IS it not an irony for Saudi Arabia that no major political and religious party of Pakistan is ready to clearly support the kingdom’s stance on Yemen? The smaller religious groups have failed in persuading the national leadership to send troops to Yemen. Apparently, the Saudis’ public diplomacy seems to have failed in the present crisis.

As of now, the kingdom has found allies among the extremist and militant groups in Pakistan. This is a bigger tragedy in the whole episode.

The Saudi representatives believe that the groups supporting them represent the majority Pakistani opinion. Last week, a Saudi adviser on religious affairs, Abdul Aziz al-Amar, addressing a seminar on ‘Difa-i-Khadim-i-Haramain Sharifain’ (protection of the custodian of the noble sanctuaries) in Islamabad said that the Pakistani government must honour the sentiments of the majority in Pakistan. Interestingly, while he marked the audience at the seminar as representative of the Pakistani public, he termed parliament’s resolution — calling for neutrality on Yemen — as Pakistan’s “internal affair”.

No doubt, the pro-Saudi religious groups have expanded their outreach inside Pakistan. Heavy financial and ideological investment by the Saudis, it is claimed, created for Riyadh the political support base in Pakistan. But those groups, which openly support the kingdom’s version, do not have much control over the religious discourse of the country. They are not in a position to dictate to the government in favour of the Saudis.

Perhaps the Saudis have calculated the influence of their supporters from their past shows of strength in the street. These groups were seen as enjoying an active presence in 2011, when they had united on the platform of the Defence of Pakistan Council (DPC), demanding cessation of Nato supplies through Pakistan, in the wake of a Nato attack in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area. Back then, the DPC was able to muster big demonstrations, attract media attention, and build what appeared to be quite a momentum because it was enjoying the support of the establishment. The whole campaign was meant to express Pakistani anger over the Nato attacks.

In fact, sometime later, when DPC leaders formed another alliance, the Defence of Haramain Sharifain Movement (DHSM), they failed to gather much support. The new platform’s leaders were thinking that they could manage alone the big demonstrations and pressurise the state, completely ignoring the fact that launching protests on behalf of the establishment is different from campaigning on their own or lobbying for their external allies.

The pro-Saudi groups may realise they cannot change public perceptions through demonstrations.

The recent street protests over the Yemen crisis managed by these groups, including Jamaatud Dawa in Islamabad, were not very impressive. Gradually, these demonstrations are being confined inside hotels, where the clerics deliver rhetorical sermons.

This, however, is not to say that these groups have lost their influence. If today they harmonise their rhetoric with the national narrative, they will gain street power soon enough.

For now, they are confused about who to connect with for international lobbying campaigns to pursue their narrow agendas. Even though DHSM leaders are repeatedly saying that the conflict in Yemen is not sectarian, they are, at the same time, highlighting the Houthis’ Zaydi sectarian credentials.

The pro-Saudi groups do not represent the majority opinion, and they may realise that they cannot change public perceptions through demonstrations. But they have found an opportunity in this crisis. The National Action Plan has built pressure on sectarian and militant organisations in Pakistan, particularly in Punjab. Hundreds of their workers and affiliated clerics were arrested on charges of violation of the loudspeaker and anti-hate speech laws. Many of their local leaders were under the fourth schedule, and law-enforcement agencies had increased their level of surveillance. These groups have managed to defuse the pressure through demonstrations, and it seems they have resumed their normal business.

In such situations, when religious actors are in the mood for political agitation, it becomes difficult for law enforcers to implement security plans. On the other hand, extremist groups seek political legitimacy from such agitations.

The religious organisations share common agendas, but their distinct worldviews make a huge difference to their approach. The two major religious political parties — Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) and Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) — are not a formal part of the pro-Saudi campaign for varying reasons.

The JI remained linked to the Muslim Brotherhood movements of the Middle East, and these movements have suffered at the hands of Arab monarchists. The Arab rulers are afraid of such political Islamist movements and their concerns about the Brotherhood have grown after its proactive role in the Arab Spring. The regional rise of the Brotherhood movements is another challenge for the Saudis, one that they consider a bigger threat than Al Qaeda and the self-styled Islamic State. They have heavily invested in countering this threat. From this perspective, JI is reluctant to become part of any movements which support the monarchists’ aggressive adventures.

JUI-F considers itself a mainstream political party and is always conscious about adopting a stance against national and mainstream views. The party had supported the parliamentary resolution on Yemen, but some of its local leaders are not happy with the decision. Critics say such local leaders are also the beneficiaries of the Arab countries’ financial support.

Obviously, the Shia parties cannot be part of pro-Saudi campaigns, as their loyalties lie with Iran. They get similar support from the neighbouring country as the pro-Saudi groups do from the Arab world and they are also launching pro-Iran demonstrations across the country. It is interesting that both sides have exposed themselves in a way that no ambiguity is left for the common man to understand the affiliations and loyalties of these groups that under normal circumstances deny their links with Iran and Saudi Arabia.

The Barelvis, who claim to be the majority sect of the country, see this confrontation in a sectarian context. They are scared that both sides will get more financial resources and political support from their external allies, which will be used to expand their outreach and networks inside the country and ultimately encroach on their spaces.

This scenario indicates that multiple sectarian contentions are increasing, which will make the religious discourse in the country more complex and perhaps more volatile.

The writer is a security analyst.

Published in Dawn, April 19th, 2015

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