BEIRUT: What are the various estimates of Israel’s nuclear capability and the role this might play in the era of peace. The exigencies that had dictated tackling the Arab-Israeli conflict prior to 1991 still exist, perhaps more urgently warranted by the demands of conducting the peace settlement in the post-1991 period. This is particular true with regard to the issue of security.

Israel’s nuclear capability is one of the most vital aspects of this issue. Determining the components and capacity of this force has been an essential consideration for counteracting its use during the conflict and for formulating a credible policy to confront its potential use and its impact on Arab military and political strategy. This process is still essential for several reasons:

1. In spite of the fact that a peaceful solution has become the only possible strategic option for all parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, in terms of security issues, Israel’s nuclear capacity is still part of the equation.

Arabs development rather than arms eradication, is still operative in the scope of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In other words, military force is still being considered in practical terms, although this is primarily a political leverage (and this is behind the arrogance of Israeli Prime Minister Aerial Sharon — to execute the Oslo Accords with the Palestinians so far).

2. Formulating a constructive framework for negotiations over Israel’s nuclear armaments, separate from the overall official political framework required a detailed awareness of the elements pertaining to Israel’s nuclear forces. This is no small nuclear power, consisting of only a limited number and primitive weapons.

It is a major arsenal that threatens the region and comprises all the features of a complex nuclear policy that relies on psychological pressure as much as it does on military strategy.

Estimating the extent of Israel’s nuclear capacity is largely guesswork due to the lack of precise information available with regard to the technological specifications of its arsenal, the supporting infrastructure and the feature of Israel’s nuclear policy.

This means that estimating this capacity is an extremely complex problem, one that requires a large scientific enterprise. In general, it is possible to assert that Israel’s nuclear force, like any other nuclear force consists of four major components: Nuclear warheads of various specifications; Transportation and delivery systems; Missile bases, and a headquarters and communications network.

Press reports as to how did Israel get the bomb confirmed that in 1973 Israel already had 13 nuclear bombs.

This information was acquired from Israeli officials and through estimates of the quantities of plutonium. It said that Israeli scientists were able to develop new methods to speed up the production of nuclear bombs between 1967-1973.