RELATIONS between India and Pakistan always need a broad canvas to paint and most of the time the result is a bold chiaroscuro. The perception of light and shade is as much in the eye of the beholder as in that of the painter as the prisms through which this absorbing drama is viewed vary greatly. Not to put too fine a point on it, it is also determined by whether one wants to see a glass half-full or half-empty.

Recent weeks have provided material for both the perceptions. The Indian external affairs minister, Pranab Mukherjee, was in Islamabad on January 13 to put his seal on the continuation of the composite dialogue into its fourth round with a meeting of their foreign secretaries on March 13-14. He, however, reminded his hosts that borders could not be redrawn and that the cessation of militancy in Kashmir alone would permit any progress on that issue.

Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri was in New Delhi on February 20 to co-chair a scheduled meeting of the Joint Indo-Pakistan commission and pressed all the right keys to ensure that its work is harmonious and productive in the years ahead. Some Indian observers, however, felt that a comment made by his spokesperson after his return to Pakistan was a trifle out of tune with that harmony. India and Pakistan have finally signed a long overdue confidence building measure on nuclear risk reduction which may encourage further progress on strategic issues.

On Kashmir, Mr Mukherjee has been dismissive of the idea of joint management and the Indian army has rather uncharacteristically gone public in expressing its opposition to demilitarisation. Relevant statements in this regard sounded like a deliberate counterpoint to Manmohan Singh’s dream of a treaty of peace and friendship.

More recently, in the traditional theatre of hopes and fears that our bilateral relations often turn into, there was also an unexpected exchange involving some statement that India could exercise the right of hot pursuit and the Pakistan foreign office spokesperson reiterating Pakistan’s undiminished determination to thwart any such adventure. It came through as a gratuitous contest in scoring points.

This exchange was in a way emblematic of how the question of terrorism has come to occupy the centre stage of bilateral talks ever since the famous Vajpayee-Musharraf joint statement that launched the current peace process. In Pakistan, there are apprehensions that it has displaced other core issues including Kashmir.Be that as it may, there may be no dialogue at all without addressing it. After the Mumbai carnage, it nearly got derailed. More recently, 59 Pakistanis perished in the attack on the Samjhota Express. Significantly, both sides began with almost synchronised reaffirmation of their resolve that the diabolic aims of the terrorists would be frustrated.

Whatever misgivings arose in Pakistan were left to the populist skills of its minister for railways who quarantined them rather well in his own inimitable style. Far from upsetting the apple cart, the tragedy near Panipat became an additional incentive to proceed with the new forum created to fight the scourge of mindless violence that still haunts our lives.

In Havana on September 16 last year President Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh showed ingenuity in devising a joint mechanism to address terrorism. The just concluded meeting of designated officials has to be assessed in the light of three inter-connected questions: how exactly has the mechanism been made operational, what are the chances of it delivering tangible results, and will it reduce the problem of violence to a point where it ceases to be an impediment to the two sides taking up other issues more earnestly.

The mechanism will operate at a reasonably senior level with meetings scheduled after every three months; it also provides for a fast-track sharing of urgent information. There is, however, a question mark when it comes to achieving results. The existing trust deficit will probably stand in the way of a comprehensive flow of intelligence. Normally, such an exchange takes place amongst allies embedded in a common framework of confidence. Even in a strategic community built on such a close- knit alliance as Nato, the problems of ‘rendition’ of suspected terrorists in and through Europe generated controversy.

It may, therefore, take a long time before terrorism ceases to be cited as an obstacle in making progress on issues such as demilitarisation in Kashmir. There is a real danger that the joint mechanism may end up as yet another ritualistic exercise for exchanging dossiers of allegations.

Notwithstanding the persistence of contradictory signals from the two sides, the most satisfying aspect of the present situation is that negotiations have become a habit and a culture of candid consultations is beginning to replace periodic military confrontations. It reduces tensions and provides forums for offering incentives and dividends for promoting the peace process.

More importantly, a gradual modification of historical differences and disputes is taking place creating space for joint decisions and compromises. This can be a profitable exercise provided the transformation of entrenched positions is equitable and not just one-sided.

The composite dialogue has altered the discourse on Kashmir substantially. The right of self-determination that was the bedrock of the UN resolutions prescribing a plebiscite in Kashmir has got replaced by concepts of autonomy and self-governance within existing borders.

Reservations expressed by a former foreign secretary who had played a key role in cobbling together the Lahore declaration and the accompanying memorandum of understanding in two articles published in this newspaper are widely shared in Pakistan. I had myself tried to analyse concepts of self-governance and demilitarisation at length on earlier occasions with a view to highlighting the parameters in which they could become the basis of a durable settlement.

From time to time, reassuring statements have come from government sources about undisclosed progress made in the secret channel that often leaves the formal diplomatic structures relatively uninformed. This is not a satisfactory state of affairs particularly because of the reasons given in India for high-level pronouncements rejecting these concepts.

It is said that the Indian participants in secret negotiations had not always synchronised their thinking with the foreign and security policy establishment and, therefore, it was necessary to set the record straight with rather dismissive statements. Perhaps Pakistan too needs a better interface between secret negotiations and established procedures of inter-state diplomacy. Excessive secrecy leaves the people less prepared to accept ‘concessions’ made on their behalf.

It has been said that only five people in Pakistan are truly in the loop on the actual state of bilateral negotiations. This seems to be counterproductive as the imperative of reconciliation between the two countries is generally accepted. There is a growing realisation that a whole host of problems would be more amenable to a solution if the two countries address them jointly.

The coming energy crunch would warrant readiness to share resources in South Asia as well as coordinate policies to import energy from sources outside the region. A bill now under consideration by US Congress would adversely affect the feasibility of the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. Washington may be more receptive to joint or similar demarches from Islamabad and New Delhi to exempt this vital pipeline from the current bid to isolate and hurt Iran.

The macro region to which India and Pakistan belong is in turmoil. The detritus of the catastrophe in Iraq can impact on the security of a number of neighbouring countries. If efforts are made to suck Iran into this vortex, South Asia will face an upheaval on its doorstep.

Afghanistan is accepted as a South Asian country but there is little input from the states of the region in shaping events in that troubled country. Instead, it is fast becoming a matter of exclusive concern for a military alliance designed for a far away treaty area. India and Pakistan discuss the delicate regional situation with many other states separately but hardly ever on a bilateral basis. There is a time to be competitive and there is a time to work together to uphold international law and legitimacy.

The foreign secretaries should make their contribution towards using the fourth round of the composite dialogue as a lever to lift it above the plateau in which it is stuck. The purpose should be to resolve outstanding issues, deepen political understanding, enhance economic cooperation and also articulate a joint approach to the creation of a just world order.

It is time for the two countries to manifest their serious intent by settling issues like the redeployment of forces in Siachen and Sir Creek without further delay. Such a settlement is within their reach with no risk whatsoever to national interest. Readiness to do so would demonstrate their resolve to take up more contentious issues for a comprehensive solution.

The people of both the countries await the next Saarc conference in New Delhi and a bilateral summit in Islamabad. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has talked about a peace treaty with Pakistan on more than one occasion. He has also spoken of his vision of altogether new vistas of economic cooperation.

Faith in such declarations would be greatly strengthened if the leaders meet again and are seen to be jointly drawing up a roadmap for an equitable settlement of issues that have poisoned relations for six decades and prevented such cooperation. Cycles of negotiations cannot be spun endlessly and in its fourth year the composite dialogue should show results visible to more than a handful of privileged insiders. Nations settle their affairs in the interest of millions who constitute them.

The writer is a former foreign secretary.

ON Tuesday — to ritualised hoots of derision from around the globe — the US Department of State released its 2006 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. The annual reports detail "the status of internationally recognised human rights" in virtually every country in the world — except, of course, the US itself.

At first glance, this year's reports contain few surprises. The State Department laments the genocide in Darfur, notes that Russia has experienced a "further erosion of government accountability" and reminds us that Cuba denies its citizens "the fundamental right to change their government peacefully." The reports also document rights abuses in China, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Venezuela, North Korea — in fact, pretty much all over the place. Even tiny Monaco is rebuked for denying its citizens "the right to change their government or denounce the royal family."

Although the State Department announces the annual reports with fanfare, the rest of the world rarely responds with enthusiasm. This year is no exception. China, a perennial target, declared that "the United States has lorded it over other countries by condemning other countries' human rights practices while ignoring its own problems." Other foreign commentators also complained about US hypocrisy. After Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, Haditha and other highly publicised human rights controversies, they wondered, where does the US get off casting stones at others?

There's nothing inherently sinister about the State Department's failure to include a chapter on US human rights abuses in the reports. Originally intended for internal government consumption, the reports were designed to help Congress determine which lucky nations would receive foreign aid. (Back in the day, Congress had a quaint tradition of insisting that the US not provide security assistance to foreign governments responsible for "gross violations" of human rights.) Because — by definition — the US doesn't provide foreign aid to itself, there was traditionally no reason for the reports to detail US human rights lapses.

But over the years, the country reports have evolved far beyond their original purpose, becoming a high-visibility part of US public diplomacy. As a result, they're inevitably scrutinised with care, both for what they say and what they don't say.

On close examination, this year's reports are notable for several major omissions — and one intriguing inclusion.

First, the intriguing inclusion: This year's reports contain an unusual — if elliptical — acknowledgment of serious US failings. "We recognise that we are writing this report at a time when our own record, and actions we have taken to respond to the terrorist attacks against us, have been questioned," notes the introduction, which goes on to insist that "US laws, policies and practices governing the detention, treatment and trial of terrorist suspects have evolved considerably over the last five years." It ain't much, but it's significant.

In the sausage factory of the executive branch, phrases like those only end up in the annual country reports after months of interagency slicing and dicing. Those unprecedented sentences survived because Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice fought for them — and won, beating back opposition that came mainly from Vice-President Dick Cheney's office. No one should view this as a dramatic turnaround, but it suggests a growing administration awareness of just how much US credibility has suffered as a result of post-9/11 human rights abuses.

Still, those important sentences are undermined by some glaring omissions in the country reports.

The report on Iraq, for instance, contains harsh words for the government, decrying "overcrowding and lack of judicial oversight" in Iraqi prisons and detention centres, incidents of "arbitrary arrest and detention" and "instances of torture and other abuses by government agents and by illegal armed groups." Not mentioned at all: The US itself holds about 14,000 detainees in Iraq. Although some US officials acknowledge that many of these detainees are probably innocent, most have never had any meaningful opportunity to challenge their detention. Meanwhile, credible allegations of detainee abuse persist.

Similarly, the report on Afghanistan highlights serious abuses by the Taliban and the Afghan government but makes no mention of the hundreds of detainees still held in Afghanistan by US military and intelligence agencies.

But in the end, though their omissions expose the US to charges of hypocrisy, the annual country reports remain valuable. Not least, the reports represent an ongoing US acknowledgment that core human rights norms ought to be respected by all — even though the US has lately been a notorious violator. — Dawn/Los Angeles Times Service

THERE is a wave of progressive change sweeping Latin America and the Caribbean after the many lonely years in which Cuba held high the torch, with free universal healthcare and education, and world-class cultural, sports and scientific achievements.

Although you won't find a Cuban today who says things are perfect –- far from it –- probably all would agree that compared with pre-revolutionary Cuba, there is a world of improvement.

George Bush, the antithesis of this process, is now in Brazil at the start of a mission to lure five countries away from regional economic integration. However, the many thousands in the streets demonstrate the region's vast repudiation of Bush and what he stands for, something polls reflect unanimously.

All Cuba's achievements have been in defiance of US efforts to isolate Cuba; every dirty method has been used, including infiltration, sabotage, terrorism, assassination, economic and biological warfare and incessant lies in the media of many countries. I know these methods too well, having been a CIA officer in Latin America in the 1960s. Altogether nearly 3,500 Cubans have died from terrorist acts, and more than 2,000 are permanently disabled. No country has suffered terrorism as long and consistently as Cuba.

The Cuban revolution has always needed intelligence capabilities in the US for defence purposes, even before it took power in 1959. Such was the fully justified mission of the Cuban Five, who have been in jail since 1998 after being convicted of conspiracy to commit espionage in Miami, where they had no chance of a fair trial. Their sights were set exclusively on terrorist operations against Cuba - activities ignored by the FBI - and they neither sought nor received any classified government information. Their cases are still on appeal, and will be for years, but their biased convictions rank with the legal lynching in the 1920s of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, the anarchist immigrants, among the most shameful injustices in US history.

Current US policy can be found in the 2004 report of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba (updated last year with a secret annexe). A fundamental goal –- the same, I remember, as in 1959 –- is the isolation of Cuba to stop this bad example spreading. If successful, this would mean no less than annexation by, and complete dependence on, the US, in fact if not in law.—Dawn/Guardian Service

WE are all working towards a common goal – to develop a self-sustaining, stable, democratic Afghanistan. Real progress has been made in the last few years.

Many challenges still lie ahead. A year ago, in London, Afghanistan and its friends in the international community agreed on a framework for cooperation and engagement in Afghanistan to ensure greater coherence of efforts between the international community and the Afghan government. This framework, known as the Afghan compact, sets out benchmarks and mutual obligations to achieve progress in Afghanistan.

Successful implementation of the Afghanistan compact will be key to the progress that we can make together. One year on, we need to assess what the compact has already achieved and where we need to make greater efforts. Progress on security, political, economic and counter-narcotics fronts is putting Afghanistan on the road to recovery. We must not lose momentum, or be distracted from the cause, by the insurgency in the south. We need to work together to ensure a comprehensive approach, with international partners playing a joined-up, supportive role. International coordination is good, but could be better focused.

We must succeed in achieving our objectives in Afghanistan, not only for the Afghan people, but also for ourselves. A failed state is a danger to us all: September 11 taught us that. I know that the Afghan government is absolutely determined to ensure the country does not slip back to the days of chaos. We share their resolve, and with the international community remain committed to help. ISAF troops, currently in southern Afghanistan, are fighting alongside their Afghan counterparts to prevent the Taliban from achieving their objectives. And that is what we are doing. Slowly but surely, ISAF forces are holding sway; the Taliban are taking significant losses, and are reverting to increasingly brutal means to intimidate and bully local people into submission.

But history has taught us that military means alone rarely defeat an insurgency. So we need to keep reassessing our approach if we are to win.

The Taliban have an efficient method of disseminating information. Their website, while crude, is updated almost daily. They are always quick to inflate their influence or the outcome of their actions. They can and do lie. We, on the other hand, cannot. But we can be quicker off the mark. Responding immediately to Taliban claims, and taking the initiative with our own messages, is one positive way to hit back. Local Afghans need to hear the voice of ISAF and the international community if they are to understand what we are about and why we are there. We need to highlight the widespread use of Taliban intimidation to control the local population, so people understand this is how the Taliban operate wherever they are. We need to put the spotlight on their murders of anyone who does not toe the line.

Our efforts to defeat the Taliban go hand in hand with our reconstruction and development work. Significant progress has been made. But despite our considerable efforts, some in Afghanistan do not believe the pace of change is happening fast enough. This is partly fed by Taliban disinformation, but also a genuine belief that things have stalled. I don’t believe they have: indeed the economic statistics show they haven’t. Each time I go to Afghanistan I see a change for the better; whether that be more shops opening, more people going about their daily business, or new schools and clinics opening. But people rightly expect more. They grow weary of corruption and administrative incompetence. They want a responsive, capable government, free from corruption and geared towards the needs of the people. This is what we want too. The UK puts 70 per cent of its development aid to Afghanistan, through the Afghan government system. We encourage others to do the same.

Not only does this allow the Afghan government to operate and develop, but it means that it can deliver services direct to the population – Afghan to Afghan – allowing the population to see improvements not brought by the international community or an NGO, but by the Afghan government. The challenge now for the international community and the Afghan government is to continue to strengthen the state institutions, improve economic management, and improve livelihoods. This three-pronged approach is designed to deliver sustainable development to Afghanistan in a way that strengthens the government and lifts the living standards of the people.Regional cooperation remains essential to Afghanistan’s future stability and prosperity, and that of the neighbouring countries. The rise in trade between Afghanistan and her neighbours since the fall of the Taliban is testament to that.

But the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan in particular has not always been the easiest. Grievances can become public. Issues like cross border cooperation and tackling the insurgency have been particularly difficult to manage. But this would be the case in many parts of the world, where two countries with so much in common have such difficult issues to tackle. We need to support both countries in efforts to remove the conditions which allow space for the Taliban to operate.

Like others, the UK has been working closely with Pakistan. As a result Taliban operatives have been arrested on their side of the border. Only recently, the Pakistani authorities arrested Mullah Obaidullah, a significant Taliban leader. His arrest will cause disruption, and we expect the Pakistani authorities to keep up the pressure on other insurgents using Pakistan as a safe haven.

But there are many positives to this relationship. Afghanistan and Pakistan share a rich history. The links between the two countries transcend national barriers. Trade and commerce between the two countries continues to grow at a significant rate. The key is to build on all this, and use it as a force for good.

The idea of a cross-border jirga is something that can do that. It is a start. It has the potential to begin rebuilding lost confidence on both sides of the border.

I cannot of course speak about Afghanistan without speaking about the drugs trade, which remains such a major obstacle to progress. The threat from drugs to Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development ranks alongside the threat from the Taliban. President Karzai has described the trade as the most corrosive element in Afghan society. It is impossible to tackle Afghanistan’s problems today if we put off dealing with the drugs menace until tomorrow. The opium economy accounts for more than 30 per cent of GDP. Drug addiction within Afghanistan is rising. Drug-related crime and corruption are rife and permeate all levels of society. And if not dealt with, the trade will continue to be exploited by the Taliban.

While it is too early to predict this year’s overall cultivation levels, indicators suggest Afghanistan is facing another year of high poppy cultivation. Security challenges, insurgent activity and the lack of extension of the rule of law continue to present obstacles to poppy elimination.Still, we have made some encouraging progress in areas where there is access to security and rule of law. The Afghan National Drugs Control Strategy is balanced and represents the right approach. It includes measures to target the traffickers and to provide legal livelihoods for Afghan farmers so they can move away from opium poppy cultivation.

With the support of the international community the Afghan government has so far financed over 17,000 community projects, which have reached some 8.5 million rural Afghans. We are working to build up the criminal justice system and establish and support the Counter Narcotics Police Force and the Afghan Special Narcotics Force. In the last year and a half, this has resulted in the conviction of over 320 traffickers, and an increase in drug-related seizures. There are no “silver bullets” or quick fixes however. This will take time and will require the full support of the international community.

In conclusion, when the Taliban were toppled from power, we knew we had a long and difficult path ahead of us. Afghanistan had suffered over two decades of war, misery and decline. The people were traumatised, and the country lay destroyed. Five years on, significant progress has been made. Despite the gloom merchants, things are getting better. We are turning the tide.

The people of Afghanistan deserve a chance to live normal peaceful lives. The Afghanistan Compact and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy are the routes to this. Delivery and focus do perhaps need to be improved. But the path they envisage is the right one, and it is one the Afghan government has marked out.

The writer is minister of state at Britain’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office.