PAKISTAN finds itself facing multiple challenges today on account of militancy and religious extremism. Even though the people are the ultimate victims, at the societal level they provide ideological support to radical and extremist forces and facilitate them in waging 'jihad'.

In a society like Pakistan, where religiosity is largely innate and critical thinking has generally been ignored, such ideological initiations play a critical role in influencing public opinion.

A counter-narrative remains conspicuous by its absence. State and society have yet to realise the nature and implications of the threat. Academics consider radicalisation a political phenomenon, triggered by inequality, socio-economic injustices and state policies. Clerics and religious scholars look at the phenomenon from a socio-political perspective but through religious shades. They argue that Talibanisation is the outcome of state polices, including the failure to enforce the Sharia. They express concern over what they see as the westernisation of Pakistani society. The state links radicalisation to external factors.

The respective narratives are also reflected in public opinion. But radicalisation is a far more complex phenomenon than these narratives are willing to concede and most prevalent notions in Pakistan are not backed by empirical evidence. Perceptions alone won't lead to solutions.

Most definitions of radicalisation term it as a process in which an individual or a group regards his/her or its objectives as superior to others. The desire to realise such objectives at all cost can lead to the use of violence.

A recent study on radicalisation by the Islamabad-based think tank, the Pak Institute for Peace Studies, concludes that the phenomenon occurs on three levels. The study finds that poverty, inequality and economic deprivations contribute to radicalisation in some areas but are not drivers of the phenomenon. There is also increasing religiosity in society, and though the think tank does not find a direct link with violent radicalisation, it identifies religious extremism as the common factor in all the visible trends of radicalisation in Pakistan.

Various indicators support findings of the study that radicalisation in Pakistan is driven by multiple factors and occurs at three levels. Firstly, it occurs among lower income groups, mainly in poorly governed areas including the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, south Punjab and a few areas in interior Sindh, where poverty, inequality and loose administrative structures spur radicalisation and terrorism. Madressahs and militant and sectarian networks act as catalysts, exploiting these factors to further their extremist agendas.

It is not surprising that sectarian outfits, such as Sipah-i-Sahaba, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, Tehrik-i-Jaffariya and small sectarian outfits of the Ahl-i-Hadith and the Barelvi sects have managed to establish and sustain strongholds in these areas. In the tribal areas, these factors can further contribute to the ongoing insurgency. Militant organisations also recruit their foot soldiers from these areas and in many terrorist attacks in Punjab the attackers have been traced to the southern part of the province.

The levels and trends of radicalisation are different in the middle-income group. The drivers of radicalisation in urban or semi-urban areas, including central and north Punjab, Karachi and Hyderabad in Sindh, the settled districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Kashmir are mainly political. These trends are influenced by both internal and external political developments and the promotion of a radical narrative by radical groups and sections of the media. Militant organisations mainly rely on promotion of such radicalisation to swell their ranks with militants. Radicalisation is not specific to a community in these parts, though madressah students and the more religiously inclined communities are usually considered more receptive to absorbing violent tendencies.

A closer look at the cadre of militant organisations involved in Kashmir and Afghanistan finds youth educated at formal educational institutions. Student wings of religious political parties as well as sectarian, charitable, radical and militant organisations remain active in colleges and universities. Other wings of such organisations seek to influence various segments of society.

Almost every religious organisation maintains wings with a specific focus on women, traders, lawyers, doctors and teachers among others. These wings have a major role in promoting radicalisation among middle-income groups and have an array of tools at their disposal to increase their influence. They consistently rely on radical literature and publications and disseminate their message not only through the printed word but also through CDs and DVDs.

Militant organisations in Pakistan increasingly use the Internet as an instrument to promote radicalisation and spur recruitment, with the youth from middle-income groups as their specific target. International terrorist organisations, such as Al Qaeda, have also benefited from this level of radicalisation.

Growing alienation from society is the major driver of radicalisation among the upper-middle class and the so-called elite of the country. Radical groups such as Hizbut Tahrir and Al Huda are active in indoctrinating these groups. Both organisations brand themselves as agents of change though they focus on different target groups. Al Huda mainly focuses on women, with the stated objective of “bringing them back to their religious roots”. Hizbut Tahrir has been striving to create a niche among the influential elite as part of its top-down approach to realise its objective of introducing a caliphate in the country.

However, though the trends are present in the areas and groups exposed to radicalisation, this is not to suggest that these are popular tendencies. Similar levels of radicalisation, minor variations notwithstanding, can be found in other Muslim countries. A recent survey by Pew Research Centre finds many similarities in public opinion on the issue across the Muslim world. Interestingly, Pakistan and Turkey are among those Muslims states with far less support for terrorism among the people. The people of the two countries are concerned about an increase in extremism linked to religion. The level of radicalisation is much higher in Indonesia, Egypt, Nigeria and Jordan. However, Pakistan faces a most unnerving degree of terrorism, which far exceeds anything faced by countries with a decidedly higher level of radicalisation. And that begs the question what are the main factors contributing to such a violent landscape in Pakistan, despite opposition to terrorism? The answer seems far off.

Firstly, society may be against violence, but not necessarily against the agendas of extremists. The second, and most important, feature is the presence of militant networks on Pakistani soil. Over 100 militant and Taliban groups and foreign terrorist networks operating in and from the tribal areas of Pakistan present the key difference between Pakistan and other Muslim states. Radicalisation and terrorism have a cause-and-effect relationship in Pakistan. The challenge of terrorism cannot be overcome without weakening this bond. But understanding the phenomenon has to be the first step.

The writer is director of Pak Institute for Peace Studies and editor of the quarterly research journal Conflict and Peace Studies.

mamirrana@yahoo.com