THE past few weeks have been incredibly bloody for Iraq, as fears resurface of a return to the sectarian carnage that was unleashed in 2006. The UN says over 1,000 people have been killed in the country in May while April (over 700 deaths) was not much better. Iraqis — both Shia and Sunni — have died on a near daily basis as militants have bombed mosques, markets and neighbourhoods, with civilians targeted along with security forces. The violence has sectarian overtones as many minority Sunnis feel Nouri al-Maliki’s Shia-led government has been ruling with a heavy hand. Al Qaeda and other extremist groups have stepped in to exploit communal differences; sectarian passions were already running high due to the civil war in neighbouring Syria.

Contemporary Iraq’s situation is the legacy of America’s experiment in regime change. After the US invaded in 2003, various types of militant outfits sprang up as the Iraqi state collapsed with the fall of Saddam Hussein. Al Qaeda’s Iraqi affiliate has emerged as probably the deadliest of them all, while there is also a working relationship between the extremist group’s Iraqi and Syrian wings. What is more, a confessional, Lebanon-like system with power divided between the dominant religious and ethnic players has failed to work in Iraq. This shows that even the most well-intentioned system imposed from the outside will not function for long. All efforts must be made to prevent Iraq’s disintegration. A failed state will only add to Iraqis’ miseries, and give more space to jihadi elements. The Iraqi government should concentrate on two areas; it needs to make increased efforts to reconcile with all of the country’s religious and ethnic communities so that the democratic process can continue. Secondly, it must take firm action against Al Qaeda and other extremists who seek to use Iraqi soil to destabilise the region. A divided, ethnically and religiously fractured Iraq is an unwelcome prospect and if not contained, the country’s internal sectarian unrest can flow beyond its borders.