Gen Raheel Sharif is returning home from the US with at least one tangible understanding with his American counterparts: both sides have agreed to help revive Afghan reconciliation talks.

Good news, alright. But I wouldn’t go any further in expressing hope — not unless someone convinces me that Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and the Pakistani leadership see eye to eye on how to make it work this time.

Washington isn’t the problem. It has accepted the Pakistani view for some time now that meaningful talks will require Kabul to concede a significant Pakistani role, and with the understanding that it can try but not guarantee success. This doesn’t mirror Kabul’s view however — definitely not in light of how Afghans have read the post-summer violence in their country. Ghani may still say yes to a Pakistani role, but the belief that Pakistan has an on-off tap when it comes to insurgent violence in Afghanistan is unflinching.

This is a deal-breaker.

There were grounds for genuine optimism in Af-Pak ties earlier this year only because Ghani seemed willing to give Pakistan space to work the problem its way, ie to convince the Afghan Taliban to talk to Kabul and nudge them to agree to mutually acceptable terms under which a ceasefire could take effect. The ultimate goal for President Ghani was always a reduction in Taliban-led violence but rather than asking Pakistan to go after these groups militarily — something Pakistan had resisted for long — he was willing to be patient enough to let negotiations do the trick.

Hopes of better ties with Afghanistan have quickly dissipated.

He is unlikely to go down this path again. As far as the Afghans are concerned, Pakis­tan failed Ghani. In fact, Ghani’s hawkish statements of late suggest that he may himself have had a rethink. Indeed, at least some individuals — Pakistanis included — who have met him since the breakdown of the talks confirm that he now believes that Pakis­tan was deliberately ignoring, if not supporting, continued Taliban violence even as it looked good by bringing them to the table for talks.

Next time round then, Ghani would likely want to use reduction in violence — and not mere talks — as the benchmark for Pakistan’s sincerity, especially now given the view in Afghanistan that the ISI handpicked and controls the new Taliban leadership.

The establishment here understandably detests the Afghan view. They have a very different view of their experience earlier this year. They say Ghani knows they went to great lengths to pressure the Taliban into agreeing to talks, including telling them they would be kicked out of Pakistan unless they obliged. Only then did the Taliban come to the table in Murree. They are also critical of Ghani’s inability to control his security establishment which, they feel, sabotaged the Ghani-Pakistan partnership. Many believe that Ghani proved to be too weak to be a reliable partner. He would need to guarantee, and prove, greater control over the process on his side to get Pakistan to play ball again.

These views are irreconcilable.

Pakistan’s control over the Afghan insurgency has long been debated. Two things are clear. First, the series of Taliban successes inside Afghanistan in recent months and their ability to operate in a wider geographical expanse within the country implies they will be even more reluctant to pull back and even less dependent on Pakistan for physical sanctuary. Objectively, Pakistan’s sway should dwindle, not strengthen, further in such circumstances.

Second, deteriorating security in Afgha­nistan and growing TTP presence on the Afghan side of the Durand line should further decrease Pakis­­tan’s incentive to go after the Haqqani network militarily, lest the operation force the Haqqanis to team up with the TTP in eastern Afghanistan to turn on the Pakistani state.

As for Ghani, his internal problems have only compounded since the summer. With dodgy politics and a weak economic performance, he has far less space to manoeuvre than he did a few months back. More importantly, counterinsurgency theory would tell you that, if anything, the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan will likely lead to further decentralisation of security management, including more say for the security establishment that Pakistan has misgivings about. To expect Ghani to expend his precious little political capital to get his military-intelligence combine to support a Pakistan-backed reconciliation process then is wishful.

Unless Kabul reassesses its take on Pakistan’s Taliban connection and Pakistan accepts the urgency of helping reduce violence in Afghanistan, the anti-reconciliation lobbies will win out again. Achieving this will be a tall order, so much so that the fear of being burnt again in the process of trying may prevent both sides from even testing the waters.

The writer is a foreign policy expert based in Washington, DC.

Published in Dawn, November 24th, 2015