WASHINGTON: US reliance on Afghan tribal militias to battle Taliban and Al Qaeda forces and hunt down leaders of both groups has been a signature feature of the war in Afghanistan. By counting on proxy forces to take the lead in ground operations, the Pentagon has reduced the potential loss of US military lives and minimized political backlash in Muslim countries about an invading force, as the overall number of US troops in the region has increased.

But the strategy has come at a cost in military efficiency and US control. As the Pentagon’s early success in routing the Taliban from Afghan cities has given way to a frustrating search for Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders, the decision to avoid committing larger numbers of conventional US troops has come in for criticism by some inside and outside the Pentagon who argue that it has resulted in missed opportunities and an inconclusive operation.

Even if Osama or Omar is captured soon, critics argue, the continued elusiveness of the majority of those on the Pentagon’s list of 40 most-wanted fugitive leaders calls for involvement of many more US forces.

The US desire to vanquish the enemy contrasts with an Afghan cultural tendency favouring negotiated surrender and side-switching over fights to the finish. Pentagon officials reported last month that bribery and deals had allowed Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters to escape from Kandahar and Tora Bora. And last week, watching the drawn-out pace of the surrender of Taliban weapons in Helmand defence officials expressed concern that the process might enable Omar and other senior Taliban members to sneak away.

The ultimate success of the proxy-force approach has important implications beyond the war in Afghanistan, particularly since the Afghan model is being touted as a possible template for American military action against Iraq or other terrorist-supporting states.

The decision to rely on local militias, senior defence officials say, was driven less by a fear of US military casualties than a determination to avoid the mistakes made during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. “Franks is very cognizant of what the Soviets did wrong,” said a senior aide. “He didn’t want the US to be perceived as an invading force. He wanted an operation that would gain the trust and confidence of Afghans and others in the Muslim world.” Pentagon officials concede some downsides to the strategy. “Some things get done in ways that aren’t exactly the ways the US military would do them,” one senior military officer said. “But that’s the cost of doing business.” —Dawn/LAT-WP News Service (c) The Washington Post.