What ignited the 1965 war is a question open to historians but it marked the beginning of a new chapter in the subcontinent, says Shaikh Aziz

Post-1965 priorities were set afresh, political theorems were written again and defence strategies redrawn. Pakistan’s position was precarious; it needed a complete re-evaluation of its foreign and defence policies. A student of contemporary history and international law, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the foreign minister, who wanted to reshape the foreign policy matching Pakistan’s aspirations in a changed world.

When India developed a border row on Chhad island in the Kuchh desert in 1960 forcing Pakistan to seek relief from the International Court of Justice, a new arms race ensued. April 1965 was a perilous period when the two countries began blaming each other of meddling in their respective territories. By the end of August 1965 both armies tried to take an edge with the use of airpower. On September 2, U Thant, the Secretary-General of the UN, wrote to Ayub Khan and Lal Bahadur Shastri to avoid escalation.

When the fighting did not de-escalate, UN Security Council passed a resolution on September 5-6, calling on both countries to cease fire, but before the governments could express reaction Indian troops had crossed into Pakistan from Lahore. Both armies engaged in a bitter war. Soon international pressure mounted. The first call was to stop fighting and return to the pre-war points.

On September 9, 1965, U Thant arrived in Pakistan and spoke to Ayub Khan. On September 18 the Security Council adopted a resolution to stop fire but to no avail. Immediately Soviet Prime Minister Alexi Kosygin invited the two leaders to meet in the Soviet Union but that call went unanswered. On September 20, the UN again passed a resolution asking the two parties to cease fire from September 22.

Bhutto arrived in New York for representing Pakistan’s view. Lal Bahadur Shastri accepted the ceasefire immediately but Pakistan had not made any announcement till then. Ayub Khan, without consulting his foreign minister, addressed the nation on radio at 03.30pm (PST) on September 22, saying that Pakistan would implement ceasefire from 03.00am (PST) on Sept 24.

When Ayub announced the ceasefire Bhutto was about to address the UN. Underlining the need for the resolution of Kashmir he announced that Pakistan could fight for a thousand years to liberate Kashmiris. Obviously this was a negation of the ceasefire announcement. It sent a wave of fretfulness in Islamabad. Law Minister S M Zafar immediately criticised Bhutto and termed his remarks as untimely.

Bhutto stayed at the UN, mustering support for Pakistan. In the last week of October he addressed the UN again and drew the world’s attention towards the tyranny being unleashed on Kashmiris. This speech created a deep sympathy for Kashmiris in Pakistan and abroad.

Bhutto had reservations on the talks proposed by the Soviet Union. To dispel his doubts Ayub asked Bhutto to visit Tashkent which he did on November 23. On December 10, Ayub met President Lyndon Johnson in Washington, and got his support for the Tashkent meeting.

Ayub left for Kabul and Tashkent on January 1, 1966. Bhutto, foreign secretary Aziz Ahmad and defence secretary Ghulam Ishaq were in his team. Bhutto was not prepared to strike down Kashmir from the agenda. On January 5 Ayub and Shastri met without any tangible results, as India did not budge on Kashmir. Till then no meeting of the three — Ayub, Shastri and Kosygin — had been held. Bhutto and the Indian Minister of External Affairs, Swaran Singh too, met many times but without making any headway.

Kosygin met Ayub and Bhutto along with Gromyko, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, and brought certain proposals, the copy of which had already been sent to Shastri. There was some flexibility of giving alternative proposals.

Bhutto kept trashing the proposals. The Pakistanis were seen busy working throughout the night but without any result. In the morning a meeting of Ayub, Shastri and Kosygin was held but to no avail. Bhutto stood firm on not accepting the Soviet proposals. Finally, Ayub rejected them.

It appeared the whole exercise had been futile. On January 9, the Russian, Indian and Pakistani leaders met with their foreign ministers. Bhutto again rejected the Soviet proposals, but Shastri and Ayub decided to hold a one-on-one meeting and after three-quarters of an hour they reached an accord. The Soviet proposals were accepted: ‘Both parties will retreat to the pre-war line and later try to resolve their differences peacefully’.

At the signing of the accord Bhutto showed his displeasure. After the signing, Ayub invited Shastri to make a stopover at Rawalpindi before flying home. Shastri said he preferred a break at Kabul. By midnight, however, Shastri was reported dead.

shaikhaziz38@gmail.com