WHEN the PML-N emerged victorious in the May 2013 elections, there was a general sense that it would be able to ensure happier times for Pakistanis.

Yet in the run-up to the 100-day mark, the government is already under fire from pundits filling press columns with concerns and dismay at the Sharif clique’s performance.

Some of the criticism is unfair. For one, there were unrealistic expectations associated with the incoming set-up. Judging output against these lofty benchmarks is bound to make the government look bad. Three months is also not nearly long enough a period to warrant a definitive verdict on the government’s failure to cope with the challenges.

In reality, the current set-up is already proving to be more determined and focused than the previous PPP-led government. A successful budget immediately after taking office, the fresh IMF deal with follow-up to meet its conditionalities, an energy policy, and a focus on regional engagement with India and Afghanistan are all commendable developments.

That said, when noted voices from across the intellectual divide begin to question the efficacy of the government, it calls for a moment of reflection in the corridors of power.

Many have examined threadbare the PML-N’s policy decisions in the first 90 days. What worries me, however, are not the decisions that have been taken but the very many that are pending. Even on a number of key priority issues, the prime minister and his relevant team members have failed to set the direction by making the much needed tough calls.

Let me flag what are perhaps the government’s three top most priorities apart from energy: Balochistan; terrorism; and the civil-military dynamic.

On Balochistan, the prime minister justifiably made a big deal about his determination to course correct. His first major move — the appointment of Mr Abdul Malik Baloch as chief minister — was widely praised.

But politics seems to have gotten in the way since. Prime example: Balochistan has been operating without a cabinet.

Mr Baloch says the prime minister hasn’t had time to attend to the issue. What? The largest province of the country is engulfed by a secessionist movement and the prime minister can’t find time to work out the political differences that are holding up the appointments?

Other press reports suggest that there are disagreements and bickering over who will get the most important and lucrative ministries. But if concerns about appeasing loyalists are going to lead to indecision and hold the province’s future hostage, this is hardly any different than what the PPP government was so relentlessly criticised for.

Next: terrorism.

While the broad contours of the counterterrorism policy have been announced, there still isn’t a holistic policy document in hand. We are told that the all-parties conference (APC) hurdle is to be passed before the government’s vision can be formally adopted.

At one level it is commendable to see the government trying to forge consensus positions. On the other hand, this APC business is becoming an excuse for inaction. Of course, the opposition must share the blame; save the MQM’s effort to produce its blueprint for a counterterrorism policy, the opposition parties seem more interested in point-scoring than providing any tangible inputs in the policy formulation process.

Nonetheless, the buck stops with the prime minister. He needs to stamp his approval and order a move on. If the policy begins to deliver, those who don’t sign on will do so at their own peril.

I also wonder whether some of the ideas shared as part of the counterterrorism policy will ever go beyond words.

Consider the case of the National Counter Terrorism Authority. In the new policy, Nacta is supposed to be the focal point for all things counterterrorism at the conceptual level. Good news. But if there was seriousness about the body’s role, shouldn’t there have been some indication of a desire to revitalise it? What is stopping the government from moving in this direction already?

The reality is that Nacta remains impotent, with its chairmanship being treated as no more than a parking spot for in-waiting or retiring officers. The same old debates about who should control the body and under what mandate continue. Substantive issues lag behind. We have seen all of this play out before. The end result was a Nacta in name, period.

Finally, on the civil-military dynamic, ideas to reorganise the Defence Committee of the Cabinet and revive the National Security Council among others are positive ones. At the same time, however, a number of decisions (or lack thereof) suggest insecurity on the government’s part.

The propensity to leave key ministerial and ambassadorial slots vacant is one example. Take the defence ministry or for that matter the post of ambassador to the US. The argument goes that by keeping the defence ministry, the prime minister can better control all things military. And in Washington, he wants someone who’ll do the civilians’ bidding, not the military’s — it’s just about finding the right person.

The logic is misplaced. The civil-military imbalance flows from a number of structural problems. If anything, a truly empowered defense minister who understands the military business can begin to check the military’s excesses far more effectively than feel-good choices that entail hogging portfolios.

As for the ambassador in Washington, the nature of the bilateral relationship dictates that a successful candidate must be one that can work across the civilian and military divide. A loyalist may create a false sense of comfort. It won’t work however — neither for Sharif, nor for the cause of civil-military rebalancing.

Prime Minister Sharif’s dilemmas won’t be resolved by ignoring them. He must urgently take the pending decisions, trust those he anoints to do the job, and judge them based on their performance. Inaction is neither strategically tenable nor will it prove to be politically expedient in the long run.

The writer is South Asia adviser at the US Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C.