IN an international order long dominated by Western powers, particularly since the end of the Cold War, concepts of “ally” and “alliance”, exemplified by Nato, have functioned as instruments of collective security while simultaneously evolving into mechanisms of geopolitical power.

This transformation has been associated with interventionist practices that contest state sovereignty under international law, including the 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia, the Iraq War and Nato’s eastward enlargement.

In particular, Nato’s eastward enlargement altered Europe’s strategic balance by intensifying Russia’s security concerns. Rather than consolidating a stable post-Cold War order, the alliance has perpetuated structural antagonism, contributing to protracted security tensions that ultimately culminated in the Ukraine crisis.

Ironically, these consequences are now visible within the alliance itself. The once-unshakable transatlantic partnership shows clear signs of internal strain, most notably in Europe’s split between two competing strategic identities: a Nato-centric Europe and a sociopolitical Europe. The former remains militarily dependent and strategically subordinate, while the latter seeks autonomy as a global “normative power” and a “third force”.

Europe’s lack of real strategic autonomy prevents reconciliation between these identities, eroding internal cohesion and external credibility. Pulled in opposing directions, Europe is unable to act as a unified actor and is increasingly vulnerable to external pressure, including from its own allies. In securing continued United States military support for Ukraine, Europe has largely adopted a posture of silence and deference.

Recent tensions between the US and Europe — including explicit trade and territorial threats toward allies — highlight a fundamental reality: alliances do not eliminate power asymmetries. When interests diverge, even close partners can be subject to coercion. The belief that shared values alone ensure solidarity is increasingly proving illusory, as history shows that alliances cannot override national sovereignty or core strategic priorities. As former British prime minister Lord Palmerston famously said of Britain, “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”

The US has redefined its national interests and recalibrated its relations with Nato and Europe, leaving the alliance facing its greatest strain not from external adversaries, but from its own leading member. The current disunity within the alliance in the context of the US ongoing war against Iran exemplifies the dysfunction within the Western alliance.

In an interview with Al Jazeera on March 30, Marco Rubio said the US would reassess its relationship with Nato after the war in Iran, citing European allies’ refusal to permit US base operations; meanwhile, in an interview with The Telegraph on April 1, Donald Trump called Nato a “paper tiger” and said he was “strongly considering” withdrawing the US from the alliance.

The ongoing confrontation between the US and Denmark over Greenland, in which the US has openly threatened its Nato ally with tariffs and coercive measures in pursuit of territorial acquisition, illustrates a broader shift in the current era of great power competition: Allies are only instruments subordinate to the ambitions of the hegemonic power. The crisis of the Nato alliance is not an anomaly; rather, it is the inevitable outcome of arrangements that conflate loyalty with obedience and partnership with hierarchy.

The concepts of “ally” and “alliance” therefore require reconsideration in light of recent global developments. Western alliances that claim to uphold sovereignty, international law and democracy increasingly undermine these principles through expansion, intervention and coercion.

Published in Dawn, April 13th, 2026