Pyongyang N-deal & Iran

THE past three years have seen the Bush administration lurch from crisis to crisis, especially after lofty plans for a transformation of the Middle East got burnt in the smouldering fires of the civil war in Iraq. Given this dismal track record, it was no surprise that the president should have welcomed North Korea’s decision to freeze its main nuclear reactor and eventually to dismantle its atomic weapons programme.

The North Korean agreement, which was the result of intense negotiations over the past many months among the representatives of China, South Korea, Japan, Russia, the US and North Korea, was concluded on February 13. It came four months after the impoverished state shocked the world by testing a nuclear device.

China was reported to have played a critical role in the final stages of the talks, especially when it appeared that Pyongyang was balking over some of the conditions that the US wished to impose. In brief, the agreement envisages the following steps: (i) the five-megawatt Yongbyon nuclear facility will be sealed and the International Atomic Energy Agency will be permitted to carry out full monitoring of the facility; (ii) North Korea will discuss all nuclear programmes with other parties; (iii) the US and North Korea will begin bilateral talks aimed at restoring diplomatic relations and removing North Korea from the US list of terrorism sponsors; (iv) Japan and North Korea will begin bilateral talks intended to settle outstanding concerns and resume normal diplomatic relations; (v) North Korea will receive energy, economic and humanitarian assistance; (vi) and the concerned foreign ministers will discuss further options including the disabling of all North Korean nuclear facilities and furthering regional security cooperation.

Five working groups would meet within 30 days to deal with issues relating to denuclearisation, normalisation of US-North Korea and Japan-North Korea relations, economy and energy cooperation and peace and security in Northeast Asia. The nuclear envoys would meet on March 19 to check on the group’s progress. After 60 days the foreign ministers of the six countries would review the progress made.

North Korea would receive initial aid equal to 50 thousand tons of heavy fuel oil on shutting down and sealing its main nuclear reactor and related facilities at Yongbyon within 60 days. In return for irreversibly disabling the reactor and declaring a halt to all nuclear programmes, North Korea would eventually receive another 950,000 tons in aid.

The Bush administration has strongly endorsed the deal, praising it as an example that could “inspire another country” to do likewise. It has, however, been attacked by Bush’s neo-con allies who see it as evidence of the president having come under the influence of the “realists” led by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. John Bolton, the former US ambassador to the UN, called the deal a “charade” and a “hollow agreement”. Another neo-con figure, Daniella Pletka from the American Enterprise Institute, characterised the deal as “worse than the general framework agreement” negotiated by the Clinton administration in 1994. She added that anyone who believed that Pyongyang would honour the deal needed “to have their heads examined”. The neo-cons also fear that the North Korean deal would send the wrong signal to Iran, which will interpret Pyongyang’s success as having resulted from its decision to test a nuclear device.

The Democrats, who had supported Clinton’s diplomatic negotiations with North Korea, have not welcomed the new agreement either. They have accused Bush of first rejecting Clinton’s 1994 framework deal, then going back to virtually a similar agreement, but in the process losing six valuable years during which Pyongyang continued its pursuit of a nuclear device. The administration is, however, claiming that the new deal is different from Clinton’s because it required North Korea to dismantle its only nuclear programme at Yongbyon and to permit outside experts to monitor the process.

In addition, it provided a mechanism for the six countries to work on broader goals beyond denuclearisation, including forging diplomatic relations between North Korea and Japan and the US, and crafting a peace treaty that formally ended the Korean War. The agreement would reward North Korea in phases only after there is evidence of it having undertaken specific action, with energy supplies counting for most of the initial incentives. More importantly, the latest understanding would allow North Korea to keep whatever nuclear weapons it has already built, plus whatever other devices it can build with fissile material that it has already produced.

It is not surprising that the Bush administration should have welcomed the deal to rein in North Korea’s nuclear programme. After all, this administration’s track record on foreign policy initiatives has been poor, with success eluding it on most issues. At a time when Bush has been facing severe criticism on Iraq and yet refusing to rule out military operations against Iran, the deal with North Korea has been grasped by the president as a rare foreign policy success. It also represents a victory for Ms Rice, who reportedly had to battle it out with Vice President Dick Cheney, who opposed any deal with the North Korean regime. She has, however, been careful not to draw too much attention to her role, calling the deal merely a “good, initial step”.

It is, however, China that appears to have benefited most from the negotiations. American officials have praised Beijing’s role, with Christopher Hill, the chief US negotiator, remarking that “China has done a great job of getting us together”. Beijing has thereby enhanced its influence in the region as well as in Washington.

Other diplomatic observers have, however, taken a more nuanced view of China’s role, with some suggesting that although Pyongyang relies on Beijing for fuel and food aid, it also resents China’s role in marshalling international pressure on its nuclear programme. Their relationship became particularly tense after Pyongyang conducted missile tests and then exploded a nuclear device.

What factors have motivated the North Koreans to agree to this deal? Was its economy on the verge of collapse? According to well-known analysts, diplomatic recognition, revival of the economy, heavy oil fuel shipments and removal from the “axis of evil” are all important gains that matter a great deal to the ostracised regime.

For the North Korean leader, there must also be some degree of satisfaction in Bush changing course and agreeing to do a deal with him. After all, only a few years ago, Bush had referred to Kim Jong-il as a “pygmy” and compared him to a “spoilt child”. When speaking to journalist Bob Woodward, Bush acknowledged that he “loathed” Kim, which led him to place the country on the “axis of evil”. While Bush was giving vent to his anger, the North Korean leader was busy manufacturing a nuclear device.

However, as in the past, this deal will not be without controversies. Differences have already emerged between the two sides. While the US aims at total denuclearisation, not a reactor freeze, the North Korean officials claim that they have agreed only to a temporary freeze, without mentioning the word “dismantling”. There are other questions as well, especially as to whether Pyongyang will surrender the plutonium already extracted. And what about its uranium-based weapons programme?

The South Koreans, too, are greatly relieved at the deal, as they were the ones most threatened by any confrontation in the region. Its diplomats call the deal “a win-win formula”. They say that although it amounts to a “grand bargain” that would ensure the survival of the Kim Jong-il regime, it will also help to achieve denuclearisation in the Korean peninsula.

There are, however, a few important ambiguities in the agreement. One relates to the perennial question of whether Pyongyang can be trusted to honour the deal; the other one is whether Pyongyang will agree to surrender the four or five atomic devices it is suspected to have already manufactured or hand over its stock of plutonium. Aware of this background, both Seoul and Washington imposed two major conditions: a clear shut and seal requirement for the Yongbyon reactor within 60 days of the agreement and compulsory inspection by the IAEA for verification.

The North Korean deal has, of course, shifted the focus to the Iranian nuclear programme. Unlike the former, Iran is several years away from developing a nuclear device but still the US has demanded that Iran suspend its enrichment activity before it is prepared to talk to Tehran. Iran has also allowed access to UN inspectors and is legally exercising its right under the NPT of developing nuclear energy for civilian purposes. Those who have welcomed the agreement with North Korea have contrasted it to the manner in which the Bush administration has been threatening Tehran amidst reports of US aircraft carrier battle groups being moved to the Gulf for a possible surgical strike on that country.

It is also disappointing to hear US and European officials claim that the North Korean deal “does not change anything as far as Iran is concerned”. An official of the IAEA is reported to have remarked that “North Korea and Iran are different countries” each with a different set of circumstances.

Non-proliferation expert Mark Fitzpatrick, for example, called for a solution of the Iran crises on the model of Libya, which dismantled its nuclear weapons programme, rather than on the North Korean model. He pointed out that the major difference was that “North Korea had already produced nuclear weapons, while Iran had not”.

He added that “the North Korean case shows that if you act with provocation and develop and test nuclear weapons, the superpowers will pay attention to you”. Francis Heisbourg, a non-proliferation expert, who has served in the French government, also pointed to the differences between North Korea and Iran. While the first is “not a country, it is a regime, Iran would have to take into account public opinion in the region and in the major capitals”.

It is, nevertheless, a fact that Iran will not be cowed by American threats or intimidation. The Bush administration would be doing itself and the region a great favour if it were to abandon its pursuit of regime change in Iran. It should, instead, opt for a peaceful negotiated resolution of all its

differences with Iran, including the nuclear issue.

The Iranian leaders may engage in bluster but they are intelligent and experienced enough to be able to grasp any hint of conciliation from Washington, should it be conveyed with dignity and sincerity. It would be also in Pakistan’s interest if it was to play a helpful role in the promotion of this objective rather than chasing shadows elsewhere.

The writer is a former ambassador.

A tragedy beyond borders

THEY were there, the Indians and the Pakistanis, the Hindus and the Muslims, the old and the young, lying side by side, sheathed in death. None knew who was who, neither the protagonists of India nor those of Pakistan.

Only an hour ago, the victims had bid goodbye to their friends and relatives who had seen them off at Delhi’s railway station. The fact that the victims bolted the doors of their compartment did not matter because they were together and feared nothing.

They and their forefathers had already been broken on the rack of history many years ago. They wanted only their journey to Attari and then Lahore to be safe and peaceful. The terrorists who set fire to the two bogies through bombs had different designs. They wanted to reignite the smouldering hostility between India and Pakistan. They killed 68 and injured many more. But their attack on the Samjhota Express was symbolic. They wanted to convey that they were opposed to reconciliation between the two countries.

Who are they? It is important to know their agenda which obviously differs from the one that New Delhi and Islamabad are pursuing. The terrorists could well be Kashmiri militants who have connections with extremist organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. The terrorists could well be from Al Qaeda which indulges in senseless killings to register its presence and clout. They could well be “freelancers” who have retaliated to National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan's claim that terrorists are operating in the Indian stock market.

They could also be from Sindh where some are against the rail link with Rajasthan because the goods from across the border lessen their monopoly. Some Pakistanis have linked them to Hindu militant organisations that were responsible for the Malegaon blasts outside the mosque.

Whoever they are, they are afraid that the peace process between New Delhi and Islamabad is nearing success. It could be because the word on both sides is that India and Pakistan are about to clinch a solution to the disputes over Sir Creek, an estuary, and the Siachen glacier, one of the heights in Kashmir where the two countries are daily losing lakhs of rupees, apart from soldiers. President Musharraf says that the solution on certain things is close. Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri is still more positive. Did the optimism in the air trigger the attack on the train?

If so, both countries have reiterated – Musharraf more emphatically – that the talks will continue. After watching the vigour with which Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukerhjee and his Pakistani counterpart have pursued the peace process in Delhi, it is clear that the governments on both sides are determined to iron out their differences. This is a welcome development after many years. However, the attack may have a negative effect also. It is too late in the day to stop Sir Creek and the Siachen glacier from reaching the penultimate in the chain of proposed agreements between India and Pakistan. But the solution on Kashmir may become more difficult.

Kasuri's meeting with Syed Geelani, a hardliner who wants the state to go to Pakistan, may not be enough to mollify the extremists. They probably want more concessions on Kashmir which has covered quite a distance on the road to a solution through back channels. Kasuri said in Delhi that they have found a formula which is under fine-tuning. It is reported that the extremists favour the proposal for an autonomous status for Kashmir with a proviso that there would be a vote after 10 years to find out if people want something else. The expectation is that India would be willing to accept a more radical solution in a decade's time.

To argue that more Pakistanis died or ask why the terrorists struck in Indian territory is to evade the issue. Those who attacked the train around midnight have dark designs to lengthen the distance between India and Pakistan that people-to-people contact has shortened inch by inch. Governments on either side have condemned the tragedy. That was expected. But they have yet to trace the culprits who indulge in blasts and acts of arson in both the countries at will.

Pakistan was considered the epicentre of terrorism until some time ago. Now the terrorists are all over and they operate from any place in the region – from Afghanistan to Bangladesh. If a joint mechanism to fight terrorism was ever needed, it is now. Yet, the point India's former chief of the army staff V.P. Malik made in a TV interview carries weight. His advice is not to ignore ground realities like training camps in Pakistan and the financing of terrorist outfits. This is not indulging in a blame game but something which US think-tanks and leading newspapers have confirmed.

Too many terrorists have thrived for too long with the assistance of fanatics in the region. How to defeat them should be at the top of the agenda of the Saarc summit at Delhi in April. Kasuri's arrival in India as scheduled despite the tragedy showed Islamabad's resolve to go forward. He must have finalised the joint set-up which has been hanging fire.

Why can't Bangladesh and Nepal be included in the machinery? Terrorists, after indulging in killings, generally take refuge in these two countries. Terrorism is a challenge for the entire region. It cannot be fought country-wise. The whole of South Asia will have to mobilise its resources to root it out. The joint mechanism also necessitates joint investigation. Can the attack on the train near Panipat be the starting point?

The West, particularly America, has advanced intelligence systems. It should pass on to India and Pakistan the information it has collected. The cooperation it is extending at present is superficial. Washington is engaged more in feeding its own spy network than in collecting intelligence on terrorists. This does not, however, mean that South Asia should not join hands with America in fighting terrorism. Washington has its methods, flawed and faulty as the situation in Iraq shows. America's policy is to use force and more force. South Asia is not averse to a dialogue with the terrorists if they give up violence first.

What South Asians from Afghanistan to Bangladesh don’t seem to realise is that they are in the midst of a terrible phase of terrorism. Religious groups and anti-social elements have joined hands. So far terrorists have been engaged in stoking the fires of communal politics. Now they are expanding their activities while people are getting increasingly sick of bomb blasts and killings. What the terrorists are conveying is that they are determined to foul the atmosphere. It is a heinous game and should be nipped in the bud.

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.

Crimes of politics

HOW does a government prosecute people for crimes against humanity when the suspects happen to be running the government? That's the question facing Afghanistan, where men suspected of horrifying acts of rape and murder sit in parliament and hold other high offices.

The question of what to do about these suspected mass killers heated up Tuesday when the upper house of Afghanistan's parliament passed a resolution calling for amnesty for those accused of war crimes. The same resolution has already passed in the lower house and will become law if approved by President Hamid Karzai. Its success is unsurprising because many of those voting on the resolutions were previously regional warlords who might otherwise be subject to prosecution.

Following the Soviet pullout in 1989, Afghanistan was torn by years of civil war, during which warlords who had fought in the resistance movement began battling each other — and committing atrocities against civilian populations. Then, in 1996, the Taliban came to power, and it ruled until the US-led invasion in 2001. At the time, the United States found these disaffected warlords to be convenient allies, but now they're creating some serious governance headaches.

The ideal solution for Afghanistan would be to create a body similar to South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which, starting in 1996, helped heal the wounds left by decades of apartheid rule. Those who committed human rights abuses were granted amnesty if they publicly testified about their crimes. Yet South Africa, unlike Afghanistan, didn't have to contend with entrenched politicians who control large swaths of territory with armed militias.

—Los Angeles Times