With the World Bank inroads and an understanding that Pakistan's then battered and under-assail power sector needed change in order to cater for the future needs of the country, specially when it faced perennial brown-outs , the decision makers had decided to re-structure this sector.

A necessary attachment to this scheme was the concept of the Independent Power Producers (IPP) and an embargo on construction of new power plants by Wapda and the KESC. On paper, this was a ban on new thermal power plants, but it soon converted into a defacto stoppage on all kinds of new plants in the governmental sector.

While the re-structuring activity was still on the drawing boards, IPPs started mushrooming-- motored through over-invoicing and the ubiquitous commissions, and have now attained enormous proportions. The way this very issue was tackled in Bangladesh- although even higher in corruption ranking than Pakistan, puts everybody to shame.

And their power purchasing agreements(PPAs) fixing the per unit price around 3 cents or so against above 6 cents for us (this going above 11 cents after the small print of the agreement gets incorporated) is a sad reminder about our values and the love we have for our country.

As IPP-created problems are immense, the last chairman of Wapda too made these look like the only culprit for the hundreds of billions lost in the utility during the period 1998-2003. Similarly the IPPs, their front loaded tariffs, the peaking out of the same by 2005 (?) and the respite thereafter has also been propagated by many an important person as a road-map towards reduction in electricity prices. Adding insult to injury was the previous management's victorious claims of saving the country from some $6 billion worth of IPP billing (spread over the life of the PPAs).

The three-year delay in the finalization of the negotiations, the extension in PPA periods, the capitulation to the bigger players and trampling of smaller ones is conveniently ignored. Subsequent constrictions in the power evacuation from IPPs like AES Lalpir situated at the Muzaffargarh district and the collision with another bigger IPP, situated near Multan again, in letting things be instead of calling for a closure are other irregularities to be reckoned with.

All in all, the IPP issue has been badly tackled and now becomes a drag for the economy. However, all this is simply because of mishandling, below-par negotiations, inability to implement the PPAs in their true spirit, the lack of spirit to look after Wapda's interest and lastly because of the total failure in creating new demand and selling more energy. The growth in sales remains nearly 4 per cent against the required figure of 8 per cent and upwards. And whatever may anyone say, the low rate of sales is solely due to exorbitant electricity rate and the load suppression model of tariffs.

Coming back to re-structuring of the power sector, we see that such an effort was already afoot through the US Aid programme from late eighties and earlier too through in-house efforts (on the UK model of area electricity boards) and much did happen. As is important, that effort then focused more on HRD than on felling the existing structures or in creating new set-ups.

During this period and before, the WB too chipped in with two very apt and beneficial programmes viz. the commercial procedure and complete revamping of allied systems during 1979 and the stores/ inventory systems of a little later. Both these systems were and still are beneficial to Wapda.

However, these have become a little diluted and need to be redone in today's environment soon. On the other hand, it must be agreed that Wapda did not benefit much from the aid and the RoR (rate of return) remained below-par. For this Wapda's then management alone should be held responsible. We also see that immediately after the US Aid started drying-up and the time came for Wapda to earn the dividends, a bureaucrat took over as the chairman.

It was five years of non-technical management and just management alone. Quietly but with the drying-up of financial resources, all technical activity was put on hold leading to the famous stagnation which eventually brought in the Army in late 1998.

During these five years i.e. the post-US Aid era, the WB and its agenda for the restructuring of the power sector was required to be followed. This was very simple. The WB would pre-qualify consultants and also prepare the road-map of the job. What were the antecedents of the consultants? Did they ever re-structure an organization the size of Wapda? Were they clear about their objectives, was the level of interaction and liaison with Wapda professionals enough and upto mark?

Unfortunately, no one asked these imperative questions, nor did anyone take the trouble of providing answers. Along with this road-map, with muddled milestones, was the creation of another edifice known as the PEPCO (Pakistan Electric Power Company). This new creation was to sheppard Wapda towards the initial of the goals viz. corporatization and then made responsible for readying these corporatized entities for the eventual sacrifice of privatization.

This process was scheduled to complete in two year's time and a blue blooded bureaucrat was appointed to head it. That his posting orders were quickly changed and the cricketer gentleman now remains incarcerated for causing a Rs2 billion loss at PACO (during his stewardship there) to the exchequer is another story.

With this change, the PEPCO was also taken over by the then chairman Wapda with the Member Power as the CEO. Now who would correct whom remained to be fixed- this cozy arrangement remained in place for some time. Probably, due to pressure from the WB, a totally unconnected professional from the computer/ IT sector was then hired to be the CEO of PEPCO retiring the Member (Power) from his additional hat. Strangely the GoP had nothing to do with this induction and the recruitment of other PEPCO executives. All this was a classic case of nepotism, adhocism and a visionless way of doing things.

Some Wapda employees, possessing the requisite qualifications were also taken on deputation but at much lesser pays- thus creating a chasm in day to day operations. Slowly but surely PEPCO was incorporated as one of the many departments of Wapda with its CEO paying full allegiance to the employer viz. the chairman, Wapda. Down the road we also saw the much harried CEO scurrying around with purchase files of Wapda stores. As to how procurement of day to day items became his duty remains elusive till day.

As such the CEO was simply kept off track during his tenure- making it sure that PEPCO would not ever take up it's original charter of duties. One fine morning, reportedly after a difference on a purchase file, the then chairman of Wapda and PEPCO invoked the resignation letter secured at the time of the initial recruitment and the GM finance (a deputationist from the audit and accounts department and who after joining Wapda in 1991 has never looked back) was made the CEO PEPCO. He retains this position although he also holds the purse strings of Wapda, being since elevated as its Member of finance.

PEPCO thus is over five year's old now against its original fixed life of only two years. An expert is on record to have stated that another (but smaller) pepco is now needed to correct PEPCO now. Had Wapda been made really profitable and an example for the rest of the fledging PSEs (public sector enterprises), then the situation could be accepted and PEPCO also made to fade away but the situation is totally different and a reason for the pro-privatization lobby's glee.

What is the present position of the restructuring activity and the corporatization of Wapda? Has all it led to any better service to the poor customers and what remains the future of this utility? Where remains the privatization thrust. As happens in all directionless forays, Wapda at present is nowhere near what can be called corporatization. It is the same but for change in the nomenclatures of various technical positions.

The word manager has taken over the earlier time tested and known engineer and nothing more. The ancillary and auxiliary services have blossomed, increased in number and also now makeup the actual body politic of the DISCO HQ. Engineering has been made to take the backseat with non-technical directions being given the precedence.

This is so because the non-technical and non-professional imported CEOs felt far easier to communicate this way. To further complicate the issue, a most unjust two-tier system of pays and allowances was also introduced- corporate pay scales for the so-called rank outsider professionals and nearly nothing for the permanent cadre.

Right on top was the small contract periods for the new slots, which all led to adhocism and the tendency to show quick results even through figure fudging. The actual technical resource thus remains as poor as always, specially when the distribution companies have become top heavy with imported autocratic CEOs, plaint and unrelated BOGs and at best the minimal of corporate cultural in place. The foremost requirement of a change in culture is simply missing. As a consequence, the last five years and the year of wilderness prior to this era have been a total waste.

Concurrently, it has also been brain-drain leading to an unparalleled depletion of HR ever seen in Pakistan. All this was further snow-balled because of the ineffective and defanged ministries of the water and power and allied ones during this very time period. We can further hold the WB and its representatives on perennial visits to the country also responsible for the rot because they would during each visit, instead of calling for the truth to prevail through change of erring management, simply call for a speedup of the privatization process or for the easy way out through increase in the already back-breaking electricity tariffs. AS such, the whole exercise of power sector re-structuring can easily be billed as regression of the highest order and an immense loss.

Can the losses incurred be recouped or can ever the regression of the power sector be made to change spots? Can all then attain the right direction? And then whether the eventual goal of privatization is in the national interest or not? All these are very important questions and there is a strong need to come up with necessary answers.

Coming to the first of imperatives, we see that indeed the present regression can be stopped. Actually the so-called reforms will have to be redone altogether. The top heavy managements specially at the DISCOs (distribution companies) need to be pruned with concurrent strengthening of the field formations. According to experts,Wapda through the current process has been made into at-least eight mini Wapdas- but with less responsibility or checks and balances.

Additionally, the so-called corporatized entities now operate and take up some very important tasks without being privy to the huge talent available with Wapda- and the meticulously crafted sections are being considered as simply redundant. To the chagrin of all, we saw even imperatives as the planning department being sent for the axe.

Similarly, the existing setups would need to be retooled/ re-engineered with maximum emphasis going to the human resource re-tooling. This is all the more so because Wapda of the last five years saw tens of thousands of vacancies being filled on contract appointments with equal numbers being made redundant. And now as envisaged, these contract employees are rightly clamouring for being confirmed and merged into the permanent cadre. Can both new recruitments and redundancies go together? With redoing of the system, the desired level of corporatization can be achieved.

Now coming to the goal of privatization, we see that the whole concept is under review in the world- rather it has been discredited internationally, while we are travelling at mind boggling speeds towards it. And all this is being done in order to qualify for $476 million, which Pakistan receives from the IMF each year under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Programme (PRGF). As rightly suggested by various experts we need not blindly follow the IMF dictate. Actually the answer lies in properly managing the power sector with the GoP ever on its tail through the ministries of water & power, finance and the establishment.

Here it would be very interesting to note that Wapda- specially during the last three years, has been doing things at will. We see that nepotism was at it's best with retired civil and military officers being required to carry on much after retirements on contracts, etc. An example would be the continuing GM at the Ghazi Barotha Hydro-Power Plant, who stays as such even after the Federal Minister for Water and Power's statement before the National Assembly that no extension was ever given to him. What ever anyone may profess, umpteen senior GM level positions in Wapda are still filled up with retired favourites and with impunity.