DECEMBER 2014. This is the month the region has been awaiting with a mixture of anticipation and anxiety. It was meant to be the month in which everything would change as international troops left Afghanistan. ‘Post-2014’ has been narrativised as the point at which Afghanistan, and the region, would either implode or enter an era of stability.
But this month is unlikely to usher in major changes. The transition from 2014 to 2015 increasingly seems as if it will be less drastic than has been feared. At the London Conference on Afghanistan last week, the international community pledged continuing support for Afghanistan, including development aid and training for Afghan security forces, thereby improving the outlook for stability without providing solutions for the country’s fundamental security and economic challenges.
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The stage was set for the London Conference in September, when Afghanistan and the US signed the Bilateral Security Agreement allowing US troops to remain in the country after this month. Despite earlier attempts by the US to whittle down the number of troops that will remain in Afghanistan, recent weeks have brought news of plans to keep additional troops on the ground.
Although Washington says this is a temporary measure while other countries organise their continuing deployments to Afghanistan, it is likely that the much-touted figure of 9,800 remaining troops will remain a baseline estimate rather than a cap. Moreover, these troops will continue to engage in combat missions against the Afghan Taliban, despite earlier insistence that the US would only play a supporting role post-2014.
The steady rumble of international support for Afghanistan is partially due to the unfolding situation in the Middle East — the rise of Islamic State (IS) has made the world wary of moving on rapidly from conflict zones.
Pakistan’s basic calculus with regard to Kabul has not changed.
This shows some foresight: IS’s success has led to shifts among Islamist militants waging ‘global jihad’, and there is a new urgency for existing groups to establish their credentials. There is growing potential for an Islamist challenge to IS to emerge under Mullah Omar’s leadership with not only the religio-nationalist goal of establishing an Islamic state in Afghanistan, but also new pretensions of regional and ultimately global dominance. In this context, abandoning Afghanistan is not an option.
Pakistan in recent weeks has made all the right noises: championing a stable Afghanistan; pledging support for President Ashraf Ghani’s desire to re-engage in negotiations with the Afghan Taliban; launching military operations in Haqqani Network sanctuaries in North Waziristan; and calling for closer counterterrorism cooperation and more trade with Afghanistan.
But Pakistan’s basic calculus with regard to Afghanistan has not changed, even while the mechanics of its interventions may be shifting. Our Western neighbour is still primarily viewed through a strategic lens as a place where Pakistan must protect its interests and limit Indian influence.
This goal overrides all else, as evident in recent comments about the potential for Pakistan-India proxy war resuming in Afghanistan. It is also apparent in the fact that renewed talks with the Afghan Taliban are the central contribution Pakistan would like to make to Afghan stability. Tellingly, the Chinese government’s attempt to increase its involvement in Afghanistan also comprised a pitch for negotiations between Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban.
Pakistan’s static stance on Afghanistan says more about our country than our neighbour. Our Afghanistan policy continues to be securitised, reflecting the tense dynamics between the security establishment and civilian government. Nawaz Sharif’s plans for greater transit trade and joint energy projects are likely to play second fiddle to security concerns. Indeed, the blame game — whereby both countries blame each other for internal security challenges — is likely to continue to define exchanges between the two governments.
This would be a shame because Pakistan is well positioned to engage with Afghanistan more holistically. The historic links between the two lend themselves to enhanced links in trade, education, culture, human rights, infrastructure development, energy, water and more.
The outcome of the London Conference should embolden those within Pakistan who support a civilian-led, holistic policy approach towards Afghanistan. Continued international support for Afghanistan reduces the likelihood of a collapse into civil war and resulting security fallout for Pakistan.
In the coming years, Afghanistan will face immense security challenges and setbacks, but is likely to muddle through, and the changes that have crept in over the past 13 years will probably consolidate, meaning that Afghanistan will become a different entity than the one Pakistan has historically engaged with. For Pakistan to devise the right policy for an evolving Afghanistan, it too will have to change. And that moment, rather than the end of this year, will mark a true turning point for the region.
The writer is a freelance journalist.
Twitter: @humayusuf
Published in Dawn, December 8th, 2014
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