THIS is with reference to the letter ‘Pakistan Navy now has higher capacity’ (July 15), which portrayed the induction of Hangor-class submarines as an en-hancement of Pakistan’s conventional capability. Fair enough, but that missed the central argument of the challenges that are posed by Indian submarines. Beyond the conventional strength, India’s step towards a survivable sea-based second-strike capability through nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) is a development that alters the deterrence equation itself, not merely the balance of naval firepower.

While Pakistan’s induction of Hangor-class submarines deserves recognition and is a legitimate source of national pride, India’s development of SSBNs is a different matter altogether. Conventional sub-marines, however capable, are not equivalent to SSBNs. A conventional boat expands a navy’s war-fighting capacity. An SSBN guarantees nuclear retaliation even after an adversary’s land-based forces have been destroyed. Powered by a nuclear reactor, it can remain submerged for months, making it exceptionally difficult to locate or neutralise. This is precisely why deterrence theory treats the sea-based leg as the most survivable component of any nuclear triad.

With a third SSBN now commissioned, alongside two others already in service and more under construction, New Delhi is moving towards continuous at-sea deterrence. Once four operational SSBNs are available, India will be able to sustain uninterrupted nuclear patrols through rotational deployment. This is the development that warrants Islamabad’s close attention, far more than any con-ventional submarine induction.

Another layer is added to the scenario by nuclear doctrine. India professes ‘no first use’, resting its posture on assured retaliation. Pakistan has deliberately kept its posture ambiguous on first use, a choice shaped by the conventional imbalance between the two states. Islamabad has long signalled that no adversary should assume Pakistan would absorb a devastating first strike before responding; a calculated ambiguity that has underpinned South Asian deterrence stability for more than a quarter of a century.

India’s emerging sea-based deterrent introduces new variables into that equation. A survivable second-strike force gives its possessor greater confidence that its retaliatory capability cannot be eliminated by a potential first strike. In theory, this can reinforce deterrence by easing fears of disarming attacks.

In practice, in a region defined by compressed geography, short missile flight times and recurring political crises, it also compresses decision-making windows and raises the risk of miscalculation.

Pakistan’s response should not be to chase numerical or platform-for-platform parity. Deterrence history shows that credibility, not symmetry, is what matters. What Pakistan requires is a combination of survivable forces, resilient command-and-control, reliable intelligence, and maritime domain awareness sufficient to ensure no adversary believes it can gain advantage by striking first.

Pakistan has historically favoured cost-effective, asymmetric approaches to deterrence over ruinous arms racing, and that logic remains sound today.

Military advances by one side inevitably reshape the strategic environment for the other. Recognising this is not alarmism; it is the basic discipline of responsible national security planning.

Pakistan’s deterrence posture must evolve accordingly if regional stability is to be preserved in an increasingly complex under-sea nuclear environment.

Lt-Col (retd) Syed Raziuddin
Rawalpindi

Published in Dawn, August 11th, 2026