Strategic shifts
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AT the dawn of the 21st century, the US was the sole superpower. Its main rival, the Soviet Union, had been dissolved a decade earlier. The era of globalisation had begun. The world looked like a global village. China was rising, but not yet in a position to challenge US supremacy. However, this unipolar world did not last long as America became embroiled in distant, unending wars. With its invasion of Iraq, the unilateral, illegal and pre-emptive use of force against adversaries became a norm. Hatred for minority communities took a violent form. The UN began to lose its relevance. Protectionist walls started impeding free international trade. The world descended into disorder.
In this uncertain clime, China opted to avoid wars, focusing instead on economic growth. The US decided to counter-balance a rising China and, in 2011, announced a pivot of its foreign policy towards Asia. Beijing reacted by flexing its economic outreach and launching the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 to link China to the outside world through connectivity projects and supply chains. The US embarked on its Indo-Pacific Strategy, co-opting Japan, Australia and India. China perceived it as an attempt to threaten the sea routes it used for exports. So it began to explore alternative land routes to Europe. An opportunity arose when, in 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to elevate bilateral ties to a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’. A few years later, when Putin proposed the idea of a ‘Greater Eurasian partnership’, China decided to work on three land corridors — the Northern Corridor via the trans-Siberian railway, the multimodal Middle Corridor via the Caspian Sea and a direct overland highway to Russia via Central Asia.
These Eurasian land routes practically neutralised America’s policy to contain China’s rise through the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Unsurprisingly, the US embarked upon another shift in its Asian policy. It decided to change its hitherto confrontational foreign policy with China to one that would work for both countries. Meeting in May 2026, presidents Xi and Donald Trump agreed to work together for “constructive strategic stability”. Pursuant to this shift, the US dropped the word ‘Indo’ from its Pacific command.
Meanwhile, in the West, Trump decided to retreat from liberal internationalism, and prevailed on US allies in Nato and Europe to spend more on their own security. Accordingly, European countries are now diverting resources towards rearmament and a unified European defence, while maintaining their economic contacts with China. America’s recent war with Iran has further undermined its global standing and brought China and Russia even closer in their support for Iran.
Today’s shifting geopolitics have baffled India.
These strategic shifts in global geopolitics have baffled India, which had aligned its foreign policy with the US-led Indo-Pacific Strategy, QUAD (Australia, India, Japan and the US) and I2U2 (India, Israel, the UAE and US). Accordingly, it never seriously tried to reconcile with China or let BRICS thrive. India failed to anticipate that the US and China might one day agree to stabilise their relationship for peaceful competition. Nor did it foresee a steep rise in Pakistan’s military profile post-May 2025 and diplomatic profile during the Iran-US war. India’s decade-long efforts to isolate Pakistan had failed. Instead of reading these strategic shifts correctly, its leadership under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has relentlessly pursued its partnership with the US and its ally Israel.
Meanwhile, Pakistan has continued to work with China, the US, Russia and key West Asian countries for regional peace and stability. It has also endorsed China’s Global Security Initiative. The latter promotes the concept of indivisible security for all and overwrites the Western idea of hegemony and dominance, laying the foundation of a new world order predicated on collective and cooperative security and respect for each other’s sovereignty.
Regionally, Pakistan’s ties with Bangladesh and other South Asian countries are also improving. Since India has made Saarc dysfunctional, Pakistan and Bangladesh could join hands to form a new grouping in South Asia with China as a full member. It is not clear whether the Modi government will be able to see these regional trends and reverse its hostile policies towards China and Pakistan. It must realise that a hegemonic approach to international relations has failed at the global level and will also fail regionally. The only way forward is to live and let live. Regardless of India’s policy approach, Pakistan must keep its doors open for dialogue with all its neighbours while maintaining its deterrent against possible Indian aggression in the years ahead.
The writer is chairman Sanober Institute and former foreign secretary of Pakistan.
Published in Dawn, June 21st, 2026
