• Justice Shah says remand is a judicial tool to be used only when justice demands
• Court sets aside service tribunal’s ruling granting advance increments to railway officer

ISLAMABAD: The Supreme Court on Wednesday ruled that remanding a case back to a lower forum for its determination afresh is a judicial instrument, to be employed only when justice demands so.

“To remand case is not a matter of routine or an automatic judicial reflex,” observed sen­­ior puisne judge Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah.

A two-judge SC bench, headed by Justice Shah, had taken up an appeal filed by the secretary/chairman of Pakistan Railways (PR) challenging the Oct 26, 2022, decision of the Federal Service Tribunal (FST), Lahore, which had granted relief to respondent

Tariq Mansoor, the accounts officer at PR’s audit department.

The case concerns Tariq Mansoor, who while serving in Pakistan Railways, obtained an LLB degree in 1992 and later applied for two advance increments under two schemes: (i) the Incentive Scheme for Railways Officers and Subordinates of Jan 22, 1966, and (ii) the Grant of Advance Increments to the Employees Drawing Pay in BPS-16 — Office Memorandum of July 8, 1996.

The respondent had approached the department through a representation, which was referred to the Finance Department and later rejected on Sept 26, 2019, on the grounds that the 1966 scheme stood abolished. The FST, however, accepted his plea.

The Supreme Court held that no benefit under the 1966 scheme could be extended to officers of the audit department, and that the LLB qualification was not recognised under the 1996 general scheme. Therefore, the resp­ondent’s case did not fall within the scope of either scheme. The benefit extended by the FST under the 1966 scheme was declared un­­s­­ustainable and set aside, Justice Shah observed.

The court considered whether to remand the matter to the tribunal but concluded that there was no justification for remand, holding that the respondent was not entitled to adv­ance increments under either of the schemes.

Justice Shah explained that a case should be remanded to a lower forum only where material facts remain undetermined, procedural fairness has been compromised, or essential evidence has not been duly examined — situations in which the appellate court cannot itself do complete justice.

“The purpose of remand is corrective, not dilatory; it serves to secure a just adjudication, not to prolong litigation,” Justice Shah observed, adding that the power to remand must be exercised with circumspection and restraint.

He noted that where the factual matrix is complete, the issues are purely legal, or the appellate record permits a final determination, the appellate court should decide the matter itself. “To remand in such circumstances is to sacrifice substance to delay justice in the name of process.”

The judge observed that restraint against unnecessary remand is rooted in the principle of judicial economy — a foundational tenet of modern adjudication that obliges courts to avoid duplication of proceedings, promote finality and conserve judicial time.

It also embodies the constitutional command for expeditious justice under Article 37(d) of the Constitution, ensuring that litigation does not get trapped in repetitive procedural rounds.

Referring to the argument that the LLB degree was equivalent to an MA degree and therefore entitled to benefit under the 1996 general scheme, the court noted that no such facility for treating equivalent degrees was provided in the scheme, nor could such a condition be judicially read into it.

“Institutional autonomy is a vital facet of constitutional governance. It reflects the recognition that each organ or department of the state possesses its own sphere of competence, expertise, and discretion within which it must be permitted to function freely,” Justice Shah observed.

He emphasised that while courts are the ultimate interpreters of legality, they must exercise judicial restraint in matters where the law vests policy discretion or administrative choice in an executive or institutional authority.

“When a scheme or departmental policy — such as one framed by Pakistan Railways or the Finance Division — does not expressly provide for a particular benefit, it is not the function of the court to read that benefit into the scheme. Doing so would amount to judicial legislation and would erode the institutional autonomy that underpins administrative efficacy.”

The court also noted that following the impugned judgement of the FST, the respondent had already received advance increments amounting to Rs75,000.

The additional secretary of Pakistan Rail­ways informed the court that in view of the circumstances, the department did not intend to recover the amount from the respondent.

The petitions were converted into appeals and allowed.

Published in Dawn, November 13th, 2025