THE militants keep changing their targets and tactics, making it difficult for law enforcement agencies to combat them. The strength of the militants lies entirely in their operational strategies. It is a real challenge for law enforcement agencies to keep one step ahead of them.

The recent variations in their operational strategies show that the militants have adopted fluid network structures that make it harder for law enforcement to infiltrate and disrupt. Al Qaeda and local militants have formed small terrorist cells for specific targets. The advantage of these cells is that they can breach surveillance covers and hit unconventional targets, intensifying the impact of their terrorist activities.

The Daimer terrorist attack last year brought more embarrassment for the country, compared to Taliban attacks in the tribal area and in the conflict-prone areas of KP. The TTP stated that the group responsible, Janud-i-Hafsa, was their subsidiary and that it had carried out attacks to draw international attention to drone attacks in Fata.

Another cell was working by the name of the Aafia Siddiqi Brigade. According to a TTP spokesperson, this cell focused on avenging Pakistan’s failure to protect the woman scientist who is in a US prison. The cell also targeted security forces.

The Ghazi Force, led by Niaz Rahim, was established in 2007. It later morphed into a terrorist cell with the aim of avenging the deaths in the Lal Masjid operation in Islamabad in 2007. The group has been reorganised for a similar purpose to target former Gen Musharraf, who had authorised the operation. Ansarul Aseer, led by TTP commander Adnan Rashid, plans attacks on jails to free Taliban prisoners and the Ansarul Mujahideen targets politicians.

Militant groups have also developed nexus with criminal networks and they are gathering millions in foreign currency as ransom without facing any resistance. This is adding to the proliferation of criminal elements.

Not only local groups but Al Qaeda too is involved in the abduction of foreigners. The Aafia Siddiqi Brigade appears to have been involved in the abduction from Balochistan of Czech women tourists, and Al Qaeda released the video of an abducted US development worker in December 2013.

Terrorist organisations also include common criminals with special skills or access to networks or criminal opportunities. Criminal groups sometimes turn ideological over time. The unchecked transportation of abducted victims from Karachi and central Punjab to the tribal areas is a major factor in the expansion of the abduction industry.

The militants often prefer flexible structural models to avoid hierarchies, which makes their groups more resilient. For example, the death of Hakeemullah Mehsud was a significant blow to the TTP, and triggered differences in the group’s ranks. The rifts between the TTP and certain Punjabi Taliban factions led by Asmatullah Muaviya and Qari Shakeel, head of the TTP advisory council, had already surfaced before Hakeemullah’s death.

Furthermore, differences among Mehsud and non-Mehsud segments of the TTP over the appointment of Fazlullah as Hakeemullah’s successor also emerged as a challenge for the TTP leadership. According to media reports, Mehsud militants were not comfortable with a non-Mehsud TTP chief, and that’s why Fazlullah chose Dir, outside Fata, as his headquarters.

Such internal differences are not new to the group which has faced similar situations in the past. However, it has managed to overcome the internal crises because its flexible organisational structure gives more operational freedom to the TTP’s chapters and commanders.

Apart from flexible structures, alliances are key to maximising benefits. The TTP serves as a bridge between Al Qaeda and its international affiliates and local terrorist groups ranging from the Punjabi Taliban to the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi. These groups not only share similar ideological and political ambitions and imitate each other’s tactics and techniques, they also mirror other terrorist outfits’ approaches by merging or otherwise converging, transforming or altering their organisational composition.

Typically, the influence of the TTP has impacted smaller groups that had been struggling to survive or had material deficiencies and required external help to survive. Al Qaeda has been more than willing to help out, in terms of both ideological and operational support.

The naming of Fazlullah as the new TTP chief after Hakeemullah’s death was significant in many ways in terms of militant strategy. Through this appointment, Al Qaeda, and local militants, both tribal and non-tribal, found a link with the pre-9/11 Islamisation movement of the region, the Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat Mohammadi. This bond with the past will augment the local jihad discourse and bring more focus on jihad in Pakistan.

Fazlullah’s credentials make him an apt representative of such a militant discourse on jihad inside Pakistan, particularly because of his campaign in the past against the Pakistani military for the same purpose in Swat. The naming of Sheikh Khalid Haqqani from Swabi district as TTP deputy chief is not only an indication of the group’s expansion in the settled areas of KP but also an acknowledgement of the contribution of non-tribal militants in the movement.

The militants have proved that they are not only successful in their operational strategies, but have also sent smart political signals in response to the government’s offer of dialogue. The TTP seems clear in its objectives in dialogue with the government.

The credit not only goes to the militants’ strategies, but also to the strength they gather from the fragmentation and confusion among the security, political and civil society leadership in Pakistan.

The writer is a security analyst.