KBD: not without consensus

PRESIDENT Musharraf’s address to the nation on January 17, 2005, that called for the construction of Bhasha dam seems to have diverted an imminent national crisis in the inter-provincial and centre-province relationships. Building Bhasha dam, however, would require first laying down a 300-km road up to the site of the dam by which time the president hopes to build a consensus to start the construction on the Kalabagh dam as well.

In effect, there is a likelihood that the work on the actual construction of the Kalabagh dam might begin before that of the Bhasha dam.

While the president’s speech has been widely hailed, his latest remarks in which he adopted the “Kalabagh, at all costs” approach, however, suggest that the Kalabagh issue is not only very much alive but can still divide the nation. In this article, I will outline a roadmap for building a national consensus on the issue.

The history of consensus-building in Pakistan is not very encouraging. In the past, consensus-building has taken more of the form of arm-twisting and procrastination rather than actual hard work that must be undertaken to bring the opposing sides closer and bridge the gap between rhetoric and the reality of an issue. Building a consensus on Kalabagh would require concurrent action on three fronts: a) changing the culture of secrecy in the political affairs of the country; b) developing an atmosphere of trust and sacrifice among stakeholders; and c) sincerely accepting whatever the ultimate outcome is.

Fulfilling these conditions of a consensus-building process would be a challenge in the current environment of mistrust; however, this is something that must be undertaken at all costs.

One example of how consensus can’t be built is the issue of the dam itself. Simply speaking, one cannot hope to build a consensus on anything — let alone an issue as explosive as Kalabagh — when every deliberation on the issue is shrouded in secrecy. The very fact that the successive reports of the committees on water resources were released only recently — a welcome step but one too late — is testament to the fact that the state has not trusted its own citizens for making a well-informed and wise decision on the subject.

Not only is secrecy counter-productive to the declared aspiration of building a national consensus but also provides an unchallenged opportunity to ill-meaning ultra-nationalists to breed further doubt and hatred among provincial populations. The only thing one can actually build under secrecy is doubt, distrust, and paranoia which is what we have on our hands after three decades of so-called consensus-building on Kalabagh dam. If a consensus is to emerge over the next few years, the first thing that needs to happen is to make sure that this culture of secrecy and lack of transparency goes. The establishment must not only learn to trust its own citizens to make the right decision for the country but also to humbly accept their judgment on the matter.

Getting rid of the culture of secrecy would also pave the way for confidence-building and give-and-take among the various stakeholders. All matters pertaining to the issue must be made transparent. Equal access to information would help ensure that everybody, including the public, really understands the stakes involved and are thus able to negotiate freely. Equal access to information and an open national debate — facilitated through third-party, trusted consultants — may help in developing a semi-consensus on the facts of the case.

In the context of Kalabagh dam, the key stakeholders clearly are the governments and the three smaller provinces (i.e. Sindh, the NWFP, Balochistan) on the one side and the one large province (Punjab) on the other with the centre playing the referee. Solving the issue amicably would require a lot more than providing true and accurate (technical) information on the issue. That the element of inter-provincial mistrust is a driving factor in this case is quite evident from even a cursory review of the projects’ technical features (e.g. Sindh’s acceptance of Bhasha dam but not Kalabagh dam despite the fact that both are to be built on the Indus river).

Clearly, the issue goes far beyond pure technical feasibility and merit and the real underlying problem is the mistrust among the provinces. The politicians of Sindh, and to some extent the NWFP, are simply not willing to give Punjab access to water to draw from and at the same time the control of the water reservoir itself. Building Bhasha, instead of Kalabagh dam, would probably ensure some separation between the control of the reservoir and the use of the water itself thus somewhat reducing Sindh’s fears that Punjab may use the water to blackmail or coerce it at some critical juncture in future. While this sentiment isn’t healthy for a union like ours, it is somewhat understandable given the history of inter-provincial relations in Pakistan. It is also something we must all strive to address at our earliest.

Assuming for a moment that building all dams (including Kalabagh) is indeed essential to Pakistan’s survival, what can be done to alleviate some of the fears and apprehensions of the smaller provinces vis-a-vis the larger province? The president’s speech has put several proposals on the table, including constitutional guarantees, moving the headquarters of the Indus River System Authority, nominating additional IRSA representatives from Sindh etc. Many of these are worthy of consideration and are likely to at least lessen some of the concerns raised by Sindh. While these are effective sweeteners, active trust-building requires a more meaningful give-and-take between the various stakeholders.

This kind of give-and-take is the essence of democratic politics. Many times in a democratic order, one option/condition is good for one set of provinces but is not good for others and what is good for the latter is not good for the former. When such is the case, the collective welfare of the individual units can only be maximized by engaging in a process of give-and-take in a democratic and honourable manner. It is conceivable that everything is “on the table” and in the end Kalabagh could really become an opportunity to solve many more problems that the provinces may have with one another than is normally conceived.

For example, Punjab could offer to accede to Sindh’s demands on NFC in exchange for the latter’s willingness to go along with Kalabagh; the centre might address the issue of royalty on gas revenues in Balochistan’s favour to bring the latter on board; and the NWFP might get a package to improve its irrigation system in return for its acceptance. These alone can lead to endless combinations through which a deal may be reached and hence the possibility to transform a potentially contentious issue into an opportunity to build a more perfect union may be realized.

The final element of a true and fair consensus-building process is respecting the process and the ultimate outcome achieved from it. What this really means is that the stakeholders start the process with a clean slate, be sincere to the process itself, and vow to respect the outcome of the process. In the context of the Kalabagh debate, what this would mean is that every option — including not building the dam at all or doing other things (e.g. improving the efficiency of the irrigation system) instead — is on the table.

While parties are free to hold their respective opinions, pre-judging or ordaining the end result of the process would render it unfair and botched in the eyes of at least one of the two parties. If the president’s claim that Kalabagh dam is beneficial for all provinces and critical to Pakistan’s survival is indeed true, he and his advisors should be patient enough to let that become self-evident as an outcome of the process itself.

Similarly, if the fears of the smaller provinces are justified, they should either be addressed as a part of the process or else they would end up dictating the outcome of the process. Respecting the process also requires that, irrespective of the outcome, at the end or all parties are mature enough to walk away from the exercise without harbouring any prejudices. Rather, they should have a feeling that they have given the proposition a fair chance and are ready to accept the collective will of the Pakistani people. This and this alone can ensure that, regardless of the final outcome, Pakistan is better off as a result of the process than without it.

Herein lies the greatest lesson that the Pakistani people and politicians can derive from the Kalabagh episode. A happy and harmonious union has a better chance of realizing the potential of the Pakistani nation than one fraught with mistrust and doubts. Our political effectiveness is the product of doing the right thing and doing it well. Building Kalabagh without the emergence of a proper consensus (as outlined above) — even though it may be the right thing to do — would jeopardize our ability to implement it without causing serious damage to inter-provincial relations.

One hopes, however, that this would not happen and that a democratic process of true consensus-building and reconciliation will bring the entire nation to a common ground and, with or without Kalabagh, Pakistan will move forward to take on the challenges of the 21st century with greater confidence and resolve than ever before.

Muslim radicals in power

ARE Muslim radicals changed by the experience of sharing in the responsibilities of government? The world has a lot riding on the answer to that question, and I can offer a small vignette drawn from a conversation with Hasan Nasrallah, the leader of the Lebanese Shia militia Hezbollah.

I visited the black-turbaned Nasrallah on Thursday in his heavily guarded headquarters in the southern suburbs of Beirut. This is Hezbollahland: The narrow streets are chaotic, with bootleg telephone, electricity and cable TV wires dangling from every building, and surveillance cameras watching everything that moves. When you enter the inner compound, Hezbollah gunmen check for explosives or tracking devices in your pen, your watch, even your wedding ring.

Nasrallah was talking in the abstract about the democratic successes of Hamas, Hezbollah and other Islamic movements. Yes, he said, having political power would change Hamas. It would “burden them with larger political responsibilities.” The group would remain attached to its principles, he said, “but its behaviour may be influenced” by the responsibility of government.

Then the phone rang, and the Hezbollah leader took a series of calls about the political stalemate that has paralyzed the Lebanese government. What transpired over the next few minutes was a demonstration that Nasrallah himself can, in the crunch, make the political deals that are part of governing. It also showed that however eager Islamic groups are for political power, they won’t easily give up their guns.

Here’s the background: A month ago, Nasrallah decided that the two Hezbollah members of the Lebanese cabinet and three other Shia ministers should walk out in protest of decisions made by Prime Minister Fuad Siniora. The technical issue was Siniora’s call for an international tribunal to weigh evidence gathered about the assassinations of Lebanese political leaders. But the real problem was Nasrallah’s fear that Siniora was challenging Hezbollah’s status as an armed “resistance” fighting Israel.

Without its Shia members, the Lebanese cabinet was unable to decide on major issues, and the country was nearing political and economic paralysis. Siniora told me Wednesday night that it was a full-blown “political crisis,” and he was searching frantically for a way out. French and American diplomats here feared that Nasrallah might scuttle the government altogether.

Instead, reason prevailed, or at least a Levantine version of it. Siniora made a statement in parliament on Thursday that finessed the resistance/militia issue to Nasrallah’s satisfaction. The prime minister also promised that consensus would rule on major issues if the Shia ministers returned. Nasrallah, after fielding a second phone call, turned to me and said the issue was “99 per cent resolved.” Hezbollah would get to keep its weapons, for now, and Lebanon would avert political disaster, for now.

Before we got into the hardball reality of Middle East politics, I had been asking Nasrallah about the idealistic version advanced by President Bush in his State of the Union speech. I read him a passage in which Bush said that “liberty is the future of every nation in the Middle East, because liberty is the right and hope of all humanity.”

“Nice words. Lovely words,” he answered, “but the important thing is to allow people to act in liberty and freedom.”—Dawn/Washington Post Service

Cabinet shuffle in India

I MAY be reading too much into the cabinet reshuffle in New Delhi. But the changes effected make me believe that Congress president Sonia Gandhi has begun the exercise of choosing her party candidates for India’s president and vice-president, the two offices falling vacant by next August.

My hunch is that Dr Karan Singh, a tall Congress leader, is being saved for the office of president. He has not been inducted in the cabinet, despite his seniority. He himself is reluctant to join the cabinet. More than that, Sonia Gandhi does not want his name to be smudged in any way. The politics of ministerial position would have dragged him to one controversy or the other.

The founder of an international Hindu forum, Karan Singh would be acceptable to the BJP. Significantly, he has never said anything against Hindutva. The other point in his favour is that if there were to be a contest — it would be close — Karan Singh would be the best choice from among the Congress leaders. He has not rubbed people on the wrong side. (Karan Singh says that his horoscope predicts his elevation to the office of president.)

The Congress candidate for the vice-presidentship is likely to be Sushil Kumar Shinde, until recently the Andhra Pradesh governor. He belongs to the scheduled caste whereas Karan Singh is a Rajput, the upper caste. Such considerations are important in the multi-ethnic society that India is. Shinde lost to Bhairon Singh Sekhawat last time because the latter was better known.

Since the vice-president is elected by the two houses, the Rajya Sabha and the Lok Sabha, Sonia Gandhi’s expectation is that Shinde in the cabinet has more opportunities to fraternize with MPs than he would have had if sequestered at Hyderabad. However, Shinde’s induction may be ominous for Ram Vilas Paswan, a scheduled caste leader. He may be axed. He displeased the Congress when he refused to join hands with Laloo Prasad Yadav in the state election in Bihar.

After losing power at Patna, Laloo Yadav has been pressing for Paswan’s exclusion from the cabinet because he blames him for dividing lower caste votes, Laloo Yadav’s forte. The fact that he has been able to get his Man Friday, minister for company affairs, Ram Prakash Gupta, elevated to the cabinet status shows that Laloo Yadav’s 24 members in the Lok Sabha are crucial. In any case, the Congress has in Shinde a tall scheduled caste leader and the exit of Paswan from the government would not be much of a loss for it.

The most intriguing part of the cabinet reshuffle is the manner in which Sonia Gandhi has got finally rid of her coterie and that too at one go. Was she tired of them and their self-importance? They still believe that they have her ears. It is one thing to be at 10, Janpath where Sonia Gandhi lives and another to be in the government wondering whom Sonia is consulting. They know in their heart of hearts that she would not have let them go if she really needed them.

Probably, they had outlived their utility. Their worry is that there may be another coterie, indifferent if not hostile to them. The argument that Sonia Gandhi wanted more of her own people in the council of ministers does not hold water. Every person is hers. Who is Manmohan Singh anyway? And his admiration for her was visibly clear at the press conference.

Not that Manmohan Singh could have reshuffled the cabinet without Sonia Gandhi’s consultations. But he has revived the old Congress practice whereby the prime minister consults the party president before constituting or reshuffling the cabinet. Mrs Indira Gandhi was the one who stopped the practice. After becoming prime minister in 1966 with the help of Congress president K Kamaraj, she sent the cabinet list to the president of India straightaway without even showing it to Kamaraj. Rajiv Gandhi did not have to do so because he combined both offices of prime minister and the Congress president. So was the case with Narasimha Rao.

The reshuffle has marred Manmohan Singh’s reputation in some way. The re-induction of Shibu Soren from Jharkhand was a mistake, whatever the pressure. It indicates that Manmohan Singh, too, has come to believe that corruption is a way of life in Indian politics. Probably, the prime minister has got convinced that if the tainted Laloo Yadav can stay, why stall Soren? This only confirms that a clean economist and bureaucrat like Manmohan Singh is learning the tricks of trade: Discretion is the better part of valour.

Unfortunately, the cabinet reshuffle has cut short the debate on the Supreme Court’s judgment on the dissolution of the Bihar assembly last March. Governor Buta Singh had dissolved the assembly on the grounds that no party was in a position to attain a majority. The Supreme Court has held by 3-2 that the governor’s act was mala fide. It also criticized the government of India for taking Buta Singh’s “fanciful assumptions as gospel truth.”

No doubt, the governor was interested in helping Laloo Yadav’s Rashtriya Janata Dal form the government with the backing of the Congress. But he was equally determined to stall other political parties from coming to power. He became a part of the plan hatched to keep the non-Congress parties out.

The supreme court has rightly rapped the governor on his knuckles. The Supreme Court’s advice to the government to verify the facts before accepting the governor’s report is pertinent. But in this case New Delhi was in fact goading the governor. My short trip to Patna a few days ago confirms this. Three central ministers phoned Buta Singh on his mobile many times. He himself said in a press interview that he did “what he was told to do.”

The sequence of events testifies to this. Buta Singh sent the report for fresh elections on Sunday, May 22, a holiday. The central cabinet met the same night at 11 pm and approved the governor’s recommendation on the dissolution of the assembly. The cabinet’s resolution was e-mailed to the president, then in Moscow. He received it at 1.52 am and faxed his approval at 5.30 am itself. Why this indecent hurry?

The Supreme Court has said that the governor “misled the council of ministers.” If this is so, mere resignation is no punishment. Shouldn’t there be some way to teach a lesson to those who play havoc with the constitution and the nation? Maybe, the institution of ombudsman when it comes into being can do something about such motivated acts. Till then what happens? If tainted ministers cannot be dropped from the cabinet, probably governors like Buta Singh can also get away with the crime they commit.

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.

Bush fuels the debate

PRESIDENT Bush’s strong espousal of alternative fuels such as cellulosic ethanol as a way of weaning America off its dependency on Middle East oil should be warmly applauded.

The president has often made reference to oil in previous State of the Union addresses but not by endorsing a particular solution with such enthusiasm and never with a specific target in mind: to cut dependence on Middle East oil by 75 per cent by 2025. It would have been even better if Mr Bush had worked with the international community to reduce oil dependence and to combat global warming, but this move at least shows that the US could make a significant contribution on a unilateral basis.

It now remains for Mr Bush to prove that this was not just a headline-grabbing initiative that will be quietly forgotten like others in the past. The fact that he is only putting $150 million behind it next year does not bode well, but it does not mean it will not happen. The striking thing is that Mr Bush has singled out cellulosic ethanols that are derived from waste wood chips and stalks rather than corn-based ethanols which are more energy-intensive in their production. Unlike some other parts of the world where ethanol production is at the expense of cutting down forests, the US has plenty of land to utilise.

Mr Bush has been thinking big. If he wants to think laterally as well he should abandon controversial farm subsidies (supposedly covered by the derailed international trade talks) exempting only farms switching to cellulosic ethanol or other approved fuels. This could trigger a big rise in output without extra government outlays.

—The Guardian, London