Whither democracy?
5
THE year 2014 was a tough one for Pakistan’s weak democracy. The optimism caused by the smooth civilian transition in 2013 became a distant memory by mid-2014, given the anaemic subsequent governance. Unfortunately, things only got worse later because of the PTI-PAT Islamabad assault and the army’s smug resurgence politically.
The year culminated with the sorry spectacle of democratic parties falling over themselves to amend the Constitution to meet the army’s demand for military courts, in effect themselves etching into the Constitution an admission of their own incompetence in not strengthening regular courts. Thus, within 18 months, the mood has changed from vibrant democracy to withering democracy, whither democracy, whether democracy and why democracy.
Pakistan’s journey since 1947 is no less dizzying: transitional democracy from 1947-51; bureaucratic authoritarianism from 1952-58; military authoritarianism from 1958-71; transitional-cum-authoritarian democracy from 1972-77; military authoritarianism from 1977-85; hybrid regime from 1985-88; transitional democracy from 1988-99; military authoritarianism from 1999-2002; hybrid regime from 2002-08; and transitional democracy from 2008 to the present. In contrast, neighbours India and Sri Lanka have been stable democracies from day one. Surely, regime stability seems overdue for Pakistan.
What is in store for Pakistani democracy? I believe the ‘whether democracy’ question has already been answered by the army’s decision in August 2014 to not pull the plug on the government during the PTI-PAT agitation. As the latter was building up around mid-year, rumours were rife that it would conclude with an overt army intervention. However, my Dawn article ‘An elected regime’ on June 12, 2014 had argued that pressures from the judiciary, civil society, media and the US had made overt army interventions difficult and, hence, options of last resort only. It had concluded that the army likely aims not to topple, but only weaken the government through the agitation. Events since then have played out according to that conclusion.
The judgment of elected leaders is usually better than that of generals.
Those pressures on the army remain. Thus, in terms of ‘whither democracy’, elected regimes will likely remain safe and secure so long as they remain submissive and supine. In case of even major policy differences with civilians, the army will likely first covertly tighten the leash, as during 2014. Only if civilians attempt to fundamentally undermine the army’s powers and institutional interests, as Bhutto and Nawaz did during 1972-77 and 1997-99, will an overt intervention be considered. The chances of Nawaz attempting to do so again are remote. The only question is whether Imran will, should he win in 2018.
There is a silver lining. Short of rapidly and fundamentally undermining the army’s powers, there is scope for civilians to challenge army wisdom on multiple policy issues without incurring an immediate ouster. An immediate surrender on issues such as military courts is not compulsory. It is worth remembering that the judgment of elected leaders is usually better than that of army generals in areas of policy differences, eg peace with India, Musharraf trial et.
This raises the issue of ‘why democracy’ if it will remain both inept governance-wise and submissive policy-wise to the army in the foreseeable future. For long-term-oriented intellectuals, the answer is clear: a better democracy can only emerge from this flawed democracy gradually. However, for the impatient, educated middle class, which exaggerates both how bad things are in Pakistan and how rapidly they can become better, long-term orientations seem anathematic despite their superior education.
While it would be wonderful if Pakistan could become like Western countries overnight, it is more realistic to compare Pakistan with countries having similar per capita incomes (around $1,100-1,500). Countries just above and below Pakistan are Cote d’Ivoire, Laos, Sao Tome, Lesotho, Sudan, Yemen, Cameroon, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritania and Senegal. Having been to most of them, I know that Pakistan does better than most of these countries on most dimensions which matter to middle class people.
Having travelled to 50-plus developing countries, I see similar governance problems and public anger, but rarely the same unfair exasperation with democracy and penchant for spurious short cuts that I see in Pakistan. Looking further up the list even in the $3,000-6,000 per capita range, one hardly comes across countries which Pakistanis would consider a worthy model. It is only above $10,000 that one consistently sees well-governed countries.
That said, Pakistanis must clearly not endure bad governance, especially police brutalities like those in Model Town, Lahore or fatalities caused by malnutrition as in Thar. There is a need to pressurise elected governments to perform better continuously, but while remaining within the confines of elected systems.
The writer is a political and development economist and a Senior Fellow with UC Berkeley.
Published in Dawn, January 13th, 2015
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