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| January 27, 2007 | Saturday | Muharram 07, 1428 |
The question of death penalty
More money for education
Failure of unilateral preemption
IT WAS more than four years ago, in September 2002 to be precise, that President George Bush elaborated in the National Security Strategy of the United States the doctrine of unilateral pre-emption against emerging threats before they were fully formed. It was argued that the United States could not afford to remain idle as “rogue states and terrorists” developed their plans to attack it using acts of terror and, potentially, weapons of mass destruction.
THE idea of a 500-mile long common economic zone involving Jordan, Israel and Palestine (West Bank) sounds utopian, though interesting. The amazing point about what has been dubbed the “valley of peace” is its geographical ambiguity. Speaking at Davos, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres said on Thursday that all the three parties had agreed to set up such a zone, which aims at cooperation in agriculture, irrigation, tourism and joint airport management. The geography of the zone is not clear from what Mr Peres told the audience. The three governments, he said, had agreed to “take the whole length of the frontier between Jordan, Israel and the Palestinians (West Bank) ... and convert it into an ongoing economic zone.” The plan does not speak of an area between the Jordan-West Bank frontier and the Mediterranean, in which case it would incorporate Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories. Instead, by speaking of a zone along these borders, the idea of the valley of peace has been left vague and open to the broadest possible interpretation. Israel’s Deputy Defence Minister Ephraim Sneh later said the zone would take up the entire valley from the Jordanian port of Aqaba on the Red Sea to the Sea of Galilee. This means that the zone will stretch all along the Jordanian-Israel-West Bank border and end up at Galilee, thus virtually excluding Israel, except for a small part near the Galilee. In fact, such schemes of joint management of airports would come in handy for Israel, which would insist on its presence in the West Bank if and when there is a final settlement of the Palestinian issue.
The problem with the Israeli approach to the Palestinian question is its refusal to deal with the issue head on and accept that a final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is dependent on an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. Regrettably, this exactly is the issue that successive Israeli governments have dodged. If Israel had been faithful to the Oslo accords, a sovereign Palestinian state should have come into being in April 1999. Instead, successive Israeli prime ministers who followed Yitzhak Rabin after he was murdered by a Jewish fanatic raised extraneous factors to derail the peace process. Instead of focussing on the Oslo accords and adhering to the time-table visualised for the withdrawal of occupying forces from the West Bank and Gaza, Prime Ministers Benjamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak raised such issues as the need for reforms within the Palestinian Authority and for Yasser Arafat to have a prime minister before the peace process could be pushed forward. However, as facts show, in spite of the reforms and the PA having a prime minister, the peace process, including the roadmap unveiled by President George Bush in 2003, has remained frozen.
The economic zone idea may be splendid, given the fact that regional economic groupings exist in many parts of the world. However, what creates doubts about the feasibility of the scheme is Israel’s track record and its proclivity for raising irrelevant issues to divert the world’s attention away from the inalienable right of freedom of the people in the Israeli-occupied areas. An indication of what the scheme’s utility for Israel is came when Mr Peres said the zone could develop into a huge market for the Arab world and this could “lower the tone and the flames of Muslim resistance and do it very quickly”.
THE HRCP’s advice to the government to adopt a moratorium on the death penalty deserves positive consideration. Over 85 countries have already abolished capital punishment. All of them have done so on grounds of humanistic principles. Regrettably, Pakistan does not belong to that camp. Not being a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Islamabad probably thinks it is exempt from the norms recognised by international law. But legally a state cannot ignore practices and laws that govern the policies of the international community. In fact, the data provided by the HRCP reflects poorly on Pakistan. In 2005, 361 people were sentenced to death in the country and at present there are 7,400 prisoners on the death row. In a country where human dignity and fundamental rights are at a discount, the human rights argument may not carry much weight.
There is another convincing and weighty point of view put forward by the HRCP and other human rights activists that must be heeded. As pointed out by them, our judicial system suffers from so many basic flaws that the chances of there being a miscarriage of justice are immense. One does not have to be reminded of the brutalities of the police which often result in extracting false confessions from prisoners who might actually be innocent. Similarly, the investigation methodology is very faulty and very often the police fail to make a strong case for the prosecution. In such circumstances, can one be certain that a person held to be guilty and awarded the death sentence, has actually committed the crime? With death penalty being an irreversible measure, would any judge with a little conscience adjudge him guilty if there is doubt about his crime? A person wrongly adjudged guilty can be provided redress any time if he has not been sent to the gallows. Such cases of abortion of justice have other repercussions as well that are best avoided. The use of terror and force by the state cannot be justified on any ground. The best option would be to replace the death penalty with life imprisonment or put a moratorium on capital punishment until the government makes up its mind on the issue.
A PROSPEROUS Pakistan will remain an illusion until all its citizens are equipped with the skills needed to become productive members of society. Much of the malaise currently afflicting the country can be traced to illiteracy or inadequate education, itself the result of the cyclical poverty that holds one generation after another down. These shackles of material and mental backwardness can be broken only through education and socio-economic opportunities, as well as the rounded world view that proper schooling affords. Uplift on the national level will not be possible if a large segment of the population continues to lack access to education. No amount of effort will project a “soft” image of the nation if its citizens, essentially because of a lack of education, remain easy prey for the bigoted and the criminal.
In this connection, it is heartening to note that the government has decided — “in principle” — to increase spending on education to four per cent of the GDP, up substantially from the current allocation of 2.7 per cent. This welcome boost could go a long way towards putting children in school and on the right track in terms of securing a future of their own. Across the border with India, similar moves are afoot to raise the education budget from roughly four per cent to six per cent of the GDP. Money, however, will not by itself improve the state of education in Pakistan. An enhanced allocation for salaries, for instance, will be meaningless if the required number of qualified teachers are not available. Similarly, funds for the construction of schools must be monitored with due vigilance to ensure that they are properly utilised. Otherwise, a bigger budget could be little more than an invitation to corruption. Priorities too ought to be set right, with the focus firmly on primary education.
Drawing attention to the huge losses that such attacks could cause as was demonstrated by the events of 9/11, it was stressed that the United States would, if necessary, act preemptively. It was understood that preemptive military action would be taken by the US unilaterally with or without the help of the “coalition of the willing”. It was also clear that while the US would welcome UN approval of such actions, it was not a necessary pre-requisite. An assurance was given by the US that the reasons for such preemptive actions would be clear, the force measured and the cause just.
The US attack on Iraq in March 2003 constituted the first practical application of the doctrine of unilateral preemption primarily on the ground that Saddam Hussein was engaged in the development of weapons of mass destruction, an allegation that proved to be false in the light of later developments. It was also alleged baselessly that Saddam Hussein had links with the Al Qaeda network. Later, an attempt was made by the US to justify the attack on the basis of the despotic nature of Saddam Hussein’s regime and the massive violations of human rights committed by it. Saddam Hussein’s attacks on Iran and Kuwait were also cited to provide justification for the US attack on Iraq.
But it is not a secret any more that several western countries, including the US, that claim to be champions of democracy and human rights, overlooked the massive violations of human rights of the Iraqi people by the Saddam Hussein regime in order to encourage and later support the Iraqi ruler in his attack on Iran. According to some analysts, the US may also have given the green signal to Saddam Hussein for his attack on Kuwait.
The US attack on Iraq, undertaken without approval by the UN Security Council, thus lacked moral or legal legitimacy. In reality, it was a blatant act of aggression that was undertaken by Washington in pursuit of its imperial designs and strategic interests in the region. It is also clear now that the main aim of the attack on and occupation of Iraq was the strengthening of US hegemony in the Middle East in order to control the oil and gas resources of the Persian Gulf region, prevent the emergence of a threat to Israel’s security in the future and reorient the political outlook of the region to suit US interests.
The Bush administration expected that the US troops would be welcomed by the Iraqi people after being liberated from the oppressive rule of Saddam Hussein, an assumption that has been belied by the growing insurgency in Iraq. According to one survey conducted in September 2006, 61 per cent of Iraqis approved of attacks on coalition forces. Thus, the American military presence in Iraq itself has become a major obstacle in the restoration of peace and stability in the country.
The developments in Iraq are a major setback for the doctrine of unilateral preemption. What has gone wrong and why has the US failed to achieve its strategic objectives in Iraq? The causes for the US failure in Iraq can be sought both in the flawed assumptions of the doctrine of unilateral preemption as well as in its application to the situation in Iraq.
The doctrine of unilateral preemption is based on the fundamental assumption that given the overwhelming military superiority of the US in the post-Cold War era, its ability to project its military power in faraway places, its economic strength and its political clout in world councils, it can unilaterally reshape the world to avert emerging threats to its security and realise its strategic designs and objectives. The Iraqi experience has demonstrated the inaccuracy of this assumption.
Undoubtedly, the US remains the most powerful nation in the world militarily, economically and politically. However, the world is fast transitioning towards multipolarity with the emergence of several centres of power which can exercise decisive influence on the course of world events. The US edge over other major powers in the economic field is slowly but surely being eroded. By 2020, for instance, China will emerge as the largest economy in purchasing power parity terms ($29.6 trillion) followed by the US ($28.8 trillion).
In the political field, the recent exercise of the double veto by Russia and China in the UN Security Council on the issue of human rights in Myanmar has shown that a resurgent Russia and a self-confident China may not allow the US to have its way in situations where their interests diverge from those of the US. Even in the case of UN sanctions against Iran on account of the latter’s nuclear programme, the US had to engage in prolonged negotiations with Russia and China to avoid the use of veto by them. The result was a diluted UN Security Council resolution with painless sanctions against Iran. Sobered by its experience in Iraq, the US did not show much appetite for precipitate unilateral military action against Iran during the tough negotiations on the sanctions against that country.
In the military arena, undoubtedly the US is the most powerful nation in the world. In any regional conflict, it has the power to overwhelm its opponents and achieve a quick victory as demonstrated by its invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. But it is also clear by now that the US lacks the power and the stamina to sustain its initial successes unless it enjoys the support of the influential political forces within the country concerned and the important countries in its neighbourhood.
In Iraq, the US managed to alienate large sections of the population, especially the Sunnis and the Baathists, through its ill-advised policies in the post-invasion phase leading to the growing insurgency against foreign occupation. Its brutalities in dealing with the militants, indiscriminate retaliatory attacks against civilians, massive violations of human rights and the degrading treatment meted out to Iraqis in US custody have served to intensify the insurgency in Iraq. In the process, the lives of more than 3,000 American soldiers have been lost, deaths and material destruction on a vast scale have been inflicted on the Iraqi people and a sectarian war has been unleashed in the country.
The US disdain for prior UN approval of its attack denied it the legitimacy it badly needed to assume the high moral ground in dealing with Iraq in the post-invasion phase. Significantly, even after the invasion, the US declined to give a “central” role to the UN in handling the Iraqi situation.
The US also failed to secure the cooperation and support of many of Iraq’s neighbours, notably Iran and Syria, for its Iraq policy in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion. Its threats against Iran and Syria and its strong criticism of the two countries for various reasons have resulted in the denial of the active support of the two countries to the US in managing the situation in Iraq. Even a friendly country like Turkey has expressed its misgivings regarding the US policy concerning the Iraqi Kurds. The net result is that the situation in Iraq is fast spinning out of Washington’s control.
In a nutshell, the US doctrine of unilateral preemption, besides lacking the sanction of the UN Charter, proved to be an invitation to anarchy in international relations. It was predestined to a dismal failure because of the flawed assumptions on which it was based and the heavy-handed manner in which it was practised in Iraq. In a multipolar world, the US alone does not have the power to reshape the world to realise its strategic designs and objectives. Besides the broad support of the international community secured through the UN and alliances, it needs the cooperation of influential political forces within the country concerned and of important countries in its neighbourhood for ensuring the success of its initiatives in such situations as in Iraq or Afghanistan.
Unfortunately, the virtual rejection of the recommendations of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group by President Bush and his latest proposal to send more than 20,000 additional troops to Iraq show that the Bush administration has not learnt the right lessons from its experience in that country. It is almost certain that its latest initiatives will result in the same dismal failure as was the case with the earlier US policy concerning Iraq.
These conclusions have important policy implications for countries like Pakistan which has contiguous borders with a destabilised Afghanistan and an Iran which is coming under growing US pressure.
The writer is a former ambassador.
E-mail: javid_husain@yahoo.com