FOR a country in which public banter about the rapaciousness of the ‘elite’ is so common, we spend very little time trying to understand what the ‘elite’ actually looks like, and how it conducts itself. In my experience, those at the receiving end of ‘elite’ power — the poor and weak segments of society — offer the best insights. But since the folk wisdom of the poor is generally excluded from what counts as ‘public opinion’, most impressions of the ‘elite’ are little better than caricatures.

Take, for instance, the reviled ‘jagirdar’ who, for urban, educated folks, is the bane of Pakistan. He retains private jails, keeps his dependents in a state of semi-slavery and subjects women to unspeakable indignity — in sum he is the linchpin of a medieval fiefdom, virtually frozen in time.

While some parts of this story bear resemblance to contemporary reality, it is also true that much about the ‘jagirdar’ has changed. Many have modernised their production systems, although not necessarily to the betterment of the landless multitudes. Tenure relations are changing even where landholdings are small. In short, capitalist farming is increasingly widespread, and this has serious implications for jagirdari.

Just as importantly, landed scions have diversified into non-agricultural spheres. In an increasingly urbanised society, processes of accumulation often defy the classical rural-urban dichotomy. Some ‘jagirdars’ have even integrated their production into regional and global networks, again with not insignificant economic, political end even cultural impacts. At the very least this makes it difficult to take seriously the armchair ‘experts’ in our cities who conveniently disassociate their structures of relative privilege from the ‘jagirdars’.

Different segments of the elite are all committed to sustaining the ‘system’.

Similar myths prevail about the ‘industrialist’. In the immediate aftermath of the country’s creation, most big industry was controlled by Gujarati-speaking families based in Karachi. Since the 1960s the situation has changed considerably, with Punjabi and Pakh­tun competitors emerging and eventually displacing the ‘traditional’ industrialist class.

Indeed, tracing the development of industrial capitalism in Pakistan confirms that society is changing rapidly. The close link between small enterprises and bigger industry — and the fact that so much industrial activity takes place outside the realm of the ‘formal’ — again complicates our understanding of who constitutes the ‘elite’ and how new contenders for economic, political and cultural power are constantly emerging.

This then brings us to the ‘religious’ component of the elite, which has also become increasingly prominent over the past three or four decades. All too often we emphasise the ideological and political influence of the religious right and completely neglect the fact that this lobby has economic interests that it protects fiercely. On the one hand religio-political movements rely on funding from foreign sources, both individual and state. On the other hand, they are closely integrated into networks of accumulation in both the formal and informal sectors.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, state institutions and personnel are often excluded from everyday discussions of elite privilege inasmuch as public discourse is heavily statist. Still every once in a while this blind spot is acknowledged, particularly during the tenure of military rulers. However, there is a tendency to understate the wider social and economic power of state personnel, especially military officers. So, for instance, the enormous wealth and power generated by the men in khaki from their innumerable real estate ventures does not feature sufficiently in analyses of elite privilege.

Finally there is the question of external influence, or what radicals call imperialism. While a great deal of polemic circulates within this country about the ‘foreign hand’, there is little meaningful under­sta­nding about the ext­ent and nature of imperialist power. First, Ame­rica is only one of many foreign powers that flex their muscles within Pakistan. Second, inf­lu­ence is exercised not only over governments but at all levels of society and the economy.

What I want to emphasise is that these diverse constituencies are connected to one another vis-à-vis the ‘system’ of power that prevails in Pakistan. Regardless of what name we give it, the point is that different segments of the elite are — with exception — all committed to sustaining the ‘system’. Certainly the dialectic of power means that contradictions rear their head from time to time. But it is the shared commitment to elite privilege across these factions which explains why the ‘system’, despite so much social change, has not been upended.

I share the sentiments of serious scholars who argue that the matrices of social, economic and political power have undergone substantial change despite the fact that there has been no spectacular ‘revolution’ in the country. Yet despite these changes the moneyed classes in all their forms continue to rule the roost in Pakistan. Being able to recognise the various expressions of elite power is necessary if systemic change is ever to take place.

The writer teaches at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

Published in Dawn, January 9th, 2015

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