the labour movements round the globe.

From then on the capitalists became the sole repository of all power. It was only a matter of time when a show of force would be made to drive home the point that the world had changed. Saddam Hussein, the one most in news currently, provided that opportunity. He bit the bait held out by the US ambassador Ms April Gillespie and occupied Kuwait. Within days the UN Security Council started churning out resolutions that enabled the US to mount a major military operation involving NATO armaments and Arab money. About a million Iraqis perished but Saddam was allowed to hold on and provide rationale for permanent positioning of US troops in the Gulf as well as the sale of armaments worth billions of dollars to oil rich states in the region.

It was at this point that Bush Sr. declared that this was the new world order. It was neither new nor provided any orderly way of resolving issues. Use of force by the powerful to gain advantage has been the norm throughout human history. It was only the horrors of the two world wars during the first half of the twentieth century that focused human thought on devising ways to resolve issues through collective wisdom and joint effort. Creation of League of Nations and the UN were efforts in that direction. If Bush Jr now compares the UN to the League of Nations he is only amplifying a reality. For the powerful any collective arrangement is an inconvenient encumbrance. In the post-Soviet Union decade the US has shown contempt for many international agreements. ABM, Kyoto protocol and International Criminal Court, to name a few.

In his monumental work ‘The story of civilization’ Will Durant remarks about one of the early civilizations that ‘wars were fought frankly for economic gains’. One ruler wanting a particular type of stone for his palace from the neighbouring state simply ordered his army to occupy the area containing the quarry. Another found copper mines next door irresistible and captured the same. The powerful still follow the same policy but are obliged to give a less mundane reason.

September 11 provided that reason to the corporate dominated US establishment. Within minutes the pundits on television channels had named the culprit...Osama bin Laden. How they reached that conclusion merely by seeing television footage remains a mystery to this day. Later the US establishment adopted the same conclusion and claimed to be in possession of massive evidence, which also has not seen the light of the day so far. Tony Blair was the only lucky one to be provided a glimpse of that. He found it overwhelming but was not too sure if it would hold in a court of law.

Afghanistan became the first target. Would the Taliban have been spared the fate that befell them if 9/11 had not happened? Highly unlikely. They had earned the ire of the powerful oil lobby by not listening attentively to Unocal. Not many held any brief for them but killing innocent Afghans in thousands for that purpose could not be condoned. Now the hapless people of that country have been thrown at the mercy of the same old warlords and continue to suffer internecine warfare. It is a moot point if their lot is any better today.

For the corporate America the reasons for attacking Iraq are ‘overwhelming’. It will provide unfettered access to the second largest reserve of oil in the Middle East. Israel will feel more secure when the only Arab country with a sizable population and oil is neutralized. A stepping-stone would be gained for going into Iran, the other country with oil and population. Above all there is no danger of suffering any casualties because there is virtually no military force worth the name to be encountered.

In the first Gulf war the media worked overtime to project Iraqi army as a formidable battle hardened force with crack guards divisions. The outcome is well known. Now after ten years of crippling sanctions our credibility or, more accurately, gullibility is again being stretched to the limit to believe that it is going to be a contest between two armies and not brutal killing of innocent people to be described as collateral damage.

Domestically it will distract public attention from corporate scandals as well as an economy not doing too well. A host of corporations dealing in defence supplies and oil would make a quick buck. Patriotic fervour will be stoked and the supporters of war made to win congressional elections. For the people of America, however, this war forebodes a different outcome. They will pick up the tab currently estimated to be anything between one to two hundred billion dollars. Estimates made before the war are generally conservative. They will earn the odium of the people around the globe. A chaotic Middle East like the present day ‘liberated ‘ Afghanistan may cause disruption of oil supplies and long queues at gas stations.. Hence even the concerted efforts of the establishment media to brainwash and bully the public opinion have failed to prevent demonstrations in the street.

The opposition to attack on Iraq has come from almost the entire world except the English speaking countries namely the US, the UK and Australia. Even Canada has chosen to oppose this venture. German chancellor and French president have ably articulated the viewpoint of the rest of the world. Bush and Blair could have ignored these voices with impunity but for the vocal opposition at home.

Tony Blair looked under stress during his recent Blackpool press conference. The opposition encountered by him from his trade unions, labour MPs and cabinet colleagues was beginning to have its effect. A rally in Hyde Park by three hundred fifty thousand people opposing war must have had a sobering effect. He persisted with advocating the need for the use of force to rid Iraq of WMDs but significantly, for the first time, expressed the hope that the objective could be achieved without war.

President Bush has invested too much of his credibility on ridding Iraq of Saddam Hussein. Others find this course perilous for the world as well as the Iraqi people. He has the opportunity to act either way. He can ignore all dissident voices and go ahead with carpet-bombing of Iraq. This will please his corporate supporters and Israel but throw the world in a turmoil. Alternatively he can decide to lead the world as distinct from bullying and let the collective wisdom prevail. Much will depend on the attitude of the American people.

The writer is a former ambassador of Pakistan.