UNCERTAINTY continues to surround the circumstances of the attack in Ghalanai, Mohmand Agency. Early reports that 'pro-government' tribal leaders had gathered to meet state officials in a bid to perhaps raise a lashkar against the Taliban in the area or prepare for an imminent military operation have still not been verified. It appears locals generally gather in the compound that was attacked, so it is not clear if there had been a specific meeting that had been targeted. Even the method of attack has come under question — was it a suicide attack or planted explosives? — because of the massive damage caused to nearby structures. What is absolutely certain though is that the loss of life has been significant: over 40 dead, with several injured and in critical condition.

Mohmand, Bajaur and the territory on the other side of the Pak-Afghan border appear to have been a triangle of menace for the state. A military operation to clear Mohmand of militants has been put on hold, perhaps because of a shortage of troops or the onset of Muharram. However, there is little doubt that eventually an operation will have to be launched. The big question is: what comes after military operations succeed in clearing areas of militants? Acknowledging that the 'hold' and 'build' phases require significant civilian administration input, the army appears increasingly willing to give space to the political agents and to reactivate administration of the tribal areas via the Frontier Crimes Regulation. While by no means ideal, the system is the only one currently available.

The military strategy, however, continues to suffer from a serious handicap: the lack of success against capturing or eliminating so-called 'high-value targets', i.e. the top militant leaders. Yesterday, following a visit to the Ladda area of South Waziristan by army chief Gen Kayani, a trip designed to tout the success of the military operation in the agency, rockets were fired in the area by the usual 'miscreants'. Such attacks are meant to demonstrate the militants' staying power, that no matter how much on the run they may be, they still retain the capacity to plan and organise strikes. Moreover, as the resettlement of South Waziristan begins cautiously, the most commonly expressed fear of residents is the possibility of reprisals by militants — another sign that there is still coordination and planning occurring in the militants' leadership. The answer to the problem continues to be an improvement in the security apparatus's counter-terrorism capabilities, from intelligence-gathering to strengthening local police forces to better coordination among the various agencies. The high-value targets must be captured or eliminated.