“YOU talk to people who shoot at your soldiers. You do not talk to people who do not have blood on their hands. They are irrelevant.”

Eric Roleau, the Swiss diplomat and writer, rendered a service by providing for posterity this priceless gem of advice from that maestro in diplomacy, Gen Charles de Gaulle. He scornfully spurned the advice offered by courtiers to parley with the yes-men in Algeria; béni-oui-oui , as they were called and made good on his bold words by negotiating a settlement in Algeria, as only he could have, risking his life and office.

But, as Britain's former Afghan envoy Sherard Cowper-Coles observes, “talking to its enemies is not something that has ever come easily to America”.

The reason he cites for this failing is only partially correct. It is not because America sees things in “black and white, with few shades of grey”. The real reason is its hubris; the arrogance of power. Compelled by circumstances to talk peace terms with North Vietnam and face the humiliation of its inglorious exit from Saigon, it punished a united Vietnam by isolating it for years.

Cowper-Coles' advice to talk to the Taliban is based on sheer realism which has now begun to seep into closed minds now. “We did not defeat the Taliban. Instead, we merely pushed them back — east and south and underground.” They regrouped and fought back. Militarily, there is a stalemate. American hopes of defeating the Taliban in the Pakhtun areas are unrealistic. So, indeed, are Taliban hopes of sweeping to power in the whole of Afghanistan.

A civil war after American withdrawal will be as ruinous as the de facto partition of the country. In either event, outside forces will be sucked in, against their better judgment. Negotiations for an overall settlement, in both the dimensions of the problem, internal and external, are the only way out.

Recipes have been flung by chefs of note to provide for a more acceptable dish than the bitter soup of today. Predictably, the worst was by Henry Kissinger. His article in the Washington Post on 'How to get out of Afghanistan' ended a string of banalities with one obvious idea: “a regional conference is the only way a bilateral negotiation with the Taliban can be enforced.”

Others, better informed, have been more precise and constructive. There is a wide consensus on three points — the Taliban must share power in Kabul while retaining primacy, but not exclusive control, in the areas where they hold sway; negotiations to that end are largely an Afghan affair with assistance from the stakeholders; a two-tier solution, internal and regional, is necessary.

Cowper-Coles suggests that “the process should be resemble a double-decker bus.

On the lower deck should be assembled all the main parties to the civil conflict that has blighted Afghanistan since before the 1979 Soviet invasion.

On the upper deck should ride all the regional parties to the dispute, the neighbours and near neighbours, all of whom have their clients within the country. The only way to avoid another round of the Great Game is to include Pakistan, India, China, Russia, the 'stans of Central Asia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and, yes, Iran, as stakeholders.”

Anatol Lieven adds one more element — “the withdrawal of all non-Afghan armed forces from Afghanistan”; that very much includes the US forces. “If it won't [pull out] the war will continue.” The Taliban will not accept their presence. Regional powers will not acquiesce in American bases either.

In an interview to Simon Tisdall, published in the Guardian in April, President Asif Ali Zardari legitimately complained that “the war in Afghanistan is destablising Pakistan and seriously undermining efforts to restore its democratic institutions and economic prosperity”.

The US has begun talking to the Taliban. Pakistan, which has suffered the most after Afghanistan, has a legitimate locus standi in the talks on a ceasefire and on the internal set-up; not, indeed, to dictate but to ensure that the internal accord is one which ensures internal peace.

The regional stakeholders are well identified. Is it too much to expect that Pakistan and India arrive at an understanding on their respective roles in Afghanistan, Pakistan to enjoy primacy, given its undeniable strategic and political interests? India has historic and economic ties which cannot be excluded, either. Afghanistan will not accept its exclusion either.

The interests of India and Pakistan need not clash. Their discord is part of the stalled peace process. An India-Pakistan accord on Afghanistan will follow an accord on Kashmir whose outlines were settled in 2007. It is time to revive that process. If the two countries fight at the regional conference, it might fail.

There is a good model in the Austrian State Treaty (May 15, 1955). The Four Powers withdrew their troops while Austria undertook to establish “a democratic government” (Article 8); dissolve Nazi bodies (Article 9); and provide transit facilities (Article 32). The Allied Powers declared that “they will respect the independence and territorial integrity of Austria”.

On Oct 26, 1955 Austria passed a federal constitutional law whereby she “of her own free will, declares herewith her permanent neutrality” and undertook “never in the future to accede to any military alliances nor permit the establishment of military bases of foreign states on her territory”.

The writer is an author and a lawyer.