An unrealistic deadline for Indus dams
By Saiyid Ali Naqvi
THE ground-breaking of the Diamer-Basha dam performed by President General Pervez Musharraf on April 26 caused my memory to recall the ground-breaking for the construction of the Tarbela Dam performed nearly 38 years ago on November 4, 1968 by the then President, Field Marshall Muhammad Ayub Khan.
But, despite the obvious similarities of the political and military status of the two personalities, there was a significant difference between the two events.
The ground-breaking performed by Ayub Khan had signalled the commencement of the work on the construction of the Tarbela dam for which the essential preliminary works (road and rail access to site, staff camps, exploratory works) had already been completed by Wapda and the necessary mobilisation of plant, equipment and labour for the initial stage of construction activities had been accomplished by the contractor, who had arrived on the site some six months earlier, in May 1968.
In contrast, on April 26, 2006, blast detonated by General Musharraf at the present site of the proposed Diamer-Basha dam was not a signal to start the construction of the dam. No one, not even the government, knows at this time when the proposed Diamer-Basha dam will reach the stage when actual ground-breaking signalling the start of construction of the dam might take place. Therefore, the event could at best be described as indicating the start of the launching of the preliminary or pre-construction works and activities.
The general thus set the target of 2016 for the completion of the project and declared that all dams, including Kalabagh, would be built under his ‘2016 Water Vision’, besides these mega dams on the main Indus River, the vision envisages the construction of Akori, Munda and Kuram Tangi dams by 2016. As such the ‘2016 Water Vision’ appears to be totally unrealistic if not an absolute fantasy.
There is no precedent to match this fantastic ‘vision’ in the history of the Indus Basin water resource development, in which the construction of the two of the world’s largest dams — the Mangla and the Tarbela dams — over a period of about two decades (1957-1976) was internationally acknowledged as the most remarkable achievement of civil engineering. Leaving aside the other three dams included in the ‘2016 Water Vision’, the present discussions will examine whether the 2016 target for the completion of the Diamer-Basha and Kalabagh dams is achievable in the face of the known constraints.
Let us first consider the prospects of the Diamer-Basha dam achieving the 2016 target. Back in 1988, an international panel of experts, organized by the government with the assistance of the World Bank, to review the report of the preliminary feasibility study prepared a few years earlier. Following the review the panel identified a number of technical issues which needed to be resolved for establishing the feasibility of the proposed dam.
Some of those issues were characterized by the panel as being the matters of concern. One such concern was the existence of large masses of moraine material (earth and rock material carried and finally deposited by the glacier) in the reservoir area upstream of Chilas town which could slide once they were subjected to saturation by the fluctuating reservoir levels and by seismic action. This phenomenon, the panel pointed out, could affect not only the dam but also the population downstream.
As to the question whether this and all other issues have been addressed by Wapda and its consultants and whether the government has satisfied itself regarding the technical feasibility of the construction of the proposed 270-meter high dam at the Diamer-Basha site providing a reservoir capacity of 7.4 million acre-feet and power generation capacity of 4,500 MW. The answer from the relevant government quarters cannot but be affirmative because the ground-breaking, no matter if it was premature, had already been performed by the president.
Lately, however, some uncertainty about the dam site has been introduced by a press report on May 4 — a week after the ground-breaking — that a German engineering firm in collaboration with a Pakistani firm had asked to the government to change the dam site to a site ‘30 kilometers away from the Chilas city’ and that, according to its proponents the new site, besides saving the Chilas city, will have other technical and financial advantages outlined in its report handed over to Wapda and which is expected to be ‘officially’ submitted to the government in June.
Regardless of its merits or demerits, the proposal has clearly opened up the question as to whether the Diamer-Basha site represents the least cost and least environmentally detrimental alternative. It is hard to guess whether Wapda will choose to ignore or brush aside the proposal thinking that this would jeopardize the programme of meeting the 2016 target for commissioning of the dam. The danger is that a good proposal might be sacrificed at the alter of what appears to be an arbitrarily set target.
In seeking an answer to the question whether the 2016 target for commissioning of the dam is achievable, assuming that the government decides to go ahead with the programme of building the dam on the present site, a crucially important point which needs to be taken into account is that the improvement of the access to the site is critical to the schedule for commencement of the construction of the dam since one of the matters of concern identified by the 1988 panel of experts related to the access to the site.
The panel had noted that the dam site was situated 330 miles from the nearest railhead at Havelian and referring to the needed transportation of large quantities of cement besides heavy equipment, the panel had advised that major work of upgrading of the Karakoram Highway must be completed before the construction of the dam was undertaken. This means that the execution of the Karakorum Highway upgrading work is going to be one critical factor that would determine the commencement of construction and commissioning of the dam.
Now, since this essential and time-consuming work would be carried out as part of the pre-construction activities for Diamer-Basha dam one may look at the past experience with Mangla and Tarbela dams to see whether 2016 target for Daimer-Basha dam commissioning is achievable.
The Diamer-Basha dam will need to overcome the following two hurdles affecting the timeline of its implementation. First, there are the concerns in Sindh and Balochistan regarding any storage reservoir on the Indus River which might cause reduction in water supplies to their canal systems and also cause negative ecological impact on the Indus delta region downstream of Kotri. Second, so far there is no commitment of funds from international donors for financing part of the project costs of $6.5 billion.
As for Tarbela dam project, its implementation also did not face the hurdles as in the case of Mangla although some time was spent during early years of 1960s on arranging additional funds to meet the cost overrun on the Indus Basin Settlement Plan works. Tarbela took as long as 16 years to reach the commissioning stage in 1976 despite the fact that the dam site was easily accessible from Lawrencepur on Grand Trunk Road. Given that the timeline for the implementation of Diamer-Basha dam will be addressing Sindh’s concerns, securing funds and executing major work of upgrading the Karakorum Highway, there appears to be little likelihood that the dam could be commissioned within a period of less than 16 years taken by Tarbela.
On the other hand, the proposed Kalabagh dam, for which much of the preparatory activities had been completed by 1987 can still be commissioned by 2016 provided the government meets the concerns of Sindh, Balochistan and the NWFP and promises to take concrete remedial steps as a precondition for achieving the consensus on the project.
The technical committee on water resources, which was constituted by the government and which deliberated on the matter in 2005, failed to resolve the differences even on the quantum of water available for storage in the Indus system. Similarly, a consensus cannot be achieved through rhetorical expressions of the resolve to build the dam which are occasionally made by those at the helm of affairs. Such pronouncements tend to politicise the project as badly as the anti-Kalabagh declarations and statements do. In the circumstances a more appropriate course to untie the Gordian knot would require the induction of independent experts of international repute.
First, the government should address the non-technical issues, such as, the apprehension of Sindh that water would be taken away by the upper riparian or the concerns of the MWFP regarding the resettlement of the people displaced from the reservoir area, through the relevant mechanisms and institutions, particularly the Council of Common Interest and the parliament.
Second, to resolve the technical issues, including the environmental and social issues, the government should take the following steps: (a) organize an independent international panel of experts, selected with the assistance of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, to clearly identify and analyse the issues and to propose mitigating measures in a well documented and comprehensive report; (b) provide the panel of experts all the relevant documents, including the report of the 2005 technical committee on water resources, (c) organise a representative group of stakeholders to interact with the panel of experts; (d) place the report of the panel before the Council of Common Interest for a review and evolving a common understanding on the findings of the panel and on the measures recommended by the panel to mitigate the negative impacts of the dam; and finally (e) arrange the implementation of the recommendations or decisions of the Council of Common Interest through the passage of appropriate acts by the parliament.
The writer participated in the construction of Mangla and Tarbela dams and in the project planning activities for Kalabagh dam as Wapda’s senior engineering and management officer.


