WILL the whirlwind tour of Hillary Clinton attempting to rebuild trust with Islamabad on the issue of military operations against the Taliban make a difference? The three-step strategy of Washington — fight, talk and build — focuses on the endgame in Afghanistan.

The idea is that the US will fight the Taliban till they agree to negotiate for a share in the post-Nato ruling set-up, something that would fall far short of taking over the country again. Meanwhile, Washington wants to build the infrastructure of the state, essentially its security apparatus but also other implements of authority, to enable the country to withstand pressure from the terrorists.

However, Islamabad seems to be unsure about the implications of this approach. Until now, it has opted to fight only selectively, talk but not as part of a strategy to consolidate the operational gains on the ground and wait to build after the dust settles. To that extent, the two allies have adopted somewhat different routes to the war against terror. Obviously, the gap between the two strategic frameworks led to a diplomatic impasse that needed to be confronted.

Clinton reiterated the US demand of eliminating safe havens for terrorists in Pakistan. Her audience in various public meetings retorted: you too, madam, should eliminate safe havens in Afghanistan. She said, we do, but you don’t. In other words, the public profile of the trust deficit remains even as the two establishments might have reached an understanding about some change in policy.

Clinton stressed the point that a strong and independent Afghanistan was in Pakistan’s interest. Her Pakistani counterpart also gave the assurance that Pakistan wanted a stable and prosperous Afghanistan. The rhetoric did not reflect the difference between the two agendas, i.e. elimination of terrorism for Washington and safeguarding Pakistan’s interests after Nato’s exit for Islamabad.

The secretary of state also pointed to the need for the host country to look east and engage India in bilateral trade to meet its development goals. On the other side, Pakistan has been trying to adjust to the shockwaves emanating from the recent India-Afghanistan strategic understanding. Whether or not Islamabad will move forward to embrace a regional policy framework remains an open question.

Meanwhile, the larger picture relating to political attitudes remains robustly anti-American. A major part of the media takes a fiercely nationalistic line in the context of the perceived threat to the country’s sovereignty. Apparently, there is no effort on the part of the establishment to keep the rhetoric from getting out of hand and harming its bargaining power vis-à-vis the US. That has led to a dichotomy. Islamabad resents American ties with India and Afghanistan. But, it has yet to convince its own people about the need to build ties with Washington.

The resolution of the All-Party Conference (APC) for ‘giving peace a chance’ surfaced a couple of times during the public appearances of Hillary Clinton. In the erstwhile context of the passage of the Kerry-Lugar bill, it would have indicated a feeble attempt by the government to project its democratic character. But, the APC’s reflection of the public sentiment against the war on terror pointed to a disincentive for a military operation against the Haqqani group on the part of Islamabad. Washington seems to ignore the message from parliament as before and deal exclusively with the security apparatus, despite Clinton’s welcome gesture to the APC resolution.

The two partners in the war against terror have been seeking to narrow the gap between their respective definitions of terrorism. For the secretary of state, it is evil per se. She warned that terrorists are like snakes in the backyard that can bite you instead of neighbours. For Pakistanis, the understanding of terrorism is more complicated because it involves the larger issues of dichotomy between Islam and the West.

For example, there have been few public demonstrations against the scores of acts of terrorism playing havoc with civic life in various localities, even as there have been hundreds of demonstrations about various issues, including some against the war on terror. Irrespective of the state’s distinction between the good and bad Taliban, depending on their attacks on Afghanistan and Pakistan respectively, large sections of the elite and masses consider them Muslims first and terrorists later, if at all.

Under these circumstances, Clinton faced an uphill task in bringing Pakistan on board, and preparing it for action within “days and weeks”. In the absence of a joint communiqué about an agreed formula to move forward on the strategic front, one can surmise that things remain hazy on the issue of a change of policy on Pakistan’s side. However, the hectic diplomatic activity during the last few weeks that led to Clinton’s visit would not make sense if there were no prospects of some forward movement. Most importantly, there seems to be a shared agenda of dispelling the general impassion of a breakdown of strategic ties between Washington and Islamabad. Also, there was the concern about taking action on what the secretary of state mentioned as agreement on 90 per cent of the issues.

Intriguingly, the military high command seems to be saying that an operation against the Haqqani group will be taken at a time of its own choosing, and that it will be done without any pressure. While the real message is only a matter of interpretation, the idea is that given no alternative Pakistan would probably operate against the safe havens. That would depend on the related issues of regional strategic moves in the east and north of Pakistan and the nature and character of negotiations with the Taliban if any.

But, while mobilising people against America goes on in full swing, preparing them for a possible détente with that country remains an elusive political agenda. The two sides need to work on cultivating support in their respective publics for their shared strategic goals before they aspire to pursue them in earnest.

The writer is a professor at LUMS.