2013. This place is a write-off until then. Not that there's any guarantee things will get better then, but they sure won't get better before. Why 2013? In March 2013, parliament's term ends. In September, the president's term ends. In November, the army chief's extension ends. In December, the Supreme Court chief justice will retire.

Sure, Zardari and the PPP-led government could get re-elected, but even if they do, they'll be back with fresh political capital and so may be more willing to take on what they know in their heart of hearts is the key structural roadblock in Pakistan: the civil-military imbalance.

2013 matters because, realistically, the possibility of developing a more coherent policy to fight militancy under the present lot — or the present version of the present lot — is zero.

Have a look around. Kayani has played his hand and barely months into the second term he grabbed for himself the results are there for everyone to see. Selectively pounding militants in Fata and desultorily chasing terrorists in cities and towns wasn't ever going to work. Now that's become obvious in all too painful a way.

But course correction at this point in Kayani's reign will be difficult. Four years into what should have been a three-year term means Kayani has been able to shape the army high command to his liking, picking and choosing officers who reflect his worldview, as some of the Dawn /WikiLeaks cables have indicated.

For the army to modify its strategic outlook right now, at least two things would need to happen. One, Kayani would have to change his mind. But for someone who has been DGMO, DG ISI and now a second-term army chief, the stripes may be too deep to scrub out.

And two, even if Kayani were to change his mind, he would need to handpick another set of officers loyal to the new policy. Barring a large-scale culling of the army high command — something difficult to imagine in the best of circumstances — the only route to achieve that is the normal promotions and appointment process, which would take some time to carry out.

So 2013 would be the chance to start over with a new army chief — assuming, of course, the present one lets go. By then the politicians may even be in a position to once again influence the appointment process.

Turn to the judiciary. CJ Iftikhar hits the constitutional age limit in 2013. Until then, it's pretty clear what the superior judiciary's strategy will be: mark out its terrain, defend it fiercely against encroachments by the executive, and occasionally preach about values others must follow and the like.

Nowhere is there concern to overhaul the judicial process to deal with terrorists and militants. The only time you hear the superior judiciary talk about such matters is when it is setting free yet another militant, and even then only to protest the judiciary's innocence and helplessness in the face of shoddy prosecutions and loophole-riddled anti-terrorism laws.

Sure, the judiciary doesn't have legislation powers nor does it steer prosecutions, but it can nudge the government to articulate a more comprehensive approach towards dealing with militants and terror suspects. And unless parliament, the executive and the judiciary are in sync on this issue, we will have militants being scooped up by one arm of the state and then set free by another arm to run around and cause more mayhem.

So perhaps in 2013, when the next chief justice is sworn in, he will be free from some of the messianic zeal of the incumbent and will focus more on refining the legal process.

As for Zardari and his government? They have just watched the army suffer its mensis horribilis — a truly horrible May with OBL, more WikiLeaks and the PNS Mehran attack — and done nothing to try and take advantage.

Unwilling to think beyond the one-point agenda of completing a term in office, Zardari & co have merrily skipped past an opportunity that few could have imagined.

(The only consolation — if you can call it a consolation — is that as the army's security paradigm continues to unravel, the resulting mess will create more opportunities to try and rein in the security establishment.)

And forget civil-military relations. With a joker for an interior minister, a holding candidate as law minister, an epically toothless defence minister and no foreign minister, can Team Zardari achieve anything against militancy even if it wanted to?

So fast forward to 2013, which is when Nawaz Sharif should get his shot. No grand strategist is he, but Sharif does in the circumstances have the useful quality of a) wanting revenge for '99 and b) being unwilling to 'take dictation'.And while Sharif is willing to play footsie with the odd terrorist outfit here and there in Punjab for electoral reasons, he does get that the 'India-centric' security paradigm needs to be discarded. In the bigger picture perhaps that realisation is more valuable than whatever tactical losses are incurred by Sharif's party members pallin' around with terrorists.

What if Zardari and his boys were to get a second term? Who knows, maybe by then they'll be sated enough to get serious about governance and fighting militancy. Stranger things have happened.

Does all of this sound a bit like clutching at straws? Probably. But right now is there much else to clutch at?

The writer is a member of staff.

cyril.a@gmail.com