ONE relationship where the potential for good can be unlocked but has not been is that between Pakistan and India. About 20 per cent of humanity resides uneasily in this nuclear-weapons environment.

The foreign ministers of the two countries will meet this month in New Delhi. Can progress towards better and more stable relations be expected? Last month's foreign secretary-level talks and their precursors with a mixed bag of results give limited grounds for optimism. The main stumbling block comes from India's nationalistic and ambitious policymakers that have a circumscribed attitude towards Pakistan. India's objective is to manage its nuclear neighbour, to make it compliant with regard to its own regional and international interests.

The path of friendship requires large-heartedness and compromise leading to reciprocal concessions. This has not been on the Indian agenda despite the well-meaning political statements of its prime minister who is widely respected in Pakistan.

Talks on the Siachen glacier dispute, the Sir Creek boundary and between the commerce and interior secretaries preceded the foreign secretaries' parleys. On Siachen, despite a near agreement in 1989-92 to disengage from the world's highest flashpoint, India, spurred on by its military, has insisted on authentication of its existing position despite compromises offered by Pakistan.

In the latest round if anything the Indian position became more aggressive, insisting that the entire boundary northwards left undemarcated on the ground by the Karachi ceasefire agreement of 1949 be demarcated before considering any disengagement. The Indian air chief publicly stated that as India had the strategic advantage of the high ground there was no need to resolve this issue, despite the unnecessarily high costs.

Talks on the Sir Creek sea boundary were equally fruitless. India suggested that the maritime boundary be agreed on with regard to the horizontal and vertical lines which would define the extended economic sea zone. As these two issues were closest to a resolution, the lack of progress on them provided an inauspicious backdrop for the foreign secretaries' talks.

However, the commerce and interior secretaries' talks showed noteworthy forward movement. Pakistan signalled a willingness to give MFN (Most Favoured Nation) status to India. The Pakistan interior secretary made a detailed presentation on the investigation and judicial process concerning suspects under trial for the Mumbai attack. The Indian government agreed in principle to permit a three-person judicial commission to come to India to move the process forward.

Both sides entered the foreign secretaries' talks with limited expectations. India's assessment was that Pakistan had been weakened by political instability, economic difficulties, expanding threats from terrorists, continued spillover from Afghanistan and sustained pressure from America on Pakistan's armed forces and intelligence services the bulwark of its defence.

The Pakistani objective was to keep India engaged, to soften the edge in the relationship and to reduce Indian pressure on various fronts including through India's traditional reliance on using Afghanistan to destabilise Pakistan.

While little of substance emerged, the main goal was to give direction to a resumed process of multidimensional engagement. In the key peace and security segment, the core dispute of Kashmir was raised without substantive discussion on avenues for its resolution.

The separate experts groups on nuclear and conventional confidence-building measures (CBMs) were reconstituted with a mandate to discuss the implementation and strengthening of existing arrangements and to consider additional mutually acceptable measures to build trust and confidence and promote peace and security.

Pakistan's suggestion that post Fukushima it would be useful to discuss nuclear safety issues was turned down by India ostensibly on the grounds that this would be best addressed in the context of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, but probably because India feels that in the nuclear field it was playing in a bigger league. The inclination of India to delink itself in the nuclear field is indicative of a myopic approach towards strategic stability and restraint which should be the prime motivating factors for both countries.

In the area of conventional CBMs, which holds little interest for India with its expanding armed forces, the few Indian suggestions to exchange military bands and visits by the heads of the defence universities and maritime/coast guards commanders had no substance or attraction for the Pakistani side.

On terrorism India stressed that bringing the Mumbai accused to justice would be the biggest CBM. Pakistan responded that fighting terrorism was a priority for both countries on which they should cooperate. On the Kashmir CBMs, India tried to include Baltistan in the disputed territory by suggesting two new meeting points outside Jammu and Kashmir which Pakistan turned down. However, the joint working group would examine operationalising two unused agreed-on meeting points. To promote people-to-people contact the working group was tasked to finalise a new visa agreement.

Probably the only concrete forward movement which will take place in New Delhi when the foreign ministers meet will be an agreement on cultural exchanges.

On balance, the talks so far have been asymmetrical in terms of results. On issues of interest to India on trade and interior ministry cooperation there has been movement. On peace and security issues of interest to Pakistan, Kashmir — Siachen, Sir Creek and water issues — there has been no movement. n

Better relations between the two countries would unlock South Asia's economic and developmental potential and also that of Afghanistan. Pakistan has to surmount internal and external challenges to strengthen its negotiating position. If India's objective continues to be to deny Pakistan any space to do, there can be little bilateral progress. In the short term this may suit India which is riding high with its economic resurgence and American alliance, but in the long term it is a shortsighted policy which would rebound on India.

The writer, a former diplomat , led Pakistan's delegations for nuclear and conventional CBMs talks with India in 2004-2007.