WITH only two expanding colonial powers, Russia and Britain, competing for expansion in the Asian heartland during the 18th and 19th centuries, their stratagems and compromises had been described as the Great Game. The final outcome had been the creation of the buffer state of Afghanistan and the demarcation of its border with British India (the Durand Line), Central Asia and Iran.

The Durand Line split the ethnic Pakhtuns into two parts, with 60 per cent being in the NWFP and Balochistan while 40 per cent formed a part of Afghanistan. Therefore, the 2,500km border that Pakistan shares with Afghanistan remains porous with members of divided tribes moving freely back and forth.

When Pakistan emerged as a sovereign state, its admission into the UN was opposed only by Afghanistan. The Pakhtuns in Pakistan have done much better economically than their cousins in Afghanistan.

The Afghan regime’s vague claim for Pakhtunistan, supposedly extending to the Indus, received the support of Soviet leaders soon after Pakistan had joined hands with the West in the Cold War.

India also drew closer to Kabul owing to the dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir. However, during the Indo-Pakistan conflicts of 1965 and 1971. Kabul remained uninvolved. In the meantime, Cold War rivals the US and the Soviet Union both extended economic aid to Afghanistan, with Moscow becoming the principal source of its armaments.

Soviet influence grew rapidly in Afghanistan and thousands of Afghans went for education and training to Soviet bloc countries. After Prince Daud toppled his cousin Zahir Shah in 1973, he realised that pro-communist elements in the country had gained popularity reflected in the establishment of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

This was the period of the Brezhnev doctrine, with a militant Soviet Union following a policy of intervention to safeguard communist regimes. The PDPA broke up into two factions, the Khalq and the Parcham. In 1978, a Khalq leader, Nur Mohammad Taraki, led a coup against Daud, who was assassinated.

A few months later, Hafizullah Amin, another Khalq leader, overthrew Taraki and began to seek closer relations with non-communist countries. A fateful decision was taken to intervene and Soviet forces marched into Afghanistan in December 1979, with Moscow claiming they had been invited by the government in Kabul. Babrak Karmal was made head of the government.

In Pakistan, Gen Ziaul Haq had been feeling isolated, especially as his Islamisation policy and continued pursuit of a nuclear programme had attracted criticism and sanctions by the US. His decision to oppose the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and to mobilise the OIC won him the support of the non-communist world with President Ronald Reagan who came to power in 1981 extending generous aid to Pakistan.

Indeed, Osama bin Laden played a prominent role in assembling jihadis from all over world and CIA-backed religious schools in Pakistan to produce more Mujahideen.

In the 1980s, India built up pressure against Pakistan, undoubtedly at Soviet behest, concentrating forces along the Pakistan border in 1984. Pakistan was obliged to consult both China and the US to ascertain what assistance it would get against an Indian onslaught. Indira Gandhi’s assassination in 1984 reduced the danger.

Pakistan enjoyed the support of the West and most of the developing world and the resolutions it introduced condemning the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan were passed by large majorities in the UN. It achieved success in nuclear deterrence as the US could not enforce sanctions against a frontline ally.

While fighting communism, scholars in the West had taken note of Islamic resurgence in the Muslim world. The Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 had encouraged greater nationalist activity by Muslims in many countries, where they were oppressed notably in the occupied Palestinian territories, India and the Soviet Union. When the Cold War ended in 1989, with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the US radically re-ordered its global priorities in South Asia.

Washington’s new concerns were the threats from Islamic fundamentalism and nuclear proliferation. After President Bush denied certification that Pakistan’s nuclear programme was peaceful in October 1990, sanctions were imposed that not only ended economic and military assistance but also forbade delivery of military equipment already paid for.

India now became the favoured power in the subcontinent. As the Congress government had launched economic reforms to speed up development, it achieved a growth rate averaging six per cent, far more than Pakistan’s during the 1990s.

Pakistan’s international standing also declined since instability in Afghanistan that took the form of a prolonged civil war culminated in the control of Afghanistan by the Taliban. Though the US had favoured this movement when it emerged in 1994 to counter the other factions that had the support of Iran and Russia, the situation became critical when the Taliban gave sanctuary to Osama bin Laden, who now headed an organisation dedicated to countering US military presence in the Muslim world. Pakistan was one of three countries that recognised the Taliban regime.

The stern implementation of Sharia laws by the Taliban attracted world-wide condemnation. Pakistan was virtually isolated by its recognition of the Taliban. Even a close friend like China did not follow suit and resented Taliban support to militant Muslim movements in western China.

With the Al Qaeda targeting American embassies in Africa in 1998, President Clinton ordered cruise missile attacks on alleged terrorist bases in Afghanistan and Sudan. India also accused the Taliban of training Mujahideen for the freedom struggle in Kashmir.

With the events of 9/11 Pakistan was forced to reverse its policy of support for the Taliban and join the war on terror, in response to US ultimatums. It had once again become an important US ally.

Global diplomacy has undergone a transformation since 9/11 with President Bush playing by neo-con rules of creating global hegemony on the basis of exercising overwhelming military power. He announced his doctrine of pre-emption that led to the occupation of Iraq in 2003.

So long as the Bush presidency lasts, Washington is unlikely to give up its imperial goals and abandon its campaign against Muslim regimes, although it may withdraw some of its troops from Iraq. However, US forces will remain in substantial numbers in many parts of Asia. The presence of US-Nato forces may even be expanded in Afghanistan if Taliban resistance continues.

Asia is likely to remain the main scene for a global power struggle, both to prevent a resurgence of Islamic values and to safeguard western access to its energy reserves and markets. The Anti-Ballistic Missile defence policy is still being pursued both in Europe and Asia. Nato may continue to provide strategic backing to US goals but the EU may seek a bigger economic stake in its burgeoning markets.

Russia and China are seeking a multilateral order even in the Great Game in Asia, as reflected in their role in the UN. However, while both have become active through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Russia feels the urge to capitalise on its former superpower status with President Vladimir Putin relying on Russia’s large energy reserves to maintain Moscow’s influence.

An element of rivalry is there between Russia and China but China’s remarkable economic growth has made Russia a junior partner. In the early 1980’s, Russia’s economy was four times that of China’s economy. In a quarter of a century, the situation is reversed today with China’s four times that of Russia.

The latter has a declining population and Pakistan has overtaken Russia in numbers. China’s population is seven times that of Russia and its technology is developing fast. The basic US concern is over China’s rise and its growing influence in Asia since it retains the communist system.

In the Great Game that now envelopes the whole of Asia, democratic India is viewed as the great power that could contain communist China. However, its poor relations with its neighbours could be a liability. China, on the other hand, has normalised its relations with most of its neighbours in Asia.

The US is seeking to contain it by its close alliance with South Korea, Japan and Taiwan.

Pakistan has a geo-strategic location of importance and given proper leadership and internal unity can be a major player in the Asia of the future.

As the only Muslim nuclear power and an advocate of moderate Islam it could cooperate with Malaysia, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran to promote the renaissance of the Muslim world. The reform and strengthening of the OIC is another area where Muslim countries can transform plans into action to ensure that we are not marginalised in the emerging order.

The writer is a former ambassador.