THE wounds of last year’s terrorist attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar are still fresh and cause for renewing our resolve to finish the job of securing Pakistan’s future. In just one year, since the APS attack, it appears that Pakistani state and society have successfully constructed a narrative of zero tolerance against terrorism.

However, the perception that the government woke up only after the APS attack is not true. Some fragmented responses already existed but these were not connected with a broader counterterrorism framework. The National Action Plan was an attempt to fill this void.

Since then, there has been a decline in terrorist attacks in the country, which is the result of the efforts put in by both military and civilian institutions. However, the state’s responses still face structural issues, out of which a few are linked to the capacity of institutions. Most such capacity issues can be addressed with proper attention and providing the required resources to the relevant sectors.

An important issue has been the flaws in the criminal justice system, which needed to be removed. But with the military courts coming to the fore, reforms in the criminal justice system have taken a back seat. Despite some on and off measures to expedite pending cases, the criminal justice system requires a meaningful overhaul.

One area where the government appears completely blank is extremism.

Meanwhile, confusion continues to mar the functioning of the National Counter Terrorism Authority, the country’s central CT body. For example, does it fall under the prime minister or interior minister? Moreover, without any board meeting held so far, the organisation’s staff lack strategic guidance. Another issue is terror financing, a subject that stays untouched because of the government’s lack of understanding of the web of the militant economy.

The operational and technical assistance and capacity-building of police is another important area that needs attention. Training programmes need to be focused on technology-led policing along with attention to management, intelligence-gathering, mobility, and connectivity. At the same time, NAP should prioritise the de-politicisation of the police, which is key to making it a professional force.

There are, however, some areas where the government has made some gains, but with a little more clarity these responses can be made more effective. The country’s existing laws are sufficient for cracking down on hate speech, provided law-enforcement agencies are trained and equipped for this. Instead of having any national strategy to counter hate, the government has opted to regulate public order and check systemic dissemination of hate material. Several militant outfits continue to publish and post material online, which is another challenge. At the same time, the government has to take a closer look at the sectarian mindset, which, supported by discriminatory laws, is a source of religious persecution.

The military operations in Fata have weakened terrorist networks, and hampered militants’ capacity to operate freely. But these operations have not completely dismantled such networks. On the other hand, border insecurity has increased due to militants’ crossing over to Afghanistan. Two things are imperative in this perspective: first, political and administrative reforms are needed in the tribal areas, which will not only deny militants a support base but also improve local security structures; and secondly, efforts are required to evolve some broader joint-security mechanism with Afghanistan.

In certain areas, the government’s responses are based on weak perceptions. As a result, measures taken in that regard are not contributing enough in countering terrorism. For one, contrary to the government’s perception, no direct relation between the decline in terror attacks and the resumption of death penalty was found. Such grey areas in responses not only undermine government efforts to eradicate terrorism, they actually are counterproductive.

For instance, NAP stresses on taking action against all sorts of armed groups, including those involved in attacks across the country’s borders. Despite tall claims made by the government, it has not yet released any list of banned outfits in public; it is, therefore, questionable how the government can stop the emergence of such outfits.

The government has taken some measures on the madressah front also, such as by geo-tagging them and asking them to register afresh. Such moves, however, have largely faced resistance from some religious educational boards and clergy. Lately, it was decided in a meeting of the country’s political and military leaders with representatives of madressah educational boards to form a committee for preparing forms to register madressahs and to evolve a mechanism for registering their accounts. However, the fate of this committee is not known as nothing significant has come out of it.

The government had also constituted a committee to construct counter-narratives comprising the heads of the madressah educational boards. It is interesting to note that many of the members of this counter-narrative committee have been part of constructing the militants’ narratives in the country. Though the outcome of their revisions has yet to be seen, the committee has not met after its inception. The importance of religious counter- or alternative narratives cannot be denied, but at the same time there is a dire need to reconstruct cultural, social and political narratives. Militant movements here are largely religious in their outlook and have ideological motives but exploit political and social arguments to infiltrate society and create a support base of sympathisers.

One area where the government is completely blank is extremism. It believes that NAP is enough to deal with all security challenges. The intensity of the extremism issue requires a multifold approach with a broader focus on both violent and non-violent individuals and groups. Apart from the educational and curriculum reforms, a creative multipronged reintegration framework is also needed.

The government also needs to be vigilant about the newly emerging threats, including the militant Islamic State group. A lot will depend on the Pakistani state’s sustained efforts and will to achieve security and eliminate militant groups and ideologies.

The writer is a security analyst.

Published in Dawn, December 6th, 2015