Where is Quaid-i-Azam’s Pakistan?
By Ameer Bhutto
THE territorial integrity and unity of states, particularly multi-national states like Pakistan that are vulnerable to ethno-centric forces, cannot be guaranteed by bullets and bayonets. On the contrary, coercion unleashes centrifugal forces that erode the sensitive and fragile social, political and ethnic tethers that bind a multi-national state. We need to look no further than our own short, chequered past to appreciate the validity of this assertion.
The glue that binds multi-national states together and makes them stable and strong is a social contract between its component units based on consensus and wilful acquiescence in expectation of liberty, equality, equity, peace and prosperity. Mutual respect, trust, and fair play must intrinsically form the core of any such social contract. Given such an environment, the spirit of fraternity that consequently flows from it cements the bond between the component units, thereby strengthening the state.
Pakistan came into being on the basis of such a social contract between the Sindhi, Punjabi, Baloch, Pashtun and Bengali people on the basis of the Pakistan Resolution. But the consensus and acquiescence among these provinces that gave birth to Pakistan is nowhere to be seen now. One could actually argue that this consensus was no more than a mirage even back in 1947, since Balochistan objected with the first post-partition sunrise and troops had to be sent in to silence all dissent by force.
The armed forces, having built permanent fortifications and trenches in the mountains which they use from time to time to quell political unrest and ‘anti-state’ sentiments, have become a more or less permanent feature of the province. Instead of resolving contentious issues amicably to allow mutual trust among the provinces of Pakistan to develop an iron fist approach has been employed which has shattered all remaining semblance of unity and cohesion.
The tragedy lies in the fact that the deep fissures that have opened up are not products of any flaws in the social contract, but are an artificial phenomenon generated by a specific clique in an attempt to establish the domination of one larger province over the other smaller ones in blatant violation of the original social contract. This has, predictably, sent the smaller nationalities into a centrifugal spin.
The Pakistan Resolution guaranteed that the component units of Pakistan would be “sovereign and autonomous” in their own affairs. But the Sindhi, Baloch, Pushtoon and Bengali peoples saw a different post-independence reality that was the antithesis of everything contained in the Pakistan Resolution.
A new creed of opportunism, expediency and hegemonic tendencies replaced the promise of the Pakistan Resolution. This wayward drift has systematically pushed the country to the edge of the precipice. It is now a crime to even talk about the Pakistan Resolution since it amounts to holding a mirror before Caliban in which he cannot avoid seeing his own ugliness.
In the aftermath of the brutal killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti and his tribesmen, a grand jirga of Baloch sardars was summoned by the Khan of Kalat in Quetta on September 21, 2006. It was attended by 85 sardars and 300 tribal elders, including those the government claims to have in its pocket. They declared that Balochistan was no longer a part of Pakistan since the rights of the Baloch people, ensured by a covenant signed by the Khan of Kalat, the British government and the government of Pakistan, had been violated and they announced their intent to move the International Court of Justice.
A follow-up grand jirga, held on October 2, 2006, reaffirmed the declaration of the first jirga. What clearer demonstration can there be of a breakdown of national consensus?
The killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti was a catalytic spark that ignited the already simmering Baloch passions. I was in Quetta a few days after the tragic incident to condole with the late Nawab’s sons. The provincial capital wore the look of a town under siege; all roads were cordoned off in the town centre by police and Rangers, who were out in a massive display of strength on the one hand, while the people were out in the streets on the other, giving vent to their frustrated emotions. It brought back memories of the darkest, and final, days of the Ayub junta.
In such a charged and volatile situation, any genuinely representative government, having already achieved their goal of eliminating a perceived obstacle in the person of the late Nawab, would see the need to diffuse the tension by trying to forge some sort of rapprochement with the alienated masses, if not their leaders, by extending an olive branch to them.
But rapprochement and reconciliation are beyond the scope of the men in boots in Islamabad who only know how to use force, unless expediency or survival instincts dictate otherwise.
Then it is acceptable to reconcile with anyone, including the menacing clerics in parliament, the Taliban elders in Waziristan or even those politicians they, not long ago, vilified as being corrupt or terrorists.
But the common citizens are not afforded the same deferential treatment when they come out on the streets to demand their rights. For them are reserved threats of dire consequences and, most recently, a promise to ‘rub their noses in the dirt.’ This approach can only add fuel to fire and further antagonise an already alienated people.
The situation in Sindh is not very different. The government has not yet resorted to the use of force here as it has in Balochistan and the Frontier, but given the collision course set between the people and the government on core issues like the Kalabagh Dam, leasing of islands to foreign companies, establishment of non-Sindhis and criminals as de facto masters of Sindh, NFC Award, etc., one wonders how far off the exercise of that option can be. The government has made it a point to adopt policies and projects that every man, woman and child in Sindh is protesting against on a daily basis.
This approach by the government has miraculously achieved something that was hitherto deemed impossible: It has united Sindh. Not only have all big and small opposition parties come closer together to cooperate in defence of Sindh’s interests, even the ministers, advisers, MNAs, MPAs and Senators of the ruling party dare not promote the government agenda in public.
Perhaps the reason why the government has not so far felt the need to resort to force in Sindh is because they have found a large band of belly-crawling sycophants here who are willing and eager to tow the government line, if in exchange for their services the government will prop them up in power and allow them to loot and plunder public and private resources. Hence, in order to secure their position, not only have new districts and constituencies been demarcated in Sindh, but electoral rolls, which had been compiled anew and computerised only four years ago, have been redrafted to their tailor-made specifications.
This unholy wedlock between the boots and the suits is a union made in hell because Sindh is having to pay a very heavy price for their honeymoon. The betrayal of its own sons has hit Sindh harder than bullets.
The government has made up its mind to use these mercenaries, terrorists and criminals and totally bypass the people to push ahead with its unpopular agenda. No serious attempt has been made to enter into a dialogue with the genuine leaders of the people to resolve the impasse.
The sole half-hearted attempt made by President Musharaf ended in embarrassment for him when, during his speech at Sukkur airport on December 23, 2005, a man in the audience that had been carefully sifted for the occasion by the agencies, stood up and asked him not to mention Kalabagh Dam in front of them because the very mention of it made their blood boil. The International Republican Institute can embellish its survey all it wants but this is the reality of the popularity of the president and his agenda in Sindh.
The government’s approach of defying public opinion can only lead to disaster. It will widen the gap between the rulers and the ruled, aggravate tensions and frustrations and damage the unity of Pakistan.
The need of the hour is to build bridges of understanding, create an atmosphere of reconciliation and regenerate the consensus that led to the creation of this country.
This cannot be achieved by means of an iron fist approach. History illustrates that such an approach may stifle a few individuals but cannot work against the masses.
Far greater and supposedly even more invincible dictators like the Shah of Iran, Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines and Ayub Khan of Pakistan were swept away by the wrath of the people.
In the face of a shockwave of public discontent, even their foreign overlords, with all their power and might, had to get out of the way.


