Why Muslim League is prone to breakups

Published September 27, 2009

PAKISTAN has an unstable party system and there is a tendency among political parties to divide into factions. Because in a multi-ethnic state like Pakistan political parties are the ultimate expression of democracy, internal rifts in them have largely contributed to political instability in the country.

However, the trend continues and its latest example is the schism in the Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-i-Azam (PML-Q), the party which governed the country between 2002 and 2007 under the 'enlightened' despotism of General Pervez Musharraf.

Of all political parties in Pakistan, the Muslim League has been most susceptible to fragmentation. It is a party whose fate has largely been controlled by outside forces rather than the party leadership or the people. In fact making and breaking of the League has been an important part of the establishment's power strategy. Hence, not surprisingly, the League or a faction thereof remains united only when it is in power. A brief look at the League's history will make it clear why it is so.

The Pakistan Muslim League, divided into various factions and sub-factions, is successor to the All-India Muslim League. The party, which was set up in 1906, to look after the political interests of the Muslims of India, finally spearheaded the struggle for a separate homeland for them. Despite its success, the League suffered from two major weaknesses lack of a well-defined social and economic programme, and lack of a strong party organisation.

These two weaknesses have persisted to date and are mainly responsible for the League's pro-establishment stance since 1947.

To begin with, the League has never had a well-defined social and economic programme. Before the 1940 Pakistan resolution, the League sought to protect the interests of Indian Muslims through the mechanism of separate electorates, under which seats were to be reserved for Muslims for elections to legislative assemblies.

But apart from the assertion that joint electorates were ill-suited to protecting the interests of Muslim minority in Hindu-majority India, the demand for separate electorates was not based on any socio-economic philosophy.

By the same token, the demand for a separate homeland for Muslims did not spell out a socio-economic programme that would be introduced in what was to become Pakistan. Pakistan would be a Muslim majority state. But would it be an Islamic state? Would it be based on Islamic law? What kind of economic system would that state have? Would it be capitalism or socialism? The leadership of the Muslim League never seriously addressed these questions.

Due to lack of any socio-economic philosophy, the League has always found it convenient to dance to the tune of the establishment. Under a religious minded General Ziaul Haq, the League was the most conservative party clamouring for the introduction of Islamic laws in Pakistan as the panacea for all ills with which the country was beset.

Under a liberal General Musharraf, the League was a moderate, forward-looking party clamouring for “enlightened moderation” as the panacea for all problems facing Pakistan.

The 1946 elections held on the basis of separate electorates were a watershed in the history of the League. The party won all the Muslim seats and accounted for three-fourths of the total Muslim votes. The victory of the League however owed more to the charismatic

leadership of M.A. Jinnah and increasing demand for a separate homeland for Muslims which the party advocated than to a vibrant party organisation.

After the creation of Pakistan the League failed to maintain its popularity. For a multiethnic state like Pakistan, there was the need for a strong and stable political party with an across-the-nation base capable of holding all ethnic groups together. In India, the Congress did that. However, in Pakistan the League failed to do so.

The absence of a strong organisation and a credible leadership after Jinnah weakened the party. Apprehensive of its defeat, the party shied away from seeking a popular mandate. The result was that over the years the party lost its popularity and strength. The party, if it was to hold on to power, had to seek the support of the establishment.

When the governor-general dismissed the central League government in 1953, the party bowed to the decision by accepting Muhammad Ali Bogra as the new prime minister. When the same governor-general dismissed the constituent assembly in 1954, the party again meekly surrendered.

The League's failure to take a firm stand against the dismissals created the impression that it was an anti-people, pro-establishment party. Hence, in the 1954 provincial elections in East Pakistan, the party was routed. In the western wing as well, the party cut a sorry

figure. A process of disintegration set in the party from which it never fully recovered.

During the Ayub era, when the need for a political party to support the regime was felt, the obvious choice was the League, which was revived by the name of the Convention Muslim League. However, notwithstanding full official backing, the party failed to regain its popularity. The 1970 elections were contested by at least three Leagues with an utterly dismal performance by each.

Throughout the Bhutto period (1971-77), the League remained a virtual non-entity. The party was resurrected after the 1985 elections held by the Zia regime to create a semblance of democracy. Though the elections were held on non-party basis, it was soon felt that a representative set-up could not work without the participation of political parties. But which party should represent the regime. Once again, the League was chosen. Senators, MNAs, MPAs and heads of local bodies were enticed into joining the born again League.

The regime projected the League as the strongest and the most popular party. However, the League's strength and popularity were built on sand.

The party remained united only as long as it remained in the saddle. After Prime Minister Junejo was sacked by the president in 1988, dissensions broke out in the party. The League however was cobbled by the establishment to face the PPP in the national elections. Despite the administration's backing, the party was unable to form the government at the centre.

With the support of the caretakers, the League won the 1990 elections and remained in power until its government was sacked by the president in 1993. Then history repeated itself.

No sooner was its government dismissed, the party fell apart and two main factions emerged one was led by the ousted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif named the PML-N and the other by Hamid Nasir Chattha called the PML-J. Of course, there were other factions like the PML-Qasim and PML-Functional each claiming to be the real League.

After Prime Minister Sharif was removed in 1999 by General Musharraf through a coup, many of his erstwhile party colleagues ditched him and formed another League faction called PML-Q to become the king's party as desired by the military strongman. There was little surprise when after the 2002 elections the PML-Q emerged as the single largest party and formed the government with the collaboration of some PPP dissidents.

In 2008 elections, the PML-Q suffered defeat at the hands of the PPP and PML-N and subsequently dissensions broke out in the party, which is hardly surprising given the history of the League. Efforts were also made to merge the PML-Q with the PML-N.

Already a large number of PML-Q MPAs in Punjab have sided with the ruling PML-N. Interestingly, neither of the PML-Q factions has popular credentials and in all probability one of the factions will merge with the PML-N or side with the PPP, while the other will wait for another opportunity to be crowned as the king's party.

The story of the League is thus a sad commentary on our politics. It is not that divisions in the ranks necessarily sink political parties. In India, for example, the Congress has split on more than one occasion. At any rate, a political party must be capable of managing the emergence of factions in its ranks, just as the Congress has done. However, to cope with such problems a party must have its roots among the masses.

The other major faction of the League, namely the PML-N, has come a long way from being a king's party and established its credentials of a popular political party. Despite facing a split at the hands of the Musharraf regime, the party survived and gave a good account of itself in 2008 elections. However, the PML-N lacks a nation-wide appeal as its popularity continues to be confined to the Punjab province.

hussainhzaidi@gmail.com

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