IN 2013 and 2014, towards the end of the last parliament and then under the present one, legislative changes were made to the country’s anti-terrorism laws, including the promulgation of the notorious Protection of Pakistan Act (PoPA) in mid-2014. The aims were varied and controversial: expanding the definition of a terrorist act; giving the state new powers to act against terrorists and financiers of terrorism; setting up new special courts; etc. Yet, nothing came close to the controversy stirred up by the granting of 90-day detention powers to the security forces: a move that was, via PoPA and amendments to the Anti Terrorism Act, 1997, allegedly meant to give legal cover to the detention of so-called missing persons and also to help with investigations linked to the Karachi operation and other counterterrorism measures. Indeed, so controversial were the new detention powers that they came with a hard cap — a sunset clause that would automatically be triggered after two years.

That two-year period is now over and, among the various NAP-related discussions in the post-Quetta bombing scenario, the revival of the special 90-day detention powers is thought to be a key demand of the military-led security establishment. The political leadership is thought to be wary of granting an extension. The PPP and MQM, which have both felt the sharp end of detention powers under the amended Section 11EEEE of the ATA 1997, have reason to oppose an extension, while the PML-N, which has the numerical strength in parliament to have an extension passed in a joint sitting, has maintained an ambivalent position so far. To be sure, with the lapse of PoPA, a range of counterterrorism measures have been affected and some of them can be reasonably debated once again and reintroduced. But does the country really need extraordinary detention powers, especially those that have been used against political forces? The problem with such ad hoc powers and piecemeal approaches is that they are open to abuse and, almost invariably in a rickety legal system, abuse does occur.

Just as importantly, recourse to add-ons and stopgap arrangements tends to suppress demand for long-lasting, structural reforms. To what extent, for example, has the creation of military courts under the 21st Amendment deflected attention away from the chronic deficiencies of the regular criminal justice system? First the ATA, then PoPA and finally the 21st Amendment — each of those legislative interventions simply created new judicial layers with no discernible systemic improvement. If anything, the new courts have created additional burdens for the higher judiciary because complex matters of due process have to be addressed when those convicted by special courts exercise their right to appeal. Ninety-day detentions may seem like a useful power to some in the security establishment, but from a systemic perspective such detentions only draw the country deeper into unnecessary legal and constitutional complications.

Published in Dawn, August 18th, 2016