PRESIDENT Obama’s address at the West Point military academy last month did not offer a grand vision of America’s global role. It did reflect many of the lessons learnt in recent times .Obama observed that “some of the most costly mistakes came not from our [US] restraint, but from our willingness to rush into military adventures without thinking through the consequences”. He advocated a middle course between isolationism and unilateralism. Informally, Obama summed up his approach as: “Don’t do stupid stuff”.

What has Obama’s cautious and deliberative approach in foreign and security policy achieved?

From an American perspective, Obama’s single greatest achievement was the killing of Osama bin Laden in the Abbottabad raid. In accordance with his campaign commitments, he ended the war in Iraq, and intends to soon exit from the one in Afghanistan. These decisions responded to US public opinion.

He used drones effectively, although often illegally, to eliminate terrorists and insurgents without risking US casualties. But the drones may have created more terrorists than they killed.

What has Obama’s cautious foreign and security policy achieved?

With some notable exceptions, Obama has used multilateral avenues to address crises, in contrast to the Bush administration’s unilateralism. Yet, the UN and other multilateral forums have served mostly as a bully pulpit; important decisions have remained unilateral.

Obama’s avoidance of military interventions in Syria and against Iran must be counted a success. Yet, the president has been strangely defensive for having done so.

The interim agreement concluded on Iran’s nuclear programme was an important achievement. It could be a precursor to a wider strategic bargain. But it has evoked strong opposition from some of America’s closest allies. Unfortunately, caution and intelligent deliberation has not always assured outcomes that redound to the president’s credit.

The withdrawal from Iraq, without a resolution of its religious and ethnic differences, has allowed the revival of a bloody sectarian war and increased the chances of that country’s fragmentation.

Although Al Qaeda ‘central’ has been much diminished in Afghanistan, it has not been eliminated. Its franchise is now spread across the Muslim world and beyond. In any case, declaring victory over the Taliban (because they could not, or did not, disrupt the first round of the presidential elections) and unilaterally setting a (2016) date for complete withdrawal without a political settlement, appears to be dictated by domestic dynamics rather than objective realities. Afghanistan may be wracked by another civil war unless Pakistan and Iran cooperate to broker peace between the Afghan factions.

On Obama’s watch, Pakistan was transformed from America’s friend into an adversary because of false policy assumptions and the high-handed actions of 2011. The restored relationship is purely transactional and devoid of trust, with no assurance, on either side, of cooperation beyond 2014.

A pliant Mubarak was dumped at the first signs of a popular revolt at the altar of ‘democracy’, leading to the predicable victory of the Brotherhood at the polls, its blundering behaviour and ouster by the military now reluctantly accepted as the best available option for Egypt.

Despite warnings from his defence secretary, Obama was persuaded by the UK and France into ‘leading from behind’ to oust another cooperative, if crazy, dictator in Libya. The resulting power vacuum has been filled by Islamic and tribal militias. The US now seeks to suppress them by utilising former members of Qadhafi’s military.

A popular but unprepared protest movement in Syria was encouraged by Western and Gulf governments to launch an insurgency against Assad’s minority Alawite regime. This has yielded the worst possible outcome: massive human suffering, the ascendancy of Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, a sectarian war spread across Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, and the survival of the Damascus regime.

Two Obama attempts to broker an Israeli-Palestinian settlement have foundered on the rock of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s intransigence. The prospect of a two-state solution is fast receding. Israel and the Palestinians will soon be encircled by armed extremist movements.

Russia’s reaction to Western-supported street protests to oust the pro-Russian Ukrainian president was not anticipated. Crimea is lost. Ukraine will remain unstable until Moscow is assured it will not join Nato and its eastern part is autonomous and close to Russia. Western Europe does not have the military capability, nor the economic stomach to fight a new Cold War with Russia.

To some extent, Obama’s foreign policy reversals can be ascribed to the difficult legacy of the Bush era and the diminution of US global power. But most of Obama’s mistakes were the result of incorrect policy assumptions. The blame rests on the closed circle of Obama’s inexperienced advisers and their preoccupation with media headlines and public opinion polls.

Obama’s West Point address reflected that the strategic perspective of even this most intelligent among American presidents remains restricted. For instance, ending terrorism will require not only training and equipping local proxies; but, more essentially, the resolution of the underlying causes of terrorism and extremism: internal and regional conflicts, poverty and unemployment and the manifest injustices against Muslim peoples.

To halt the spreading sectarian wars in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon requires, above all, a strategic reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran as well as the ‘modernisation’ of Islamic societies. This is a challenge worthy of an American president awarded the Nobel Peace Prize prematurely.

His speech rightly observed that peace requires the “evolution of human institutions”. It could be added that in the emerging multi-polar and interdependent world, America cannot impose solutions. It will need to work in concert with other major powers, especially China and Russia

Despite Ukraine, Russia has to be brought back into a cooperative mainstream. Escalating sanctions against Moscow will not achieve this.

Policies to ‘contain’ China-by a US military pivot to Asia and building alliances around China’s periphery will provoke a mutually debilitating competition and discard the monumental prospects for global progress in the 21st century that can flow from genuine cooperation between the US and China.

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.

Published in Dawn, June 8th, 2014