WHEN a series of bomb blasts ripped through seven commuter trains, causing mayhem in Mumbai nine days ago, it was hardly surprising that suspicion immediately fell on Islamist militants, with Lashkar-i-Taiba becoming the main focus of attention on account of its sordid track record. It denied responsibility, which has more recently been claimed by an outfit calling itself Lashkar-i-Qahhar. The latter has sought to justify the indiscriminate murder of nearly 200 innocents on the basis of events in Kashmir and Gujarat.

It is more likely, though, that the logic behind the despicable acts of terror was simpler: that the bombs were calculated to provoke communal disharmony and violence on the one hand, and to disrupt the process whereby India and Pakistan have gradually been drifting towards fulfilling the minimum conditions for amicable coexistence.

If that was indeed the case, the terrorists appear, fortunately, to have failed on the first count. It must be hoped that efforts to sour relations between New Delhi and Islamabad will also ultimately founder, but the initial indications are far from reassuring: the postponement of the routine talks scheduled for this week comes at a time when it is particularly important for the neighbours to clear the air between them.

Pakistan’s foreign minister Khurshid Kasuri copped a great deal of flak for mentioning Kashmir in the context of the Mumbai bombings. However, it is hard to see how those who are pointing accusatory fingers towards the infrastructure of terrorism in Pakistan can fail to acknowledge that the unresolved dispute over Kashmir is not only central to nearly six decades of tensions between the two countries but also provides extremists with a pretext for their wanton acts of violence.

Much of the rhetoric from New Delhi in recent days has been couched in “war on terror” cliches. Islamabad’s ripostes have been almost equally unimaginative, although it is well within its rights to demand evidence of Pakistani complicity in the Mumbai attacks. Of course, Pakistan, too, seldom hesitates to insinuate an Indian link in the event of violent occurrences. There are plenty of knees on both sides of the border that are ever ready to jerk. In the latest instance, however, there is little point in denying the plausibility of a Pakistani connection, even though it ought not to be taken for granted. Charges that Pakistan is insufficiently tough on terrorism have, of course, been flowing for some years, usually from the northwest, with western military officials occasionally echoing Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s regular complaints. The apparent resurgence of the Taliban has inevitably been accompanied by the now familiar accusations, and from a distance it is all but impossible to ascertain the extent to which the Kabul authorities and foreign forces may be trying to excuse their own inadequacies.

The most damaging allegations are those that implicate elements within the ruling structure, notably the ISI. It is widely known (although not officially acknowledged) that in years gone by the military intelligence agency played a profoundly unhelpful role in both the Afghan and the Kashmiri contexts. General Pervez Musharraf apparently purged the most obvious Islamist sympathisers from the ISI hierarchy in the aftermath of 9/11. A relapse would be ominous, regardless of the extent of Musharraf’s involvement. On the other hand, had there been any proof of ISI malfeasance in the Islamist and/or terrorist sphere, wouldn’t the United States have confronted Musharraf with it?

In other respects, the “soft on terrorism” claims are bolstered by indications that Musharraf’s measures against Muslim fanatics often seem half-hearted or prove to be temporary. In some cases, it may indeed be true that the suspect individuals or organisations are beyond the reach of the authorities. In others, the general probably feels obliged to tread somewhat gingerly for fear of antagonising large sections of the population. It’s not a happy compromise. But then, no one had any right to expect that the return to relatively secular Muslim statehood would be an easy task after the obscurantist excesses of the Ziaul Haq era, a period when the incumbent military dictator stayed in Washington’s good books by building up the forces that Musharraf is expected to destroy.

Anyhow, it would be profoundly unfortunate — as well as an unwarranted gift to the Mumbai terrorists - were India and Pakistan’s slow march towards a modus vivendi to be indefinitely interrupted at this juncture. It would be considerably wiser for Delhi to accept Musharraf’s offer of full cooperation in the investigation than to pursue any of the confrontational strategies currently being proposed.

For instance, The Guardian’s Jonathan Steele reports a suggestion from Ajai Sahni of the Institute for Conflict Management to the effect that India “impose costs” on Pakistan “by increasing defence spending and starting an arms race that would bankrupt its neighbour”. That’s a supremely stupid idea from every possible aspect, not least because it would be likely to deplete rather than enhance India’s security.

It would be even more unwise for New Delhi to heed the advice of those who have lately been suggesting, in the light of recent events, that India should model its behaviour on that of Israel. Such egregious folly would be disastrous beyond anyone’s wildest nightmares, a recipe for regular bloodshed that would also serve the purpose of entrenching and expanding terrorist networks.

Israel’s latest exploits illustrate not only its immorality and its bloodlust, but also the ultimate futility of seeking to resolve longstanding problems exclusively through force.

On the day after the carnage in Mumbai, members of the Lebanese militia Hezbollah crossed Israel’s northern border and captured two soldiers after killing a few of their comrades. Israel responded with air attacks that have claimed more lives than the Mumbai bombers. Almost all of Israel’s victims thus far have been civilians, including large numbers of children. Hezbollah has retaliated to the bombing raids with rocket attacks on Haifa and other targets; these too have claimed civilian lives, albeit on a much smaller scale.

A couple of weeks earlier, Palestinians from Gaza had carried out a similar raid, capturing one Israeli soldier and killing three. The consequence was Israeli attacks on Gaza that were designed to destroy its infrastructure, creating a humanitarian crisis. About a year ago, Israel had withdrawn its troops and Jewish settlers from the Gaza Strip, effectively turning the tiny territory into a prison for one million Palestinians, a few of whom subsequently chose to lob crude and not particularly lethal Qassam rockets into adjacent parts of Israel.

Pending the release of its soldier (it’s worth noting that Israel holds 9,000 Palestinian prisoners, a tenth of whom are held without trial), the Israelis are holding hostage about a third of elected Palestinian representatives and ministers, and the premises of Hamas office-holders are regularly coming under attack. The crisis came at a time when Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas was on the verge of winning the Hamas government’s acquiescence on the goal of a two-state solution, so it may have suited Hamas’s interests to provide a distraction, and Israel proved all too eager to join in the game.

The expansion of the conflict into Lebanon is, of course, an extremely dangerous escalation: there is a risk that Hezbollah’s backers Syria and Iran could be drawn in, which would effectively mean an all-out Middle East war. It has been suggested that Hezbollah’s pointless provocation a week ago may have been recommended by Damascus or Tehran, or both. Now Israel has said its attacks on Lebanon will not cease unless Hezbollah is disarmed.

UN Security Council resolution 1559 had called for the militia’s disarmament, but that part of it was never implemented — not least because Hezbollah, which evolved into a formidable fighting force during Israel’s 18-year occupation of Lebanese territory and took credit, with some justification for Israel’s 2000 decision to abandon its so-called security zone in the south of the country, is arguably more powerful than the Lebanese army. For Israel to attempt a disarmament would entail a land invasion by tens of thousands of soldiers, something that the Ehud Olmert government appears unwilling to risk.

Many analysts are of the view that the situation will eventually be resolved through a prisoner exchange of some sort, although it needn’t be simultaneous. I hope they are right, but theirs is clearly a best-case scenario — and there’s no saying how many Lebanese must die before it becomes viable.

Israel’s “disproportionate” reprisals in Gaza and Lebanon have attracted mild western criticism, but the Bush administration has been totally supportive, with George W. Bush even opposing, during the Group of Eight summit in St Petersburg, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s call for a ceasefire. In his opinion, Damascus should be leaned upon so that it can persuade Hezbollah to “stop doing this ...”.

No surprises there either, and the eloquence is touching. One could, after all, hardly expect Bush to appreciate the fact that Hezbollah is a much smaller problem in the Middle Eastern context than Israel’s attitude, and its determination to unilaterally leave Palestinians with even less than the 22 per cent of historical Palestine that they are demanding. For as long as the idea of a cohesive and viable Palestinian state remains chimerical, the region will know no peace.

All in all, surely the situation in that part of the world is hardly the sort of scenario India should be seeking to replicate in the subcontinent.

Email: mahirali1@gmail.com