FOR the past 13 years, I have never had a problem rationalising Pakistan’s Afghan policy. I had disagreements with its warped logic, but there was a method to the madness nonetheless. This is no longer the case. I am at a loss to explain why Pakistan is not doing whatever it takes to get the Afghan Taliban to talk to President Ashraf Ghani given that this is the only way the Pakistani security establishment can achieve its self-defined goals in Afghanistan.

In a nutshell, Pakistan’s post-9/11 policy was aimed at striking a fine balance between supporting the US campaign in Afghanistan while hedging vis-à-vis the Taliban. To achieve this, Pakistan continued to oppose a military solution in Afghanistan, preferring a negotiated settlement through talks between Kabul and the Taliban.

Pakistan didn’t support all talks though. Rather, because it distrusted the intent of any Karzai or US-led efforts and felt that these were ploys to break the Taliban from within and ease America’s way to military victory, it wanted talks that offered it a central role. Hence, Pakistan claimed it had leverage over the Taliban and was willing to use it to initiate talks if it was guaranteed a ringside seat in the room where Afghanistan’s future was decided, ie, Pakistan promised to play ball only if had a say in how things progressed.

Throughout the Karzai years, the moment never came. But it has now, courtesy of Ghani’s conciliatory policy towards Pakistan. The Afghan president has not only shown willingness to address Pakistan’s concerns about India’s presence in Afghanistan but has also offered Pakistan the key role by formally asking it to use its leverage over the Taliban to bring them to the table.

The Afghan Taliban movement is no longer a monolith.

Pakistan’s initial response was favourable. It immediately began to nudge and cajole the Taliban to initiate a dialogue with Kabul. The result was a couple of talks about talks in China. At the same time, the Taliban launched their most vicious spring offensive yet despite Pakistan’s promises to try and prevent it.

Pakistan didn’t want the Taliban to go for the kill on the battlefield. But it turns out that Rawalpindi had underestimated the challenge of bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table. The problem is that the Taliban movement is no longer a monolith and while Pakistan is able to wield influence over the pro-talk leadership within the movement, it is failing to do so over those who wish to fight to victory.

Ghani is understandably frustrated and has asked Pakistan to tighten the noose around the Taliban. The non-committal response is bewildering. None of the justifications one hears for Pakistan’s reluctance to initiate more direct action against the Taliban make sense.

One argument is that Pakistan had always said it did not control the Taliban. True. But equally, Pakistan’s very relevance to the whole equation was its claim that it had enough leverage to get the Taliban to the table, even if it couldn’t impose a solution on them. Even that has not been achieved so far; it is clear that mere verbal pressure from the ISI is not affecting the pro-fight group within the Taliban.

Others argue that Pakistan will face a blowback from the Taliban if it goes after them. This claim doesn’t hold true any longer either. For one, Pakistan proved with the TTP that it has good enough preventive and pre-emptive intelligence to protect its city centres. Second, the TTP is in disarray so the Afghan Taliban’s option to back their efforts to raise Pakistan’s costs further — seen as their most likely approach if they wanted to punish Pakistan — is neutralised. Most important, what is required is not any massive military operation against the Taliban movement per se. Rather, it is to team up with the pro-talk Taliban against the pro-fight lot and weaken the latter from within through law enforcement-cum-intelligence operations, arrests, and forced expulsions of their families from Pakistan.

A third group recognises the problem but wants Kabul to give Pakistan more time. This may have been possible if the Taliban’s offensive was not so vicious but with the current levels of violence, Ghani is unlikely to be able to hold on to his pro-Pakistan stance any longer. It is now or never.

Finally, one needs to ask what Pakistan’s inability to get the Taliban to the negotiating table implies for Pakistan. Either the pro-fight Taliban will maintain their sanctuaries here and fight their way to victory. By Pakistan’s own admission, this will end up giving TTP more space in the long run. Or they’ll fail to win but keep Afghanistan in a perpetual state of civil war. This too will be disastrous for Pakistan. Thus my question: why aren’t we acting?

The writer is a foreign policy expert based in Washington, DC.

Published in Dawn, June 30th, 2015

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