Mending our India policy
By Javid Husain
IT is not an exaggeration to say that Pakistan’s relations with India since its inception have been the central or rather the determining factor of its foreign policy. One would, therefore, presume that our India policy would be marked by steadiness of purpose, clarity of vision, the virtue of moderation, soundness of analysis and depth of strategy.
As against this, our India policy has suffered from lack of a sense of direction, confusion of thought, a tendency to take extreme positions, pious hopes and the absence of a carefully worked out long-term strategy, particularly in the recent past. This has predictably led to disappointments and frustration on our part, and to flip-flops of our India policy.
Since the birth of Pakistan, its relations with India have been generally tense and uneasy and occasionally hostile as reflected by the several wars and military confrontations between the two countries, the last one being the full mobilization of troops by both sides following the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001.
There have been two primary reasons for the discord between India and Pakistan: the Kashmir dispute and India’s quest for hegemony in South Asia which was met by Pakistan’s opposition. Another underlying factor for the tension-ridden relationship has been the grudging reluctance with which India accepted the creation of Pakistan and its continued hope, sometimes nurtured secretly and sometimes expressed publicly, that sooner or later the partition would be nullified and Pakistan would become a part of the Indian federation.
The latest example of this not-so-secret hope was the reported statement by the Indian president on February 2, 2006, that a federation between India and Pakistan was a possibility in the next 50 years or so. It explains the pains that the Indians take to stress that Pakistan and India are culturally the same, thus negating the very rationale for the creation of Pakistan. This is also the subtle message that is being conveyed to the masses in Pakistan through the cultural onslaught by the Indian electronic media.
The fact of the matter is that Pakistan belongs to the Islamic civilization whereas the vast majority of the Indians represent the Hindu civilization. As stressed by the Quaid-i-Azam at Lahore in March 1940 and later in his famous correspondence with Gandhi in 1944, the Muslims and the Hindus belong to different civilizations and cultures, have distinctive outlook on life and of life, and, therefore, they constitute two different nations.
In the face of the challenges that a hostile India posed and the tensions generated by the Kashmir dispute, our leaders and policy-makers have been guilty of three fundamental flaws in managing our relations with India: they have pursued policies which our resources cannot sustain leading to the classic mistake of a strategic overstretch, defined the concept of security almost exclusively in military terms with politics and economics taking a back seat, and ignored the lesson of history that in modern times nations that have prospered in the world have accorded higher priority to building economic strength than to military strength at the initial stages of their development.
Since 1990s, we have added to these policy flaws the blunder of policy formulation in a vacuum, ignoring the dictates of the global and the regional strategic environment and a tendency to swing like a pendulum from one extreme to the other.
The combination of strategic overstretch and over-reliance on the military at the expense of the political, diplomatic and economic dimensions of policy in managing our relations with India drained our resources and weakened us gradually vis-a-vis India. The preponderant weight of the military in our body politic and frequent military take-overs stunted the growth of political and representative institutions in the country, destabilized our polity and undermined the process of economic development through large-scale diversion of resources from development to military purposes.
It is not surprising, therefore, that, according to the UN Human Development Report for 2005, Pakistan’s annual GDP per capita growth rate during the period 1975-2003 was 2.5 per cent as against 3.3 per cent recorded by India. Our performance during the period 1990-2003 worsened further with the comparative figures being 1.1 per cent for Pakistan and 4.0 per cent for India. The net result is a much weaker Pakistan politically, economically and militarily relative to India now compared to the situation in early 1960s.
The disintegration of the Soviet Union drove home the primacy of economic strength in any long-term contest between nations. The Soviet Union was defeated in the Cold War not because of a lack of advanced weaponry. In fact, its fundamental mistake was to build a heavy military superstructure on weak economic foundations resulting in its inevitable collapse. The lesson of history is that sustainable military power can be built only on the foundation of political stability and economic strength. Unfortunately, we have put the cart before the horse by building up military power at the expense of political stability and economic development. Our defence expenditure has consistently exceeded the development expenditure during the 1990s and subsequently. Little wonder that India has moved far ahead of us in almost every aspect of economic activity.
As for the global strategic environment, two developments relevant to Pakistan-India relations stand out. One is the rejection by the international community of terrorism and resort to violence by non-state actors which has had an adverse effect on freedom movements in Kashmir and Palestine. The second is the gradual emergence of India as a major player on the international political stage. Both these developments have important implications for Pakistan’s India policy which are too obvious to need any elaboration.
Finally, a word about the flip-flops of our India policy as exemplified by the travel from the Lahore Declaration through to Kargil, the Agra Summit and the Pakistan-India Joint Statement of January 6, 2004, and more recently by the talk about economic union with India. Such pendulum-like swings in our India policy betray the absence of steadiness of purpose and a carefully worked out long- term strategy based on national consensus, and instead a preoccupation with quick results flowing from short-term and arbitrary approaches.
It is axiomatic that only a politically, economically and militarily strong Pakistan can safeguard its national interests and security by standing up to the Indian hegemonistic designs in the region. Only such a strong Pakistan in this power-based international system can have some hope of generating pressure on India and attracting international support for securing a just and honourable settlement of the Kashmir dispute.
Judged from this standpoint, our India policy of the past half a century which weakened Pakistan vis-a-vis India and resulted in the dismemberment of the country without any significant success to its credit can only be considered a failure. The need, therefore, is a fundamental review of our current India policy which continues to suffer from the shortcomings mentioned above.
What are Pakistan’s options in an admittedly difficult strategic environment? Perhaps the most important requirement right now is to adopt a long-term strategy for handling our relations with India based on a careful calculation of all the relevant factors and on national consensus to be evolved after debate and discussion among all the stakeholders.
Such a long-term strategy must recognize that peace is a strategic imperative for both India and Pakistan now that they both possess nuclear weapons. This strategy should aim at avoiding a confrontational approach towards India, which we can ill afford, and loose talk of economic union with that country, which would strike at the very roots of Pakistan. Instead, our long-term objective should be to build up our internal strength and take well-calculated steps externally through adroit diplomacy to turn the strategic situation in our favour. The process of composite dialogue with India, meanwhile, should continue to defuse tensions in our relations with India, avoid the risk of the outbreak of an armed conflict and resolve the outstanding disputes politically.
However, it must be understood that a satisfactory settlement of the Kashmir dispute is not feasible in the immediate future because of its emotional overtones and historical background. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has ruled out any redrawing of borders between India and Pakistan in response to repeated appeals by our leaders. He reiterated this point on February 1, by stressing that he had no mandate to negotiate the transfer of “Indian territory”.
Perhaps more importantly, an immediate settlement may not even be in our interest as the current strategic realities, which would determine its substance, favour India. We should, therefore, bide our time and wait for the right moment. As for the immediate future, while maintaining our principled position on the issue based on UN resolutions, we should persuade India, as interim measures, to improve the human rights situation in the held Kashmir and allow the Kashmiris maximum autonomy in running their affairs.
Pakistan’s policy-makers need to devise a long-term strategy which would secure an honourable peace with India and achieve a just and satisfactory settlement of the Kashmir dispute while ensuring our national security and economic well-being. This indeed is a daunting but not an impossible task. However, the prerequisite for any chance of success in this endeavour is a democratic, politically stable and economically strong Pakistan.
The writer is a former ambassador.


